Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Estate, challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment to Zenith on the Estate's breach of the insurance contract claim. After review and oral argument, the court certified questions to the Florida Supreme Court: (1) Does the estate have standing to bring its breach of contract claim against Zenith under the employer liability policy? (2) If so, does the provision in the employer liability policy which excludes from coverage "any obligation imposed by workers' compensation . . . law" operate to exclude coverage of the estate's claim against Zenith for the tort judgment? (3) If the estate's claim was not barred by the workers' compensation exclusion, does the release in the workers' compensation settlement agreement otherwise prohibit the estate's collection of the tort judgment? View "Morales v. Zenith Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Steine was a subcontractor for installation of thermal units at a Wal-Mart store in Gas City, Indiana. Steine rented a boom lift from NES. Steine foreman Crager signed a one-page, two-sided NES “Rental Agreement” with a signature line is at the bottom of its front side. Above the signature line, the Agreement states: “Signer acknowledges that he has read and fully understands this rental agreement including the terms and conditions on the reverse side” and “Please note that there are important terms on the reverse side of this contract, including an indemnification provision.” Menendez, a Steine employee, died from injuries he suffered while operating the 40-foot boom lift. His family filed sued NES and others, alleging negligence. NES sought indemnification from Steine. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Steine. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The indemnification clause in the rental agreement does not expressly state, in clear and unequivocal terms as Indiana law requires, that Steine agreed to indemnify NES for NES’s own negligence. View "NES Rentals Holdings, Inc.l v. Steine Cold Storage, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2009, the Union submitted three grievances on behalf of Company employee and Union member Lubik, alleging that the company violated a past practice by failing to schedule Lubik, a maintenance clerk, for Saturday overtime when the maintenance department was scheduled to work. After the Arbitrator sustained the three grievances and ordered the company to pay Lubik back wages for the missed overtime. The district court vacated the award because it concluded that the award did not draw its essence from the Collective Bargaining Agreement, determining that the plain language of the CBA unambiguously‖ gave the company the exclusive right to schedule its workforce. The Third Circuit reversed and ordered enforcement of the arbitration award. View "Akers Nat'l Roll Co. v. United Steel, Paper & Forest,Rubber, Mfg., Energy, Allied Indus. & Serv. Workers Int'l Union" on Justia Law

Sheridan Fire Fighters Local No. 276 filed suit against the City of Sheridan alleging that the City breached the parties' collective bargaining agreement when it failed to provide pay raises to five firefighters who had qualified for a "step increase" in salary. The City responded that the raises were not required and that, under the terms of the agreement, the City retained discretion in the award of pay raises. The district court granted summary judgment for the City. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for entry of summary judgment in favor of Local 276, holding (1) the agreement was ambiguous about whether step increases in salary were mandatory or left to the City's discretion; and (2) because Local 276 presented evidence in support of its summary judgment motion consistent with the union's interpretation that the agreement required the City to give step increases to all eligible firefighters, and the City offered no evidence to the contrary, there were no genuine issues of material fact, and Local 276 showed it was entitled to judgment in its favor. View "Sheridan Fire Fighters Local No. 276 v. City of Sheridan" on Justia Law

The Companies, Cookson and Vesuvius, appealed the district court's judgment denying their motion for summary judgment and granting the cross-motion of the Union. After the Companies closed a facility that Vesuvius had operated, Vesuvius and the Union entered into a Facility Closure Agreement (FCA). Both parties subsequently disputed whether the agreement required Vesuvius to pay a retiree medical allowance (RMA) to certain eligible employees. The district court held that the FCA imposed such a requirement. The court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly interpreted the parties' agreement and that the Union, as party to that agreement, had standing to enforce it even where the benefits of enforcement accrued to third-party retirees. View "United Steel v. Cookson America, Inc." on Justia Law

In this employment case, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether a prospective employee could bring a promissory estoppel claim or a fraudulent misrepresentation claim based on an employer's representations regarding a job that was terminable at will. Plaintiff worked as a salesperson for defendant for nearly eight years before he had a heart attack that required him to seek a less stressful job. In reliance on his manager's promise that plaintiff would be given a new "corporate" job with defendant that would meet his health needs, plaintiff turned down a job with a different employer. Ultimately, defendant did not hire plaintiff for the corporate job, and plaintiff subsequently had to take jobs that paid less than the corporate job or less than the position that he had turned down. Plaintiff sued claiming promissory estoppel, fraudulent misrepresentation, and unlawful employment practices, including discrimination. The trial court granted partial summary judgment for defendant on the promissory estoppel and fraudulent misrepresentation claims, and plaintiff dismissed the unlawful employment practices claim without prejudice. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that because the corporate job was terminable at will, plaintiff could not reasonably rely on the promise of employment or recover future lost wages. "[T]he at-will nature of employment does not create a conclusive presumption barring plaintiff from recovering future lost pay where the employee has been unlawfully terminated… or as in this case, where plaintiff was never hired as promised or allowed to start work." The Supreme Court concluded the appellate court erred in determining that as a latter of law, plaintiff could not reasonably rely on defendant's representations and could not recover future lost wages. Both the appellate and trial courts' decisions were reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Cocchiara v. Lithia Motors, Inc." on Justia Law

K&D Enterprises, through its manager, Mid-America, contracted to purchase an apartment complex. Prior to the closing, K&D Enterprises created a new company, Euclid-Richmond Gardens, and assigned its rights under the purchase agreement to that new company. Euclid-Richmond Gardens hired K&D Group, Inc., a property-management company, to manage the apartment. K&D Group hired former employees of Mid-America and assumed the operations of the complex. The Bureau of Workers' Compensation later conducted an audit and determined K&D Group was the successor in interest to the business operations of Mid-America, a determination that authorized the Bureau to base K&D Group's experience rating, in part, on Mid-America's past experience, which included a large workers' compensation claim. After K&D Group's administrative appeal was denied, K&D Group unsuccessfully filed a mandamus action in the court of appeals. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and issued the writ of mandamus, holding that K&D Group was not a successor in interest for purposes of workers' compensation law, and thus, the Bureau abused its discretion when it transferred part of Mid-America's experience rating to K&D Group. View "State ex rel. K&D Group, Inc. v. Buehrer" on Justia Law

Margaret Hunt, a teacher, sued her former employer, the Richmond County Board of Education for breach of her employment contract. The parties stipulated to the amount of damages, and after a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment in the stipulated amount plus prejudgment interest. The Board cut two checks, one reflecting the interest and fees, and another intended to reflect the damages award. The award was treated as wage income, with various sums withheld to comply with state and federal tax laws. Hunt objected to that treatment of the damages award, contending that the second check prepared by the Board should have been for the full amount of the damages, and that the payment should be reported for tax purposes using an IRS Form 1099. The parties could not agree on the tax treatment of the damages award. As a result, the Board filed suit seeking an injunction against Hunt in the event she resorted to certain collection methods (such as garnishment of the Board's assets). The superior court grated a temporary restraining order. Hunt appealed to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court reversed: "the mere apprehension of injury does not support the grant of an injunction." View "Hunt v. Richmond County Bd. of Education" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned the scope of an arbitration clause under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Respondent Christopher Landers served as Appellant Atlantic Bank & Trust's executive vice president pursuant to an employment contract. The contract contained a broad arbitration provision. Respondent alleged five causes of action, namely that he was constructively terminated from his employment as a result of Appellant Neal Arnold's tortious conduct towards him. Appellants moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the employment contract. The trial court found that only Respondent's breach of contract claim was subject to the arbitration provision, while his other four causes of action comprised of several tort and corporate claims were not within the scope of the arbitration clause. Upon review, the Supreme Court disagreed: "Landers' pleadings provide a clear nexus between his claims and the employment contract sufficient to establish a significant relationship to the employment agreement. We find the claims are within the scope of the agreement's broad arbitration provision." The Court reversed the trial court's order and held that all of Respondent's causes of action must be arbitrated. View "Landers v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp." on Justia Law

From 2002 through 2004, George Harper and his law firm at that time, Jackson Lewis, represented EnerSys Delaware, Inc. in a variety of employment and labor law matters. Harper served as EnerSys' attorney of record in at least five employment-related lawsuits during this time. The relationship between Jackson Lewis and EnerSys deteriorated in 2004 when EnerSys brought a malpractice claim against the firm based on some labor-related legal advice that it claimed resulted in fraudulent testimony. In 2011, EnerSys filed this suit against a former EnerSys employee, Tammy Hopkins, alleging six causes of action including breach of contract based on violations of the confidentiality agreement and various computer use policies and agreements, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and breach of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act. When EnerSys learned that Hopkins had retained Harper to represent her, it moved to have him disqualified pursuant to Rule 1.9(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that Harper's previous assistance in developing EnerSys' litigation strategy was insufficient grounds upon which to disqualify him due to the dissimilarities of his previous representations and the current suit. EnerSys then filed this appeal. This case presented the question of whether the denial of a motion to disqualify an attorney was immediately appealable. The Supreme Court held it was not and dismissed the case as interlocutory. View "EnerSys Delaware v. Hopkins" on Justia Law