Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs appealed the district court's dismissal of their complaints alleging that defendants failed to compensate them for work performed during meal breaks, before and after schedule shifts, and during required training sessions. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal with prejudice of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq., gap-time, conversion, estoppel, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961, claims. The court remanded, however, the FLSA and New York Labor Law claims, the NYLL gap-time claims, the breach of express and implied oral contract claims, the breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims, the quantum meruit claims, and the unjust enrichment claims for amended pleading. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Nakahata, et al. v. New York-Presbyterian HealthCare System, Inc. et al." on Justia Law

This case arose when plaintiff filed suit against Conoco for breach of the Offer Letter and breach of its obligations under a severance plan (the Plan). The court concluded that plaintiff waived any challenge to the Trustee's application of the common law presumption of integration or Texas's parol evidence rule; plaintiff's arguments regarding his change in title were unpersuasive; plaintiff's "at will" employment argument relied on outdated and out-of-context Texas authority and was unpersuasive; the waiver was not invalid and unenforceable on account of fraud in the inducement; plaintiff ratified an alleged fraud, thereby preserving the validity and enforceability of the waiver regardless by submitting a claim to Conoco Human Resources but then continuing to work at Conoco; the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(1)(B), civil enforcement provision "completely preempts" plaintiff's state law claims against Conoco and the district court did not err by denying plaintiff's first motion for remand; the district court correctly denied plaintiff's renewed motion for remand; plaintiff was not entitled to recover attorneys' fees; and plaintiff waived his claim for breach of the Offer Letter, pertaining to a substantial reduction in his post-merger job position and responsibilities, for failure to plead with specificity. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment against plaintiff. View "Clayton v. ConocoPhillips Co., et al" on Justia Law

The Maine Labor Relations Board determined that firefighters for the City of Augusta who retired after the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement between the City and the firefighters union were entitled to retiree health insurance benefits under the expired agreement's terms. The Board based its decision upon its determination that the retirement benefits were part of the static status quo that must be maintained during continuing negotiations. The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Board did not err in concluding that the City must continue to pay the retirees retiree health insurance benefits during negotiations in order to maintain the static status quo. View "City of Augusta v. Me. Labor Relations Bd." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, injured on an oil and gas rig, filed suit against various third parties - including TESCO and TESCO employee Jeffrey Anderson - after recovering workers' compensation benefits from his employer, DeSoto. SWE was the owner/operator of the oil and gas well. The court concluded that the SWE contract did not establish that the common law duty of care Anderson owed plaintiff extended to preventing unforeseen injuries caused by DeSoto's failure to follow SWE's safety rules; Anderson and TESCO had no duty to foresee that injury to a DeSoto employee would occur because other DeSoto employees not under defendants' control had failed to exercise their duty of care; ordinary care did not require Anderson to foresee that his encouraging word would cause a DeSoto driller to do something he had not already decided, indeed, been ordered to do; and the amount of encouragement Anderson gave the DeSoto driller was insubstantial. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in striking an expert report submitted by plaintiff and in denying the motion to amend. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Williams v. Chartis Casualty Co. et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Mary Soileau was injured while working for the Town of Mamou when a front-end loader detached from a tractor and struck her in the leg. She named the tractor manufacturer, the Town, Smith's Hardware (where the Town rented the tractor for employees' use), the hardware store's owners and their insurance company. Trial began with only the owners and their insurer as the remaining defendants in the suit. On the third day, Plaintiff moved to dismiss the owners and their company in the presence of the jury, stating that she did not seek any damages personally against them. Hearing no objections, the trial court granted the request, but made no written (and therefore signed) judgment of dismissal. On day four, the insurer moved for a directed verdict, based on contract language that it was obligated to pay only if its insureds were legally obligated to pay. The insurer's motion was denied, and ultimately over $9 million in damages were awarded to Plaintiff. Concluding that the trial court erred in denying the insurer's motion, the appellate court reversed, dismissing the insurance company. The issue before the Supreme Court centered on the effect Plaintiff's in-court dismissal of the insured parties was during her personal injury action. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the appellate court erred in its analysis, reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Solieau v. Smith True Value & Rental" on Justia Law

While employed with Employer, Employee agreed to arbitrate any disputes arising from his employment. Employee's employment was later terminated. Employee filed a charge of discrimination with the Utah Anti-Discrimination and Labor Division of the Utah Labor Commission (UALD), alleging that Employer discriminated against him, retaliated against him, and harassed him. The UALD dismissed Employee's discrimination claims. Employee appealed to the Utah Labor Commission. The district court subsequently granted Employer's motion to compel arbitration and ordered Employee to submit to arbitration. The Supreme Court vacated the order compelling arbitration, holding that the district court erred in compelling arbitration because the plain language of the arbitration clause in Employee's employment contract allowed him to pursue administrative remedies prior to submitting to arbitration. View "Zions Mgmt. Servs. v. Record" on Justia Law

Defendants-Appellants Sandra Walker and Joseph Eilers were found liable for damages after breaching employment agreements, and for conspiring to interfere with Plaintiff-Appellee SolarBee, Inc.'s existing business relationships. Finding the trial court's findings of fact were sufficient and that the damages awarded were supported by the evidence, the Supreme Court affirmed damages awards against both Defendants. View "SolarBee, Inc. v. Walker" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant George Lopez conducted mediations in a program created and managed by the Administrative Office of Courts of the State of Utah. In 2006, he was removed from the panel of mediators that mediated certain domestic matters. Plaintiff brought suit in federal district court alleging that his removal from that list of mediators violated his right to due process and his right to equal protection of the laws in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983. He also alleged breach of contract, breach of implied contract, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Upon review of the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants, the Tenth Circuit found that because Plaintiff's primary argument was based on his alleged contractual rights as a public employee, and because the Court found that there was no implied contract (because evidence in the record revealed Plaintiff was not a public employee), Plaintiff's arguments necessarily failed. View "Lopez v. Admin Office of the Court" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a janitorial cleaning services franchisee, along with franchisees from other states, filed a putative class action in the U.S. district court against Defendant, the Massachusetts corporation that franchised Plaintiff's business, alleging that Defendant misclassified him as an independent contractor and committed various wage law violations. The district court certified several questions of law to the Massachusetts Supreme Court, which answered by holding (1) a plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 150 by filing a complaint with the attorney general does not deprive a court of jurisdiction to consider Plaintiff's claims under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, 148, 148B, 150, and 151(1) and (1a); (2) a franchisor is vicariously liable for the conduct of its franchisee only where the franchisor controls or has a right to control the specific policy or practice resulting in harm to the franchisee; and (3) a defendant may be liable for employee misclassification where there was no contract for service between the plaintiff and the defendant. View "Depianti v. Jan-Pro Franchising Int'l, Inc." on Justia Law

This suit stemmed from plaintiff's suit for breach of contract against his former employer, ICD, and tortious interference with contract against ICD's president. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's order, which amended a judgment to provide that plaintiff was entitled to post-judgment interest at the rate set forth in 28 U.S.C. 1961, contending that he was entitled to a post-judgment interest at the rate set forth in C.P.L.R. 5004. The court concluded that plaintiff was entitled to .25% post-judgment interest where section 1961's plain terms governed the rate of post-judgment interest applicable in this case. Accordingly, the district court correctly and constitutionally applied section 1961, notwithstanding that the judgment had been entered in a diversity action and had been docketed by plaintiff in a New York state court. View "Cappiello v. ICD Publ'ns, Inc." on Justia Law