Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Labor & Employment Law
Village Practice Management Company, LLC v. West
Ryan West, a former employee of Village Practice Management Company, LLC ("Village"), sought a declaratory judgment from the Court of Chancery of Delaware. West argued that Village could not declare a forfeiture of his vested Class B Units after he joined a competitor post-employment, as the Agreement did not limit post-employment competitive activities. Village contended that West forfeited his vested Class B Units by joining a competitor, invoking the Management Incentive Plan's ("Plan") forfeiture provisions.The Court of Chancery denied Village's motion to stay proceedings and compel West to submit his claims to Village's Compensation Committee. The court then granted West's motion for judgment on the pleadings, holding that the Agreement only restricted "detrimental activity" during employment. Consequently, Village could not enforce a forfeiture of West's vested Class B Units for activities occurring after his resignation. The court also awarded West his attorneys' fees.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Delaware reversed the Court of Chancery's decision. The Supreme Court found that the term "Participant" in the Agreement could reasonably be interpreted to include former employees, making the Agreement ambiguous. Therefore, the grant of judgment on the pleadings in favor of West was improper. The Supreme Court also reversed the award of attorneys' fees to West, as he was no longer the prevailing party. However, the Supreme Court upheld the Court of Chancery's denial of Village's request for a stay, distinguishing the case from others that required disputes to be resolved by a committee first. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "Village Practice Management Company, LLC v. West" on Justia Law
Miele v. Foundation Medicine, Inc.
Susan Miele was hired by Foundation Medicine, Inc. (FMI) in 2017 and signed a restrictive covenant agreement that included a nonsolicitation provision. In 2020, Miele and FMI executed a transition agreement upon her separation, which incorporated the restrictive covenant agreement and included a forfeiture clause. FMI paid Miele approximately $1.2 million in transition benefits. After joining Ginkgo Bioworks in 2021, Miele allegedly solicited FMI employees to join Ginkgo, leading FMI to cease further payments and demand repayment of benefits.Miele sued FMI in late 2021 for breach of the transition agreement, and FMI counterclaimed for breach of contract. Miele moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the provisions FMI relied on were unenforceable under the Massachusetts Noncompetition Agreement Act. A Superior Court judge granted Miele's motion in part, ruling that FMI could not enforce the forfeiture provision but allowed FMI to assert Miele's breach as a defense and seek damages. The judge concluded that the transition agreement qualified as a "forfeiture for competition agreement" under the act.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case. The court held that the Massachusetts Noncompetition Agreement Act does not apply to a nonsolicitation agreement, even if it includes a forfeiture provision. The court reasoned that the act explicitly excludes nonsolicitation agreements from its scope, and a forfeiture clause does not change this exclusion. The court reversed the Superior Court's order partially granting Miele's motion for judgment on the pleadings and remanded the matter for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Miele v. Foundation Medicine, Inc." on Justia Law
Bare v. Rainforest Alliance, Inc.
Matthew Bare sued his former employer, Rainforest Alliance, Inc., in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, alleging that the company failed to pay him a redundancy settlement after his position was made redundant due to a reorganization. Bare claimed that he had agreed to resign in exchange for the settlement, which was contingent upon his execution of a release-of-claims agreement. However, after Bare made critical comments about the company, Rainforest Alliance terminated him and refused to pay the settlement, leading to claims of breach of contract and violation of the District of Columbia Wage Payment and Collection Law.The Superior Court dismissed Bare's complaint with prejudice, agreeing with Rainforest Alliance that Bare had failed to allege the occurrence of a condition precedent—specifically, the execution of a release agreement. The court found that without alleging this, Bare could not claim he had earned the redundancy payment under the contract or the wage law. Bare had argued that the issue of the condition precedent was a factual matter for summary judgment or trial and that Rainforest Alliance had waived the condition by not providing a release agreement. He also requested leave to amend his complaint if the motion to dismiss was granted.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and held that the trial court should have granted Bare's request to amend his complaint. The appellate court found that Bare's request to amend was his first, the case had been pending for a short time, there was no evidence of bad faith or dilatory motives, and there was no prejudice to Rainforest Alliance. The court also determined that Bare's proposed amendment, which would include allegations that Rainforest Alliance waived the condition precedent by not providing a release agreement, was not futile. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Bare v. Rainforest Alliance, Inc." on Justia Law
Wilbur-Ellis Company LLC v. Jens
Brett Jens resigned from his position at Wilbur-Ellis Company, LLC, and subsequently joined a competitor, J.R. Simplot Company. Wilbur-Ellis filed a lawsuit against Jens and Simplot, seeking a preliminary injunction to enforce restrictive covenants in Jens’s employment agreement and to prevent Simplot’s alleged tortious interference with the agreement. The district court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction, concluding that the restrictive covenants were no longer enforceable.The United States District Court for the District of South Dakota reviewed the case and determined that Wilbur-Ellis was unlikely to succeed on the merits of its breach of contract claim against Jens. The court found that the restrictive covenants in Jens’s employment agreement did not survive past the agreement’s expiration date of February 28, 2010. Wilbur-Ellis appealed the denial of the preliminary injunction, arguing that the restrictive covenants were intended to begin when Jens’s employment ended. Simplot cross-appealed, contending that Wilbur-Ellis could not enforce the restrictive covenants because the employer in the agreement was Wilbur-Ellis Air, LLC, not Wilbur-Ellis Company, LLC.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision for abuse of discretion. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s denial of the preliminary injunction, agreeing that the restrictive covenants did not survive the expiration of the employment agreement. The court emphasized that the agreement did not contain a survival clause or any language indicating that the restrictive covenants were intended to extend beyond the termination of the agreement. Consequently, the court concluded that Wilbur-Ellis was unlikely to succeed on the merits, which is the most significant factor in determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction. View "Wilbur-Ellis Company LLC v. Jens" on Justia Law
BUTLER v. COLLINS
Cheryl Butler was hired as an assistant law professor at Southern Methodist University (SMU) in 2011. After a mandatory third-year performance review, her contract was renewed, and she became eligible for tenure consideration in the fall semester of 2015. Due to illness, Butler requested an extension of the tenure vote, which was denied, but she was later granted leave under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) for the spring semester of 2016. Her tenure committee, chaired by Professor Roy Anderson, concluded that Butler met tenure standards for scholarship and service but not teaching. Consequently, the law faculty voted not to recommend tenure, and Butler's appeals to the SMU Law School Dean and the Provost were unsuccessful. Butler completed the 2016-2017 academic year without teaching any classes.Butler filed a lawsuit against SMU and several of its employees, alleging racially discriminatory tenure standards and processes, and retaliation for her internal complaints about race, disability, and FMLA discrimination. She brought federal statutory claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Americans with Disabilities Act, Title IX, and the FMLA. Additionally, she asserted state-law discrimination and retaliation claims under Texas Labor Code Chapter 21, along with state common law claims for breach of contract and negligent supervision. Against the employee defendants, she claimed defamation, conspiracy to defame, and fraud.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas dismissed Butler's defamation and fraud claims against the employee defendants, citing preemption by Chapter 21 of the Texas Labor Code. The court held that the gravamen of these claims was unlawful employment discrimination and retaliation, which Chapter 21 specifically addresses. Butler appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit certified a question to the Supreme Court of Texas regarding whether Chapter 21 preempts common law defamation and fraud claims against employees based on the same conduct as discrimination claims against the employer.The Supreme Court of Texas held that Chapter 21 does not preempt common law defamation and fraud claims against employees. The court reasoned that Chapter 21 subjects only employers to liability for discriminatory and retaliatory conduct and does not immunize individuals from liability for their own tortious actions. Therefore, Butler's defamation and fraud claims against the employee defendants are not foreclosed by Chapter 21. View "BUTLER v. COLLINS" on Justia Law
Evoqua Water Technologies LLC v. Moriarty
Matthew Moriarty, the defendant, appealed a Superior Court order dismissing his amended counterclaim against Evoqua Water Technologies LLC and Neptune-Benson, LLC. Moriarty's counterclaim sought declaratory relief and tort damages, alleging violations of a non-compete agreement he signed in 2010 while employed by Neptune-Benson, Inc. (NBI). Evoqua acquired Neptune-Benson in 2016 and hired Moriarty in 2017. The plaintiffs sued Moriarty in 2018 for breaching the 2010 agreement, among other claims, and obtained a preliminary injunction in 2019 to enforce the agreement.The Superior Court dismissed Moriarty's counterclaim, citing the litigation privilege for statements made during judicial proceedings. Moriarty's counterclaim included claims for emotional distress, declaratory judgments, constructive discharge, misrepresentation, and interference with business relations, based on alleged false testimony by an Evoqua executive during the preliminary injunction hearing.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's dismissal. The Court held that the litigation privilege protected the executive's testimony, barring Moriarty's claims for emotional distress, misrepresentation, and interference with business relations. The Court also found Moriarty's declaratory judgment claim moot, as the non-compete agreement had expired in 2020, and his constructive discharge claim failed to state a valid cause of action. The Court concluded that Moriarty did not demonstrate that his working conditions were so intolerable that a reasonable person would feel compelled to resign. Thus, the dismissal of Moriarty's amended counterclaim was upheld. View "Evoqua Water Technologies LLC v. Moriarty" on Justia Law
Lawson v. Spirit Aerosystems
Larry Lawson, former CEO of Spirit AeroSystems, Inc., retired and entered into a Retirement Agreement with Spirit, which allowed him to continue vesting in long-term incentive stock awards as if he were an active employee. This agreement was conditioned on his compliance with a non-competition covenant from his original Employment Agreement. Lawson later engaged with a hedge fund, Elliott Management, which was involved in a proxy contest with Arconic, a competitor of Spirit. Spirit deemed this a violation of the non-competition covenant and ceased payments and stock vesting under the Retirement Agreement.The United States District Court for the District of Kansas held a bench trial and found that Lawson had not violated the non-competition covenant, ruling in his favor. Spirit appealed, and the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that Lawson had breached the covenant and remanded the case to determine the enforceability of the covenant under Kansas law.On remand, the district court found the non-competition covenant enforceable without applying the reasonableness test from Weber v. Tillman, concluding that the covenant was a condition precedent to the receipt of future benefits, not a traditional non-compete. The court severed the injunctive enforcement mechanism from the covenant, leaving only the condition precedent.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, predicting that the Kansas Supreme Court would not apply the Weber reasonableness test to a non-competition condition precedent to the receipt of future benefits. The court also denied Lawson's motion to certify the question to the Kansas Supreme Court, finding it unnecessary to resolve the issue. View "Lawson v. Spirit Aerosystems" on Justia Law
Caldwell v. Champlain College Inc.
Robert Caldwell was recruited by Champlain College's then-president Don Laackman in September 2016 and worked as Vice President of Advancement and later as Chief Advancement Officer from January 2017 to September 2019. His role was primarily as chief fundraiser. In fiscal year 2018, he missed his fundraising goal by approximately seventeen percent, and in fiscal year 2019, he missed his goal by more than 56 percent, resulting in a shortfall of over 2.2 million dollars. In May 2019, Caldwell was diagnosed with chronic kidney disease and informed President Laackman of his diagnosis. Laurie Quinn replaced Laackman as interim-president in June 2019 and discussed Caldwell's performance with him in July 2019. Caldwell mentioned he was dealing with health issues. In September 2019, Quinn fired Caldwell, citing his poor fundraising performance.Caldwell sued Champlain College in March 2021, alleging disability discrimination under the Fair Employment Practices Act (FEPA) and promissory estoppel. The Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Civil Division granted summary judgment in favor of Champlain College on both claims. Caldwell appealed the decision.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court applied the McDonnell Douglas framework for assessing disability discrimination claims and found that Champlain College provided a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Caldwell's termination—his failure to meet fundraising goals. Caldwell failed to provide evidence that this reason was pretextual. Additionally, the court found that Caldwell did not present any evidence of a specific and definite promise that would support his promissory estoppel claim. Therefore, the court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of Champlain College. View "Caldwell v. Champlain College Inc." on Justia Law
Ford v. The Silver F
Billy Ford worked as a full-time security guard for Parkwest Casino Lotus from September 2018 to December 2021. Upon hiring, Ford signed an arbitration agreement that excluded claims for workers' compensation, unemployment compensation, certain administrative complaints, ERISA claims, and "representative claims under [PAGA]." In February 2022, Ford filed a complaint against Parkwest under PAGA, alleging Labor Code violations, including mandatory off-the-clock health screenings and inaccurate wage statements. Parkwest moved to compel arbitration of Ford's individual PAGA claims and to dismiss the representative PAGA claims, citing Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana.The Superior Court of Sacramento County denied Parkwest's motion to compel arbitration, finding that the arbitration agreement specifically excluded all PAGA claims. Parkwest appealed, arguing that the agreement was ambiguous regarding the exclusion of individual PAGA claims and that such ambiguity should be resolved in favor of arbitration.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the arbitration agreement unambiguously excluded all PAGA claims, including individual claims. The court reasoned that the language of the agreement and the circumstances under which it was executed indicated that the parties intended to exclude all PAGA claims from arbitration. The court affirmed the trial court's order denying Parkwest's motion to compel arbitration. View "Ford v. The Silver F" on Justia Law
Ramsey v. Sheet Pile
Douglas Ramsey, the plaintiff, sued his former employer, Sheet Pile, L.L.C., for breach of his employment agreement and a promissory note under which he had loaned the company money. Sheet Pile counterclaimed for breach of the employment agreement and sought an injunction to force Ramsey to return confidential information. Ramsey largely succeeded at trial, receiving an award for prejudgment interest and the denial of Sheet Pile’s requested injunction. Sheet Pile appealed, challenging the jury instructions, sufficiency of the evidence, the grant of prejudgment interest, and the denial of injunctive relief.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas oversaw the initial trial. The jury found in favor of Ramsey, awarding him the final $5,000 of his salary and $155,878.47 in damages on the loan. The jury also found that Ramsey breached the employment agreement but was not liable due to Sheet Pile’s prior material breach. After the trial, the district court awarded Ramsey prejudgment interest and denied Sheet Pile’s request for a permanent injunction. Sheet Pile filed a post-judgment motion reiterating its arguments, which the district court denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s decisions on the jury instructions and the finding of prior material breach. However, it vacated the award of prejudgment interest, finding that the jury had improperly included interest in its damages award, leading to a double recovery. The court remanded the case for the district court to offer a remittitur based on the amount owed on the loan as of the date Ramsey filed suit. The court also instructed the district court to consider an injunction requiring Ramsey to return any documents containing confidential information. The court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ramsey v. Sheet Pile" on Justia Law