Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff was hired as the Superintendent of Dothan City Schools in Dothan, Alabama. The employment contract stated Plaintiff could only be terminated for cause. Furthermore, the contract stated that the termination would not be effective until the Board provided Plaintiff with a statement of the cause for termination and allowed her an opportunity for a hearing. Lastly, the employment contract provided that Plainitff could resign with or without cause as long as she gave at least 120 days notice in writing of her resignation to the Board. Six days after Plaintiff’s intent to resign was sent, Plaintiff alleges that the Board voted to terminate Plaintiff’s contract. She brought claims for deprivation of due process and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, conspiracy to violate civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1985, and breach of contract. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice.   The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of Plaintiff’s due process claims and affirmed the district court’s denial of Plaintiff’s conspiracy and breach of contract claims. The court explained that instead of construing all ambiguities in Plaintiff’s favor, the district court used the minutes to recharacterize the allegations within Plaintiff’s complaint. When taking the factual allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint as true, there is a plausible claim for relief. In paragraph 18 of the complaint, Plaintiff’s classifies her communication as an “intent” to resign, not an actual resignation. The court wrote that the district court erred by ignoring that Plaintiff had a plausible claim to relief and not drawing reasonable inferences in her favor. View "Phyllis Edwards v. Dothan City Schools, et al" on Justia Law

A Mississippi circuit court granted law firm Campbell DeLong, LLP, a declaratory judgment against a former partner of the firm, Britt Virden, who had alleged breach of contract, among other claims. Virden appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. On certiorari review, the Supreme Court found that Virden’s prewithdrawal claims were not precluded by a signed agreement, which only came into operation in the event of death, termination, withdrawal, or retirement of a partner. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the appellate and circuit court judgments and remanded the case for the circuit court to allow Virden an opportunity to maintain an action against his former firm for breach of an implied contract regarding partner compensation. View "Virden v. Campbell Delong, LLP, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs worked as detention officers for Glynn County under Sheriff Jump’s supervision. Although it is unclear from the record whether the Officers are formally deputy sheriffs, it is undisputed that they are, at minimum, direct employees of Sheriff Jump, in his official capacity, akin to deputies. The Officers brought a Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) collective action alleging that the County “illegally calculated their and other detention officers’ overtime wages.” The County moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. In response, the Officers amended their complaint to include Sheriff Jump in his individual capacity. The County and Sheriff Jump then moved to dismiss the amended complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim, arguing that neither defendant was the Officers’ employer under the FLSA.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed both the district court’s denial of the Officers’ motion for leave to amend and its ultimate dismissal of the amended complaint. The court held that the district court correctly dismissed the Officers’ complaint against Sheriff Jump in his individual capacity because he is not an “employer” under the FLSA. Further, the court agreed with the district court that Sheriff Jump would be entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity when making compensation decisions for his employees. Further, the court held that Georgia “retained its Eleventh Amendment immunity” from suits in federal court for breach-of-contract claims because no statute or constitutional provision “expressly consents to suits in federal court. View "Langston Austin, et al. v. Glynn County, Georgia, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued defendants Jeff Jenkins, Jeff Jenkins Productions, LLC, and Bongo, LLC, for breach of contract and eight other causes of action. Plaintiff’s complaint alleged she conceived the idea for and worked to develop and coproduce a popular television program that came to be known as Bling Empire on Netflix. In the spring of 2018, Plaintiff presented the idea for the program to Defendant Jenkins during a series of discussions, and she gave Jenkins written development material concerning the program. Plaintiff alleged causes of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, intentional and negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent inducement, and other claims. Defendants responded with an anti-SLAPP motion.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s order denying Defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion to strike Plaintiff’s complaint. The court concluded that adhering to the two-part test announced in FilmOn.com Inc. v. DoubleVerify Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 133 (FilmOn), that while the creation of a television show is an exercise of constitutionally protected expression, in this case, there is no “functional relationship” between the activity challenged in the complaint and the issue of public interest, as required by FilmOn.  Further, the court wrote that the conduct challenged, while it “implicates” a public issue, does not “contribute to public discussion of that issue” Consequently, Defendants’ activity excluding Plaintiff and failing to compensate her was not undertaken “in furtherance of free speech ‘in connection with’ an issue of public interest.” View "Li v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

The petitioners here—two motorcycle dealerships who sought to enforce restrictive covenants against a former employee under Florida law— asked the Georgia Supreme Court to reconsider the application of a public-policy exception, citing recent changes in Georgia law that required a more flexible and permissive approach to enforcing restrictive covenants. When contracting parties choose the law of a jurisdiction other than Georgia to govern their contractual relations, Georgia courts generally honored that choice unless applying the foreign law would violate Georgia's public policy. Having taken a fresh look, the Supreme Court concluded that Georgia law remained "the touchstone for determining whether a given restrictive covenant is enforceable in our courts, even where the contract says another state’s law applies." After a careful review of Georgia decisional law and statutory history in this space, the Court found the Georgia legislature has codified this view, including with the recent enactment of the Georgia Restrictive Covenants Act. In this case, the trial court accepted the parties’ choice of Florida law to govern the employment contracts at issue without first determining whether the restrictive covenants in the contracts complied with the GRCA. The Court of Appeals reversed, and in doing so, correctly identified application of the GRCA as the first step in the analysis of whether the public-policy exception overrides the parties’ choice of foreign law. But because the Supreme Court set out a clear framework for that analysis in this opinion, it left it for the trial court to apply that framework in the first instance. The Court therefore vacated the decisions below for further review by the trial court. View "Motorsports of Conyers, LLC, et al. v. Burbach" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued The Savannah College of Art and Design, Inc. (“SCAD”) for race discrimination and retaliation after he was fired from his job as Head Fishing Coach. As part of his employment onboarding, however, Plaintiff signed a document agreeing to arbitrate—not litigate—all legal disputes that arose between him and SCAD. Accordingly, SCAD moved to dismiss and compel arbitration. The district court, approving and adopting the magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation (“R & R”), granted SCAD’s motion. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the district court erred by ignoring that his agreement with SCAD was unconscionable and that SCAD waived its right to arbitrate. He also argued that the district court abused its discretion in rejecting his early discovery request.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s order granting SCAD’s motion to dismiss and compel arbitration. The court concluded that the Plaintiff’s arbitration agreement is neither substantively nor procedurally unconscionable. Further, the court found that SCAD did not waive its right to enforce arbitration and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Plaintiff’s request for early discovery. In short, the court concluded that Plaintiff is bound by his agreement to arbitrate his legal claims against SCAD. View "Isaac Payne v. Savannah College of Art and Design, Inc." on Justia Law

The First Circuit certified to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) the unresolved question of what is meant, in the context of a franchise agreement, by "performing any service," as that phrase is used in the Massachusetts Independent Contractor Law (ICL), Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, 148B(a).Plaintiffs, owners and operators of 7-Eleven franchises in Massachusetts, filed a putative class action against 7-Eleven, Inc. for alleged violations of the Massachusetts ICL, the Massachusetts Wage Act, and the Massachusetts Minimum Wage Law, challenging 7-Eleven's decision to classify them as independent contractors rather than employees. The district court ruled in favor of 7-Eleven and then, after remand, ruled for 7-Eleven again. At issue was whether Plaintiffs performed "any service" for 7-Eleven under the Massachusetts ICL. The First Circuit certified to the Massachusetts SJC the following question: Do Plaintiffs perform "any service" for 7-Eleven within the meaning of the Massachusetts ICL where they perform various contractural obligations under their franchise agreement and 7-Eleven receives a percentage of the franchise's gross profits. View "Patel v. 7-Eleven, Inc." on Justia Law

The City and County of San Francisco (the City) owns and operates San Francisco International Airport (SFO or the Airport). Airlines for America (A4A) represents airlines that contract with the City to use SFO. In 2020, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the City enacted the Healthy Airport Ordinance (HAO), requiring the airlines that use SFO to provide employees with certain health insurance benefits. A4A filed this action in the Northern District of California, alleging that the City, in enacting the HAO, acted as a government regulator and not a market participant, and therefore the HAO is preempted by multiple federal statutes. The district court agreed to the parties’ suggestion to bifurcate the case to first address the City’s market participation defense. The district court held that the City was a market participant and granted its motion for summary judgment. A4A appealed.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment. The court concluded that two civil penalty provisions of the HAO carry the force of law and thus render the City a regulator rather than a market participant. The court wrote that because these civil penalty provisions result in the City acting as a regulator, it need not determine whether the City otherwise would be a regulator under the Cardinal Towing two-part test set forth in LAX, 873 F.3d at 1080 View "AIRLINES FOR AMERICA V. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court confirming the arbitration panel's finding that a non-compete clause Dr. Michel Skaf signed in his employment contract with Wyoming Cardiopulmonary Services (WCS) was unenforceable but that a previously-granted liquidation award was still valid, holding that there was no error.After WCS terminated Skaf for cause Skaf opened his own cardiology office. WCS sued Skaf for breaching the non-compete clause in the parties' employment contract. The arbitration found Skaf violated the noncompete clause and awarded WCS liquidated damages. The Supreme Court remanded the case. On remand, the arbitration panel again found in favor of WCS, that the non-compete clause was unenforceable, but that the liquidated damages award was still valid. The district court confirmed the award. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the panel did not commit manifest error by denying Skaf interest on his deferred compensation award; and (2) because Skaf did not previously appeal the panel's award, he was barred from doing so now. View "Skaf v. Wyo. Cardiopulmonary Services, P.C." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's award of $21,643.65 in attorney fees and costs to DAPCPA RPO, a full-service public accounting firm, after the court concluded that Defendant breached a purchase and sale agreement (PSA) and a covenant not to solicit, holding that there was no error.Defendant, a former employee of DAPCPA RPO, formed a new firm and provided services to former DAPCPA RPO clients. DAPCPA RPO filed suit, alleging several claims. The district court granted summary judgment for DAPCPA RPO in part, concluding that the parties' PSA and covenant not to solicit were valid and enforceable contracts and that Defendant breached them. Ultimately, the Court awarded DAPCPA RPO a total of $21,643.65 in attorney fees and costs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that DAPCPA RPO was entitled to its fees and costs. View "Hensel v. DAPCPA RPO LLC" on Justia Law