Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

A group of medical providers sued a former employee for breach of an employment agreement. The employee counterclaimed, alleging he was owed unpaid wages and bonuses. The providers initially raised "failure to state a claim" as their sole affirmative defense. However, after nearly four years of litigation, they attempted to argue for the first time that the contract was illegal and therefore void. The lower court found that the providers had waived this affirmative defense and issued a judgment in favor of the employee. The providers appealed, and the Court of Civil Appeals reversed, concluding that the lower court had abused its discretion by refusing to consider the providers' claim of illegality.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma disagreed with the Court of Civil Appeals. It held that the trial judge did not abuse her discretion in striking the providers' last-minute effort to raise a new affirmative defense. The court noted that the providers had failed to raise the illegality defense in their initial responsive pleading and did not seek to amend their answer in a timely manner. Furthermore, the providers did not raise the illegality defense until after the trial court had already awarded summary judgment to the employee on the issue of breach of contract, more than ten months after the close of discovery, more than nine months after the lower court's deadline for filing dispositive motions, and almost four years after the original lawsuit was filed. The court concluded that the record was sufficient to support a finding that the providers' delay was unjustified and prejudicial. The court vacated the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals, affirmed the trial court's order striking the illegality affirmative defense, and remanded the case to the Court of Civil Appeals to resolve any remaining undecided issues raised in the appeal. View "Tulsa Ambulatory Procedure Center v. Olmstead" on Justia Law

The case involves Bristol SL Holdings, Inc., the successor-in-interest to Sure Haven, Inc., a defunct drug rehabilitation and mental health treatment center, and Cigna Health and Life Insurance Company and Cigna Behavioral Health, Inc. Bristol alleged that Sure Haven's calls to Cigna verifying out-of-network coverage and seeking authorization to provide health services created independent contractual obligations. Cigna, however, denied payment based on fee-forgiving, a practice prohibited by the health plans. Bristol brought state law claims for breach of contract and promissory estoppel against Cigna.The district court initially dismissed Bristol’s claims, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal, holding that Bristol had derivative standing to sue for unpaid benefits as Sure Haven’s successor-in-interest. On remand, the district court granted Cigna’s motion for summary judgment, ruling that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) preempted Bristol’s state law claims.On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Bristol’s state law claims were preempted by ERISA because they had both a “reference to” and an “impermissible connection with” the ERISA plans that Cigna administered. The court reasoned that Bristol’s claims were not independent of an ERISA plan because they concerned the denial of reimbursement to patients who were covered under such plans. The court also held that allowing liability on Bristol’s state law claims would interfere with nationally uniform plan administration, a central matter of plan administration. View "Bristol SL Holdings, Inc. v. Cigna Health and Life Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between a real estate salesperson, James Kennedy II, and a real estate broker, Weichert Co. Kennedy worked for Weichert from 2012 to 2018 under two written agreements that identified him as an independent contractor. After his affiliation with Weichert ended, Kennedy filed a class action lawsuit alleging that Weichert violated the Wage Payment Law (WPL) by misclassifying him and other real estate salespersons as independent contractors and unlawfully deducting fees and expenses from their commissions.The trial court denied Weichert's motion to dismiss Kennedy's complaint, ruling that the question of Kennedy's status was not determined by the parties' agreement, but by the legal standard that generally governs employee classification issues under the WPL, known as the "ABC" test. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision, but noted that the 2018 amendments to the New Jersey Real Estate License Act, or the Brokers Act, authorized real estate brokers and salespersons to enter into independent contractor relationships. However, it held that these amendments applied prospectively and thus governed only a brief portion of Kennedy's claim.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed the lower courts' decisions. It held that the parties' agreement to enter into an independent contractor business affiliation is enforceable under N.J.S.A. 45:15-3.2, and Kennedy, as an independent contractor, was not subject to the WPL pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:11-4.1(b). Therefore, the trial court erred when it denied Weichert’s motion to dismiss the complaint. The case was remanded for the dismissal of Kennedy’s complaint. View "Kennedy v. Weichert Co." on Justia Law

The case involves Songie Adebiyi, a former Vice President of Student Services at South Suburban College in Illinois, who was terminated in 2019 due to alleged performance issues. Adebiyi claimed that her termination was in retaliation for filing a charge with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the Illinois Department of Human Rights. She sued the college and its president, alleging racial discrimination and retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as well as breach of contract.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted summary judgment to the college and its president, ruling that Adebiyi failed to show a causal link between her charge of discrimination and her termination. The court found that the evidence did not support Adebiyi’s retaliation claim. Adebiyi appealed the decision, arguing that the district court erred in dismissing her Title VII retaliation claim and abused its discretion when it denied her motion to amend the complaint and seek more discovery.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. The appellate court agreed with the lower court's finding that Adebiyi failed to demonstrate a causal link between her protected activity and the adverse employment action. The court found no evidence of pretext in the college's reasons for termination or suspicious timing between Adebiyi's filing of her EEOC and IDHR charge and her termination. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of Adebiyi's motion to file an amended complaint and take additional discovery. View "Adebiyi v. South Suburban College" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit heard an appeal from Bulk Transport Corp. against Teamsters Union No. 142 Pension Fund and its Trustees. The dispute originated from two collective-bargaining agreements between Bulk Transport and Teamsters Local 142, active from 2003 to 2006. The Union insisted that Bulk Transport apply one such agreement, the Steel Mill Addendum, to non-steel mill work (LISCO work), which Bulk Transport initially did, subsequently making pension contributions on behalf of the LISCO workers. However, when Bulk Transport lost the LISCO contract, they ceased these contributions, leading to the Pension Fund assessing a withdrawal liability of about $2 million under the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act (MPPAA).After arbitration, Bulk Transport paid but demanded a review of the decision. The district court agreed with the arbitrator's ruling that Bulk Transport had adopted the Addendum by conduct, and thus the Pension Fund was entitled to the withdrawal liability. The district court also denied Bulk Transport's request for a refund.The Seventh Circuit, however, reversed the district court's decision. It held that the written agreement, not the practice or conduct, should dictate the terms of pension contributions to multi-employer plans. The written agreement in this case did not cover the LISCO work, and the court rejected the argument that Bulk Transport's conduct altered the substantive terms of the agreement. The court held that the writings were conclusive and that employers and unions could not opt-out of the requirements orally or through their course of conduct. The court affirmed the district court's denial of attorney's fees for the Pension Fund and remanded the case with instructions to order the Pension Fund to repay the withdrawal liability it collected from Bulk Transport. View "Bulk Transport, Corp. v. Teamsters Union Local 142" on Justia Law

Paulo Trindade, a former employee of Grove Services, Inc., sued his previous employer for breach of contract and violations of the Massachusetts Wage Act, claiming he had been underpaid on his sales commission compensation for the years 2014, 2015, and 2016. Following a bench trial, the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts ruled in part for Trindade and in part for Grove, awarding Trindade $330,597 in damages. Both parties appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the lower court's judgment. The Court of Appeals agreed with the district court's conclusion that Trindade's amended complaint, which included a claim for unpaid wages for 2016, related back to his original complaint, making the claim timely under Massachusetts law. The Court of Appeals also concluded that the district court was correct in its decision to award the damages it did, including an amount for the late payment and underpayment of Trindade's 2016 commission. View "Trindade v. Grove Services, Inc." on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of Alabama, David and Anna Roberson appealed from an order by the Jefferson Circuit Court that dismissed their indemnification claim against Drummond Company, Inc. ("Drummond"). David, a former vice president of Drummond, was convicted of bribery in federal court for approving payments that were part of an environmental public-relations campaign. After his conviction, Drummond continued to pay David's salary and benefits for a period, but later terminated his employment. The Robersons then sued Drummond and others, asserting multiple claims, including one for indemnification. They alleged that Drummond had directed David to make the payments that were later deemed to be bribes, and that he had incurred damages as a result, for which Drummond had a duty to indemnify him. The circuit court dismissed the indemnification claim, ruling that indemnification generally comes into play in a contractual arrangement, and the Robersons had neither produced nor alleged the existence of a contract or agreement establishing such a duty. The Robersons appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the losses the Robersons sought to recover were not indemnifiable, as they were not judicially imposed liabilities to a third party or out-of-pocket expenses that David incurred in processing the invoices. The court also found that the Robersons failed to demonstrate they had sufficiently pleaded a claim for common-law indemnification. The court rejected the Robersons' argument that Drummond's resolution to pay David's salary and benefits constituted a contract for indemnification, stating that the obligation they alleged Drummond undertook was not a promise to indemnify David, but simply a promise not to fire him. Finally, the court found that the Robersons had failed to preserve their claim for court-ordered indemnification under the Alabama Business and Nonprofit Entity Code for appellate review, as they had not asserted this argument in the trial court. View "Roberson v. Drummond Company, Inc." on Justia Law

In the Supreme Court of Wyoming, an appeal by Ronald Pinther, a former insurance agent, was dismissed. Pinther had worked for American National Property and Casualty Insurance Company (ANPAC) and American National Insurance Company (ANICO). He filed a lawsuit against ANPAC, ANICO, and another agent, Philip Maggard, claiming breach of contract, breach of good faith and fair dealing, fraudulent inducement, promissory estoppel, civil conspiracy, and age discrimination. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of ANPAC and Mr. Maggard. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the district court had not erred in its decision. The court found that Mr. Pinther's breach of contract claim against ANPAC was governed by the Post-Termination Compensation Schedule outlined in the agent agreement. The court further held that Mr. Pinther's claim of a breach of an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing could not be maintained given the at-will nature of the agency contract. The court also dismissed Mr. Pinther's fraudulent inducement claim against ANPAC, noting that the recruiting brochure did not govern his agreement with ANPAC. The court further held that Mr. Pinther's claim for tortious interference with a contract against Mr. Maggard could not be maintained as the actions of Mr. Maggard, as an agent of ANPAC, were imputed to ANPAC. Lastly, the court held that Mr. Pinther's civil conspiracy claims against ANPAC and Mr. Maggard failed as the underlying tort claims did not survive summary judgment. View "Pinther v. American National Property and Casualty Insurance Company" on Justia Law

In a dispute between ORP Surgical, LLC (ORP), and Howmedica Osteonics Corp., also known as Stryker, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's ruling. ORP and Stryker, both involved in medical device sales, had a successful business relationship under two sales contracts, the Joint Sales Representative Agreement (JSRA) and the Trauma Sales Representative Agreement (TSRA). The relationship soured when Stryker terminated the JSRA and hired one of ORP's sales representatives, and later, when ORP terminated the TSRA, Stryker hired a dozen of ORP's representatives. The district court ruled in favor of ORP, finding that Stryker breached the sales contracts and owed ORP damages, attorneys’ fees, sanctions, and costs. On appeal, Stryker challenged the rulings on the breach of contract claims, the attorneys’ fees award, and the nominal damages award. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s holdings on the breach-of-contract claims but reversed its award of attorneys' fees under the indemnification provision. It also affirmed the award of nominal damages for Stryker's breach of the non-solicitation/non-diversion provision. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "ORP Surgical v. Howmedica Osteonics Corp." on Justia Law

Two online fundraising companies, Snap! Mobile, Inc. ("Snap") and Vertical Raise, LLC ("Vertical Raise"), were involved in a dispute. Snap accused Vertical Raise and its CEO, Paul Landers, of poaching its sales representatives and customers, which violated non-compete and confidentiality provisions in the former sales representatives’ employment agreements with Snap. The trial court granted Snap a preliminary injunction to prevent further violations and partially ruled in Snap's favor on some claims. A jury trial on damages resulted in an award of $1,000,000 to Snap. However, the trial court increased the award to $2,310,021. Both parties appealed. The Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed the trial court's award of discretionary costs for expert witness fees but reversed the trial court’s order granting an additur or new trial. The Supreme Court ordered the trial court to enter a judgment consistent with the original jury award. The Supreme Court also reversed the trial court’s decision granting Snap a permanent injunction. In a separate contempt proceeding, the Supreme Court affirmed the contempt court's decision to dismiss contempt charges against Vertical Raise and Paul Croghan, a former Snap employee. The contempt court had determined the preliminary injunction was vague, overbroad, and unenforceable. View "Snap! Mobile v. Vertical Raise" on Justia Law