Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

This case involved an uninsured motorist benefits claim filed in connection with injuries allegedly sustained by the appellant in a 2001 motor vehicle accident. Appellant was driving a truck insured by Harleysville Insurance Company when he rear-ended another vehicle. The police report contained no mention of a phantom vehicle being involved in the accident. Appellant later reported the accident to his employer, explaining he momentarily took his eyes off the road, and when he looked again, a vehicle was stopped in front of him; he was unable to stop and rear-ended the vehicle. Twenty days later, appellant completed a written Workers’ Compensation Employee’s Statement in which he reported the accident occurred due to the other vehicle stopping suddenly in front of him. But again, no phantom vehicle was reported. Over eight months later, appellant filed a claim for uninsured motorist benefits, alleging the accident was caused by a phantom vehicle pulling out in front of the other vehicle, causing appellant to stop suddenly. Harleysville denied appellant’s claim and sought a declaratory judgment that he was not entitled to uninsured motorist benefits. The Superior Court reversed the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County, which held appellee Harleysville Insurance Company did not suffer prejudice as a result of appellant’s failure to report the phantom vehicle within a 30-day time requirement established by the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (MVFRL). Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court decision. View "Vanderhoff v. Harleysville Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Michelle Straw appealed a superior court judgment that dismissed her case for breach of an implied employment contract against defendant Visiting Nurse Association and Hospice of Vermont and New Hampshire (VNA). She argued the jury instructions in her case were erroneous and prejudicial because they failed to instruct on the standard for "just cause" termination. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Straw v. Visiting Nurse Association and Hospice of VT/NH" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the Chairman of the Trustees of the Rhode Island Bricklayers Benefits Funds (the Funds), sued Union Stone Inc., alleging that Union Stone had failed to pay the full amount of fringe benefit contributions due for work performed in Massachusetts and Connecticut by members of the International Union of Bricklayers and Allied Craftworkers pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement. After a trial, the district court entered judgment in favor of the Funds, awarding the unpaid contributions, interest, and attorneys' fees. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) refusing to enforce a purported settlement agreement between the parties; (2) admitting certain evidence on the ground that it was tainted by violations of the discovery rules; (3) declined to impose sanctions; and (4) awarding interest and attorneys' fees. View "Enos v. Union Stone, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant sued his former employer (Employer) in district court, alleging claims for fraud and wrongful termination. Employer, however, had been sold to a foreign corporation (Corporation), which was not a resident of Wyoming. Corporation filed a motion to dismiss the case for improper venue and failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The district court granted the motion on both grounds. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court's dismissal for improper venue; but (2) vacated the district court's dismissal for failure to state a claim, holding that the court erred as a matter of law when it reached the merits of the case after determining that it had to be dismissed on venue grounds. Remanded for a dismissal without prejudice based upon improper venue. View "Bourke v. Grey Wolf Drilling Co., LP" on Justia Law

Claimant suffered a lower back injury during the course of his employment and filed notice of a workers' compensation claim. Employer later informed Claimant he would be discharged from his employment. Claimant signed a termination agreement in order not to forfeit his severance pay. The agreement stipulated that Claimant released his previously accepted workers' compensation claim. The Workers' Compensation Commissioner refused to approve the termination agreement, finding there was no consideration offered by Employer to Claimant in exchange for Plaintiff's release of the workers' compensation clim. The Workers' Compensation Review Board affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Board properly affirmed the Commissioner's decision not to approve the agreement as a "voluntary agreement" or stipulation in light of its finding that Claimant's release of his workers' compensation claim was not supported by consideration. View "Leonetti v. MacDermid, Inc." on Justia Law

This case concerned the 2011 NFL lockout. Active NFL players filed a class action suit (Brady suit) against the NFL, alleging violations of the federal antitrust laws and other claims. Retired NFL players also filed suit against the NFL and its teams, alleging antitrust violations (Eller I suit). After both actions were consolidated, the Brady suit was settled, the players re-designated the NFLPA as their collective bargaining agent, the NFL and NFLPA signed a new collective bargaining agreement (CBA) incorporating the settlement terms, the Brady plaintiffs dismissed their action, the lockout ended, and the 2011 NFL season commenced. Carl Eller and other retired NFL players (plaintiffs) then filed this class action (Eller II) against the NFLPA and others. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss and plaintiffs appealed, alleging claims for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage under Minnesota law. The court concluded that no reasonable jury could find that plaintiffs had a reasonable expectation of a prospective separate contractual relation with the NFL that would provide more than the increased benefits provided in the 2011 CBA. Even if plaintiffs alleged a reasonable expectation of prospective contractual relations or economic advantage with the NFL, plaintiffs failed to allege facts proving that defendants improperly or wrongfully interfered with these advantageous prospects. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Eller, et al. v. NFL Players Assoc., et al." on Justia Law

Malyevac and ADI entered into an agreement under which Malyevac sold ADI's computer products and services to its customers. The agreement contained noncompete, non-solicitation, non-disclosure, and return of confidential information provisions. A few months after entering into the agreement, Malyevac resigned. ADI filed a complaint, alleging that Malyevac was violating the agreement by performing work and services and selling products in direct competition with ADI, by engaging in other prohibited activities, and by failing to return confidential information. Malyevac claimed that the provisions were overbroad and unenforceable. The trial court sustained a demurrer without granting ADI leave to amend its complaint. The Virginia Supreme Court reversed, holding that the merits of the claim cannot be determined on a motion for dismissal. View "Assurance Data, Inc. v. Malyevac" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Costantini, Jr. and Kahn sought indemnification for their fees and costs in underlying litigation involving Swiss Farm. The court concluded that Costantini was entitled to indemnification under Article 14 of the Operating Agreement because he was a manager of Swiss Farm and was sued by Swiss Farm in that capacity and prevailed. However, the court concluded that, although Kahn was sued for breach of fiduciary duty and prevailed, he was not a member of the Board of Managers, an officer, an employee or an agent of the company and, therefore, was not entitled to indemnification under the Operating Agreement. Accordingly, the court granted in part and denied in part plaintiffs' motion for judgment on the pleadings. View "Costantini, et al. v. Swiss Farm Stores Acquisition LLC" on Justia Law

Respondent was employed by the Canutillo Independent School District as executive director of facilities and transportation. After reporting alleged financial improprieties to the District authorities, Respondent was fired for allegedly making threatening personal phone calls to another man during work hours. Respondent subsequently sued the District for violation of the Texas Whistleblower Act and for breach of contract. The trial court granted Respondent's plea to the jurisdiction. The court of appeals held that the trial court erred in granting the plea as it related to Respondent's whistleblower claim but otherwise affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the court of appeals' judgment, holding that the trial court properly granted the plea to the jurisdiction, holding (1) Respondent's complaints to District authorities were not good-faith complaints of a violation of law to a "law enforcement authority" under the Whistleblower Act, and thus, the plea to the jurisdiction was well taken; and (2) Respondent's breach of contract claim failed because Respondent failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. View "Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Farran" on Justia Law

Wilson worked as an admissions representative, recruiting students to enroll in CEC’s culinary arts college. CEC admissions representatives worked under a contract that gave them a bonus for each student they recruited, above a threshold, who completed a full course or a year of study. In 2010, the U.S. Department of Education issued regulations prohibiting this kind of arrangement; new rules were scheduled to take effect in July 2011. CEC decided announced to its admissions representatives that it would cease paying bonuses at the end of February 2011 and that no bonuses would be regarded as earned by that date unless the relevant student had completed the year of study or course by that time. Wilson sued, asserting that CEC owed him bonuses for “pipeline” students, whom he had recruited and who were on target to complete a full course or year of study between March and June 2011. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that Wilson successfully pleaded that CEC exercised its right to terminate the agreement in bad faith and in violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. View "Wilson v. Career Educ. Corp," on Justia Law