Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Steve Sangwin, a State employee, was a qualified subscriber and beneficiary of the State of Montana Employee Benefits Plan (Plan), which was administered by Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Montana (BCBS). Steve's daughter, McKinley, was also a beneficiary under the Plan. This case arose after BCBS denied a preauthorization request for a medical procedure for McKinley on the grounds that the procedure was "experimental for research." Steve and his wife (collectively, the Sangwins) initiated this action by filing an amended complaint setting forth five counts, including a request for certification of a class action. The Sangwins defined class members as other beneficiaries of the Plan who had their employee benefits denied by the State based on the experimental exclusion for research in the past eight years. The district court granted the Sangwins' motion for class certification. The State appealed. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court's order defining the class; but (2) reversed and remanded with respect to the question certified for class treatment, holding that the district court abused its discretion in specifying for class treatment the question of whether the State breached its contract of insurance with the plaintiffs. View "Sangwin v. State" on Justia Law

Egg Harbor Township authorized construction of a Community Center and, as required by N.J.S. 52:38-3 adopted a project labor agreement (PLA). All contractors working on the project were required to sign the PLA, which contained a “supremacy provision,” providing that the PLA, with the local Collective Bargaining Agreements, superseded any national agreement, local agreement or other collective bargaining agreement (CBA). Sambe, the general contractor, signed the PLA. Sambe subcontracted roofing work to Donnelly, which signed the PLA and agreed that any party it selected to perform work would also be required to sign the PLA. Donnelly selected the Carpenters Union to perform the work, even though it was not a signatory to the PLA, apparently because the two were parties to a CBA. Sheet Metal Workers protested. The NLRB assigned the work to Carpenters and later concluded that Sheet Metal violated the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. 185, by maintaining a section 301 suit against Donnelly and Sambe following that decision. In the parallel litigation district court granted summary judgment on Sheet Metal’s breach of contract claim. The Third Circuit granted the NLRB’s petition for enforcement of its order; vacated the breach of contract judgment against Donnelly and Sambe; and remanded the with directions to enter judgment in favor of Donnelly and to conduct further proceedings on the claim against Sambe. View "Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n v. E.P. Donnelly, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, former employees of a school district (District), were members of a collective bargaining unit. One plaintiff retired while the 1999-2003 collective bargaining agreement (CBA) was in effect, and the other plaintiffs retired under the 2003-2007 CBA. In 2009, the District informed Plaintiffs that their co-pays would be governed under the terms of the 2007-2012 CBA, resulting in an increase from their previous co-pay charges. Plaintiffs filed this action for breach of contract, alleging that by increasing their co-pays, the District violated the terms of the CBAs in effect when Plaintiffs retired. Supreme Court granted summary judgment for Plaintiffs. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding that the contract did not specify that an equivalent level of coverage would continue during retirement. The Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the Appellate Division as modified, holding (1) the plain meaning of the contract unambiguously established that Plaintiffs had a vested right to the "same coverage" during retirement as they had when they retired; and (2) because an issue of fact remained as to whether the parties intended for the right to the "same coverage" to preclude any modifications to prescription co-pays, it was necessary to remit the case for a hearing on the issue. View "Kolbe v. Tibbetts" on Justia Law

In 2007, Professor Ortony of Northwestern University, asked Dean Peterson, for a year’s leave to visit another university. Peterson proposed to authorize paid leave during calendar year 2008 and the 2011–12 academic year, if Ortony would teach during the intervening time and then retire. Peterson’s letter stated: “At your request, I will accept your resignation ... effective with your retirement on August 31, 2012” and specified when Ortony would be on paid leave and when he would carry a full teaching load. Ortony signed the letter in June, 2007. In 2011 Ortony did not want to retire and insisted that he had not agreed to do so. He filed an EEOC charge under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 626, and subsequently filed suit. The district court granted the University judgment on the pleadings. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Northwestern did not terminate Ortony: it bought out his tenure by promising him five years’ pay for three years’ work. That he changed his mind does not make the 2007 contract less binding. The court rejected Ortony’s argument that he “construed the [contract] to set out a tentative plan under which he could leave the University, if he chose to do so, in five years.” View "Ortony v. Northwestern Univ." on Justia Law

Michele Beach sued a clinic and its executive director, alleging that they had breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by conducting an unfair investigation and unlawfully retaliating against Beach for her suggestions about improvements in security systems. Beach had worked for the clinic when the clinic's executive director concluded that prescription drug records had been systematically falsified and that Beach was responsible. The superior court granted summary judgment to the defendants, and Beach appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court. View "Beach v. Handforth-Kome" on Justia Law

The NECA-IBEW Health and Welfare Fund provides health benefits to members of a local union of electrical workers. The Fund negotiated a Local Agreement with Sav-Rx, a provider of prescription-drug benefits, under which Sav-Rx reimburses pharmacies for dispensing medication and then invoices the Fund for some of its costs. The Local Agreement does not call for arbitration. A few months later, Sav-Rx negotiated a different agreement with the national organization of the IBEW, with which the local is affiliated. The National Agreement offers locals reduced charges and more services than the Local Agreement and contains a mandatory arbitration clause. Local unions and funds could opt into the National Agreement, but the Fund's trustees never voted on the matter. Over the next eight years the Fund accepted from Sav-Rx services provided by the National Agreement. The Fund sued Sav-Rx for invoicing the Fund at rates not authorized by either the Local or National Agreement. The district court dismissed, finding that Fund had accepted the benefits of the National Agreement and was bound to it; Sav-Rx established that the Fund knew it was accepting benefits under the National Agreement. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "NECA-IBEW Rockford Local Union 364 Health & Welfare Fund v. A&A Drug Co." on Justia Law

Dr. Adolfo P. Morales sued Jackson HMA, LLC., d/b/a Central Mississippi Medical Center (Jackson HMA) for breach of contract. A jury awarded Morales substantial damages. Jackson HMA filed a "Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, and, in the alternative, For a New Trial" and a "Motion for Amendment of Judgment." The Circuit Court denied the post-trial motions and Jackson HMA filed this appeal. In 2004, a recruiter for Jacksom HMA sent Morales a "letter of intent" outlining Jackson HMA's proposed offer. The letter twice stated that the proposed offer required "preapproval" by "Corporate" (HMA). Although not requested or provided for, Morales signed and returned the letter. On it he wrote "I agree to all and accept the terms of your offer." At trial, Morales acknowledged that this letter was not a contract, as it "no doubt" required preapproval from the corporate office. Subsequently, Jackson HMA sought approval from corporate HMA, but corporate did not approve the terms. Jackson HMA's CEO impressed upon corporate the need for an ophthalmologist and suggested new terms to corporate which reduced the guaranteed amount and period by half. The CEO received approval of these reduced terms from an HMA vice-president for the eastern part of the United States. Thereafter, the recruiter sent Morales a second letter detailing the new "terms of our offer" which reflected the reduced guarantees approved by corporate HMA. The letter lacked the phrase "letter of intent" and also made no reference to a requirement of corporate approval of the terms. The letter included the language, "[b]y signing and returning this letter, you will confirm your commitment to entering into a contractual agreement . . . . Accordingly we will begin the process of assimilating contract documents for your review." Morales signed the document, but approval never arrived. In early March 2005, the recruiter informed Morales that the contract had not been approved. In late 2005, Morales filed suit alleging that Jackson HMA had breached its contract with him. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Morales. Jackson HMA appealed. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded that Morales presented sufficient evidence for the jury to find that a contract existed. However, Morales presented insufficient evidence to support the jury's damages award. The Court affirmed the judgment for Dr. Morales, but reversed on the issue of damages and remanded this case to the Circuit Court for a new trial solely on damages. View "Jackson HMA, LLC v. Morales" on Justia Law

The Market sought a declaration that its employment separation agreement with defendant was invalid because defendant had altered the agreement and fraudulently induced the president of the Market to sign it. Defendant counterclaimed to enforce the agreement. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Market where defendant failed to fulfill a condition precedent - returning company property - and such failure meant that the Market had not duty to perform under the agreement. Alternatively, the district court did not abuse its discretion in striking defendant's pleadings based on defendant's deliberate and willful discovery abuses. The district court acted within its discretion to impose sanctions under Rule 37. View "St. Louis Produce Market v. Hughes" on Justia Law

Verizon New England, Inc. ("Verizon") had a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with Local 2327, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO (the "Union") that was originally signed in 2003. When, in 2008, FairPoint Communications ("FairPoint") purchased Verizon's telecommunication operations in Vermont, New Hampshire, and Maine, FairPoint agreed to hire all former Verizon employees, represented by the Union, in those states. In 2010, the Union filed a grievance against FairPoint based on allegedly wrongful transfer of work. An arbitration panel entered an award against FairPoint, concluding that the facts constituted a wrongful conveyance. FairPoint filed suit in district court, arguing that the arbitral panel had exceeded its authority by wrongfully adding and subtracting terms from the CBA. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Union. Nonetheless, the district court denied costs and fees pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) no grounds existed on which to vacate the arbitral award; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying costs and fees. View "N. New England Telephone Operations LLC v. Local 2327, Int'l Brotherhood of Elec. Workers, ALF-CIO" on Justia Law

In 2009, GameStop, Inc., which operated retail stores that sold video games and video gaming software, hired Petitioner as an assistant manager. When she began her employment, Petitioner received a store associate handbook. In a document included with the handbook was an arbitration agreement. Petitioner signed and dated an acknowledgment of the handbook and rules including arbitration. In 2011, Petitioner sued GameStop and some of its managers (collectively, GameStop) for wrongful discharge, sexual harassment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, among other causes of action. The circuit court dismissed the complaint pending Petitioner's submission of her claims to final and binding arbitration. Petitioner appealed, arguing that she did not enter into a valid arbitration with GameStop or, in the alternative, the arbitration agreement was unconscionable and unenforceable. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Petitioner and GameStop entered into a valid agreement to arbitrate Petitioner's claims; and (2) the arbitration agreement was neither procedurally nor substantively unconscionable. View "New v. GameStop, Inc." on Justia Law