Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Employee sustained injuries in the course of his employment with Four Star Transportation. Despite being hired by Four Star, Employee was initially considered an employee of Better Integrated Services. Better Integrated leased Employee to Beacon Enterprises, which then leased Employee to Four Star. Beacon had an insurance policy with Kentucky Employers' Mutual Insurance (KEMI). An ALJ determined (1) Employee's injury entitled him to benefits and a permanent partial disability award, and (2) KEMI's policy covered Employee's injury. The Workers' Compensation Board reversed, finding Employee was not covered under the KEMI policy due to the fact he was unaware that Four Star was leasing him from different entities, including Beacon. The court of appeals affirmed. The Uninsured Employers' Fund appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Employee could not be considered Beacon's employee because he did not enter into a contract for hire with Beacon; (2) the Board did not act arbitrarily in finding that the ALJ's opinion was not supported by substantial evidence; and (3) the Board and lower court's decision was not based on Better Integrated and Beacon's failure to comply with Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.615. View "Ky. Uninsured Employers' Fund v. Hoskins" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of his breach of contract and retaliation claim against Boston Scientific. Plaintiff filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy and then Boston Scientific terminated his employment shortly after his filing. The court concluded that, because the guaranteed payments at issue, if due at all, were property of the bankruptcy estate, plaintiff lacked standing to assert his breach of contract claim. Plaintiff's argument that had Boston Scientific not terminated him, the payments he received under the Employment Agreement would have been future earnings also failed. Because plaintiff never requested leave to amend his complaint to include a retaliation claim, the district court could not be faulted for failing to allow him to do so. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Longaker v. Boston Scientific Corp., et al" on Justia Law

Appellants, state police officers, brought this suit individually and on behalf of a class consisting of members of the Arkansas State Police Retirement System (ASPRS), contending that various state defendants had violated the law by failing to properly fund the ASPRS between 1992 and 2003 and that the improper funding violated the Arkansas Constitution. The circuit court dismissed some of Appellants' claims and remanded. On remand, the circuit court granted summary judgment for Defendants. On appeal, Appellants asserted that the circuit court erred in finding that a uniform and travel-expense allowance provided for in Ark. Code Ann. 12-8-209 was not reportable to the ASPRS as a portion of payroll pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. 24-6-209(a). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 24-6-209(a) does not include a uniform and travel-expense allowance such that it is reportable to ASPRS for purposes of calculating retirement benefits. View "McLemore v. Weiss" on Justia Law

The United States Postal Services (USPS) terminated Plaintiff's employment contract after discovering, through a sting operation, that Plaintiff had stolen mail containing money. The Postal Service Board of Contract Appeals (PSBCA) convened an evidentiary hearing and determined that Plaintiff's breach of his employment contract justified the decision to terminate his contract. Plaintiff did not appeal this decision. Meanwhile, Plaintiff initiated a Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) suit against the United States for the actions of USPS employees on the date of the sting, alleging six torts. The district court dismissed three of the claims and granted summary judgment to the government on the remaining claims. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court as to all claims, holding (1) the district court correctly concluded that the PSCBA's findings precluded relitigation of the factual issues in Plaintiff's FTCA suit; and (2) summary judgment was properly granted as to Plaintiff's FTCA claims for negligent supervision, malicious prosecution, and invasion of privacy by postal inspectors. View "Rios-Pineiro v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Estate, challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment to Zenith on the Estate's breach of the insurance contract claim. After review and oral argument, the court certified questions to the Florida Supreme Court: (1) Does the estate have standing to bring its breach of contract claim against Zenith under the employer liability policy? (2) If so, does the provision in the employer liability policy which excludes from coverage "any obligation imposed by workers' compensation . . . law" operate to exclude coverage of the estate's claim against Zenith for the tort judgment? (3) If the estate's claim was not barred by the workers' compensation exclusion, does the release in the workers' compensation settlement agreement otherwise prohibit the estate's collection of the tort judgment? View "Morales v. Zenith Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Steine was a subcontractor for installation of thermal units at a Wal-Mart store in Gas City, Indiana. Steine rented a boom lift from NES. Steine foreman Crager signed a one-page, two-sided NES “Rental Agreement” with a signature line is at the bottom of its front side. Above the signature line, the Agreement states: “Signer acknowledges that he has read and fully understands this rental agreement including the terms and conditions on the reverse side” and “Please note that there are important terms on the reverse side of this contract, including an indemnification provision.” Menendez, a Steine employee, died from injuries he suffered while operating the 40-foot boom lift. His family filed sued NES and others, alleging negligence. NES sought indemnification from Steine. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Steine. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The indemnification clause in the rental agreement does not expressly state, in clear and unequivocal terms as Indiana law requires, that Steine agreed to indemnify NES for NES’s own negligence. View "NES Rentals Holdings, Inc.l v. Steine Cold Storage, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2009, the Union submitted three grievances on behalf of Company employee and Union member Lubik, alleging that the company violated a past practice by failing to schedule Lubik, a maintenance clerk, for Saturday overtime when the maintenance department was scheduled to work. After the Arbitrator sustained the three grievances and ordered the company to pay Lubik back wages for the missed overtime. The district court vacated the award because it concluded that the award did not draw its essence from the Collective Bargaining Agreement, determining that the plain language of the CBA unambiguously‖ gave the company the exclusive right to schedule its workforce. The Third Circuit reversed and ordered enforcement of the arbitration award. View "Akers Nat'l Roll Co. v. United Steel, Paper & Forest,Rubber, Mfg., Energy, Allied Indus. & Serv. Workers Int'l Union" on Justia Law

Sheridan Fire Fighters Local No. 276 filed suit against the City of Sheridan alleging that the City breached the parties' collective bargaining agreement when it failed to provide pay raises to five firefighters who had qualified for a "step increase" in salary. The City responded that the raises were not required and that, under the terms of the agreement, the City retained discretion in the award of pay raises. The district court granted summary judgment for the City. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for entry of summary judgment in favor of Local 276, holding (1) the agreement was ambiguous about whether step increases in salary were mandatory or left to the City's discretion; and (2) because Local 276 presented evidence in support of its summary judgment motion consistent with the union's interpretation that the agreement required the City to give step increases to all eligible firefighters, and the City offered no evidence to the contrary, there were no genuine issues of material fact, and Local 276 showed it was entitled to judgment in its favor. View "Sheridan Fire Fighters Local No. 276 v. City of Sheridan" on Justia Law

The Companies, Cookson and Vesuvius, appealed the district court's judgment denying their motion for summary judgment and granting the cross-motion of the Union. After the Companies closed a facility that Vesuvius had operated, Vesuvius and the Union entered into a Facility Closure Agreement (FCA). Both parties subsequently disputed whether the agreement required Vesuvius to pay a retiree medical allowance (RMA) to certain eligible employees. The district court held that the FCA imposed such a requirement. The court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly interpreted the parties' agreement and that the Union, as party to that agreement, had standing to enforce it even where the benefits of enforcement accrued to third-party retirees. View "United Steel v. Cookson America, Inc." on Justia Law

In this employment case, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether a prospective employee could bring a promissory estoppel claim or a fraudulent misrepresentation claim based on an employer's representations regarding a job that was terminable at will. Plaintiff worked as a salesperson for defendant for nearly eight years before he had a heart attack that required him to seek a less stressful job. In reliance on his manager's promise that plaintiff would be given a new "corporate" job with defendant that would meet his health needs, plaintiff turned down a job with a different employer. Ultimately, defendant did not hire plaintiff for the corporate job, and plaintiff subsequently had to take jobs that paid less than the corporate job or less than the position that he had turned down. Plaintiff sued claiming promissory estoppel, fraudulent misrepresentation, and unlawful employment practices, including discrimination. The trial court granted partial summary judgment for defendant on the promissory estoppel and fraudulent misrepresentation claims, and plaintiff dismissed the unlawful employment practices claim without prejudice. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that because the corporate job was terminable at will, plaintiff could not reasonably rely on the promise of employment or recover future lost wages. "[T]he at-will nature of employment does not create a conclusive presumption barring plaintiff from recovering future lost pay where the employee has been unlawfully terminated… or as in this case, where plaintiff was never hired as promised or allowed to start work." The Supreme Court concluded the appellate court erred in determining that as a latter of law, plaintiff could not reasonably rely on defendant's representations and could not recover future lost wages. Both the appellate and trial courts' decisions were reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Cocchiara v. Lithia Motors, Inc." on Justia Law