Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs Brett Woods and Kathleen Valdes were state employees and representatives of a class of New Mexico state and local government employees who alleged they paid for insurance coverage through payroll deductions and premiums pursuant to a policy issued by Standard Insurance Company (Standard), but did not receive the coverage for which they paid and, in some cases, were denied coverage entirely. Plaintiffs filed suit in New Mexico state court against three defendants: Standard, an Oregon company that agreed to provide the subject insurance coverage; the Risk Management Division of the New Mexico General Services Department (the Division), the state agency that contracted with Standard and was responsible for administering benefits under the policy; and Standard employee Martha Quintana, who Plaintiffs allege was responsible for managing the Division’s account with Standard and for providing account management and customer service to the Division and state employees. Plaintiffs' ninety-one-paragraph complaint, stated causes of action against Standard and the Division for breach of contract and unjust enrichment; against Standard for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, and Unfair Practices Act violations; and against Standard and Ms. Quintana for breach of the New Mexico Trade Practices and Fraud Act. The issue this appeal presented for the Tenth Circuit's review centered on whether remand to the state court pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) was required under either of two CAFA provisions: the state action provision, which excludes from federal jurisdiction cases in which the primary defendants are states; or the local controversy exception, which requires federal courts to decline jurisdiction where, among other things, there is a local defendant whose alleged conduct forms a significant basis for the claims asserted by plaintiffs and from whom plaintiffs seek significant relief. The Court concluded that neither provision provided a basis for remand, and therefore reversed the decision of the magistrate judge remanding the case to state court. But because the Tenth Circuit could not determine whether Defendants have established the amount in controversy required to confer federal jurisdiction, the case was remanded to the district court for the resolution of that issue.View "Woods v. Standard Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Lori Edwards appealed a trial court's ruling denying her petition for writ of mandate, challenging Edwards's classification and payment as a substitute teacher for the 2007/2008 school year. Edwards contends that, because she provided teaching services during the entire school year, she was a permanent employee and therefore was unlawfully deprived of backpay for the 2007/2008 school year. Edwards also argued the trial court erred in finding her writ petition barred by the three-year statute of limitations. Upon review of the matter, the Court of Appeal concluded Edwards's writ petition was not barred by the statute of limitations because the limitation period was tolled while Edwards was pursuing internal administrative remedies. Nevertheless, the Court concluded the trial court did not err in denying Edwards's petition on the grounds the Lake Elsinore Unified School District did not misclassify Edwards as a substitute teacher and was not required to pay Edwards backpay.View "Edwards v. Lake Elsinore Unified etc." on Justia Law

At issue in this lawsuit was whether workers engaged in testing and inspection of fire protection equipment are covered by New York’s prevailing wage statute. The New York State Department of Labor issued an opinion letter stating that the workers were covered but that the opinion shall be applied prospectively. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit certified to the Court of Appeals a question regarding what deference a court should pay to an agency’s decision, made for its own enforcement purposes, to construe a statute prospectively only. In its amicus brief in the Court of Appeals, the Department asserted that no deference was due to it by the courts deciding the litigation. The Court of Appeals answered (1) courts should give an agency no more deference than it claims for itself; and (2) a party’s commitment to pay prevailing wages pursuant to the prevailing wage statute binds the party to comply with the statute as correctly interpreted, whether or not the correct interpretation was known to the parties at the time of contracting.View "Ramos v. SimplexGrinnell LP" on Justia Law

Lynn Becker contracted with the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation (Tribe) to provide services related to the Tribe's development of its energy and mineral resources. Following a dispute concerning Becker's compensation under the contract, Becker brought breach of contract, breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and accounting claims against the Tribe in the United States District Court for the District of Utah. All of Becker's claims were state law claims. Nevertheless, Becker's complaint asserted that the district court had federal question jurisdiction because the case raised substantial issues of federal law. Becker appealed the district court's dismissal of his complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed.View "Becker v. Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah" on Justia Law

In 1998, Jerry Lee Baldwin entered into a written agreement with the Board of Supervisors for the University of Louisiana System to serve as the head football coach at the University of Southwestern Louisiana, now University of Louisiana at Lafayette (UL). The contract provided that Baldwin’s employment with UL would last until January 31, 2003. By letter dated November 27, 2001, Baldwin was “relieved of [his] duties” as UL’s head coach effective November 26, 2001, after winning only six of twenty-seven games (an 18% win record). Baldwin continued to receive his full monthly salary and other employee benefits from UL including health insurance, accrual of leave time, and accrual of retirement credits for the remainder of the contract term. Baldwin sued the Board over the contract. Defendants sought review of the court of appeal’s determination that the coach’s contract had been terminated, which triggered a contractual obligation to provide notice. Interpreting the contract in its entirety, the Supreme Court found that the appellate court erred in finding that the failure of notice constituted a breach of contract under the facts of this case. Accordingly, the Court reversed the appellate court’s decision and reinstated the summary judgment rendered by the trial court, which dismissed the coach’s breach of contract claim against defendants.View "Baldwin v. Board of Supervisors for the University of Louisiana System" on Justia Law

After Sining Mao left his employment with Seagate Technology, LLC, Mao joined Seagate’s competitor, Western Digital Corporation. Seagate subsequently commenced a district court action alleging that Mao stole Seagate’s trade secrets and confidential information and provided it to Western Digital. Western Digital invoked an arbitration clause in Mao’s employment agreement with Seagate. Before the arbitration hearing, Seagate brought a motion for sanctions against Western Digital and Mao (Appellants) based on alleged fabrication of evidence. An arbitrator issued an award against Appellants in an amount exceeding $500 million. The district court vacated the award in part, but the court of appeals reinstated the award. On appeal, Appellants argued that the arbitrator’s exceeded his authority by issuing punitive sanctions and prejudiced Appellants by refusing to hear evidence material to the controversy. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals’ decision reinstating and confirming the arbitration award in full, holding that the arbitrator did not exceed his authority or refuse to hear material evidence as required for vacatur.View "Seagate Tech., LLC v. W. Digital Corp." on Justia Law

Washington Group, an engineering, construction and management services company, offered Abraham a position as a “lead scheduler” for a project in Wisconsin. After negotiations, Washington Group sent Abraham a letter offering him the title of “project control manager,” a higher position higher in the chain of command. Abraham, who worked for the company for about a year, pursuant to his written contract before leaving the company and filing suit, claimed that Washington Group and its parent, URS, also promised him that he would perform the duties of a project control manager and then breached that promise. The defendants claim that Abraham understood that it would give him the title of project control manager for purposes of increasing his salary but he would perform the functions of a lead scheduler on a day-to-day basis. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that Abraham received all of the promises set forth in his unambiguous written contract.View "Abraham v. Washington Grp. Int'l, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of his former employers, BoA, on his claim of age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq., and breach of contract. Under the McDonald Douglas Corp v. Green framework, assuming arguendo that plaintiff met his burden of demonstrating a prima facie case of age discrimination, the court agreed with the district court that BoA has satisfied its burden to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for plaintiff's termination. BoA has explained that plaintiff's employment was terminated as part of a company-wide reduction in force; two months prior to his termination, plaintiff received a negative mid-year performance review; and as of September 2010, plaintiff was ranked 136th across all BoA sales personnel for the year and his performance was the worse of all employees in his group. In regards to the breach of contract claim, the district court correctly determined that plaintiff was an at-will employee and that although annual bonuses were discretionary, there is no record evidence, or even an allegation, indicating that plaintiff was promised a mid-year bonus. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "Delaney v. Bank of America Corp." on Justia Law

McCarthy worked at Ameritech, a wholly owned subsidiary of AT&T, until her position was terminated in 2008 as part of a reduction in forces. She sought to retire at that time to care for her ailing husband, but Ameritech allegedly told her that she was not eligible to receive post-retirement healthcare benefits, on which her husband depended. She elected to continue working through the company’s Employment Opportunity Pool for another nine months, until she turned 65 and retired with benefits. She then filed suit alleging, among other things, age and sex discrimination. After Ameritech admitted that McCarthy was, in fact, entitled to post-retirement healthcare benefits when it terminated her position in 2008, she amended her suit to add a claim for fraudulent inducement. The district court awarded summary judgment, rejecting the merits of each claim. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part. McCarthy may present her fraudulent-inducement claim to a jury. The district court properly awarded summary judgment to the defendants on each of the other claims View "McCarthy v. Ameritech Publ'g, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, active and retired Baltimore police officers and firefighters who participate in a public pension plan, challenged the City's decision changing the manner in which annual increases to pension benefits are calculated. Plaintiffs claimed that the substitution of a cost-of-living adjustment for a "variable benefit" violates the members' rights under the Contract Clause and the Takings Clause. The court concluded that the members' rights under the Contract Clause were not impaired because the members retained a state law remedy for breach of contract. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's judgment with respect to the City's elimination of the variable benefit. The court affirmed the district court's decision upholding the remaining portions of the ordinance at issue, and vacated the district court's order dismissing the Takings Clause claim. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Cherry, Jr. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore City" on Justia Law