Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs Michael Ashby and Randy O'Brien, inmates at the state department of correction, asserted professional malpractice complaints against attorney C. Bruce Davidson to The Bar Plan Mutual Insurance Company, Davidson's professional liability carrier. Bar Plan then intervened in consolidated actions for damages filed on behalf of plaintiffs against Davidson, asserting a cross-claim that it was not obligated to indemnify Davidson for the claims of plaintiffs because Davidson had failed to notify Bar Plan of any claims against him pursuant to Bar Plan's policy. The trial court granted summary judgment to Bar Plan. The Supreme Court held that Davidson's failure to comply with Bar Plan's policy was not dispositive because plaintiffs opposed summary judgment on grounds of waiver and estoppel. The Court then reversed summary judgment, holding that genuine issues of fact remained regarding whether Bar Plan's misrepresentation of valid coverage resulted in plaintiffs sustaining actual detriment. Remanded.

BancInsure, Inc. appealed a declaratory judgment in favor of Columbian Financial Corporation and a former director, Carl McCaffree (collectively the Insureds). The insurance policy at issue here was a "claims-made" policy covered any claim made to BancInsure against any Columbian officer or director for a "Wrongful Act" as defined by the policy. A disputed provision of the policy pertained to the scope of coverage if Columbian was placed in receivership or otherwise ceased to engage in active banking business. The parties interpreted the provision differently. The Insureds contended that if Columbian went into receivership, the policy covered all claims made through the end of the original policy period, although only for Wrongful Acts committed before the receivership. BancInsure contended that the policy covered only claims made before the receivership. The operation of the disputed provision became relevant in August 2008 when the Kansas State Bank Commissioner declared Columbian insolvent and appointed the FDIC as its receiver. Soon thereafter, Columbianâs management sent BancInsure a letter to notify it of potential claims by the FDIC and others. The parties disputed many of the claims against Columbian which led to Columbian filing suit to the district court to determine which claims were covered under the policy. The sole issue on appeal to the Tenth Circuit was whether the district court had jurisdiction. Though no party disputed jurisdiction, the Tenth Circuit found that there was no actual controversy between the parties when the district court below rendered its judgment. The court therefore lacked jurisdiction. The Tenth Circuit reversed the lower courtâs decision and remanded to case with instructions to the court to vacate its judgment.

Petitioner Brady Farr appealed a circuit court judgment in favor of Respondents The Gulf Agency, Orange Beach Insurance Agency and Lexington Insurance Company. Mr. Farr finished renovating his house in 2003. In 2004, he decided to sell his property to a developer who wished to turn the property into condominiums. In anticipation of the sale, Mr. Farr obtained a $1 million loan, secured by a mortgage. As part of the loan process, the mortgage company ordered an appraisal of the property. The property was appraised at $1.3 million and the improvements were valued at $313,000. In 2004, Mr. Farr contacted Orange Beach to insure the property against "total loss." Lexington, acting as Orange Beach's agent, submitted an insurance application for policy limits based on the appraisal to The Gulf Agency, who ultimately served as underwriter for the policy. In the fall of 2004, Mr. Farr was concerned that the policy limits were not sufficient to adequately cover a total loss of the property. In September, Mr. Farr's concerns were realized when Hurricane Ivan destroyed the property. He filed a claim with Orange Beach. In November, Mr. Farr sold his property for $1.18 million. The sales agreement was amended to reflect the total loss he suffered as a result of the hurricane. Lexington's adjuster visited the property to determine the cause of Mr. Farr's loss. The adjuster found the hurricane was the "proximate cause". Lexington subsequently paid Mr. Farr $50,000 for the damage. Alleging that the policy did not provide adequate coverage and that Lexington failed to pay the proper benefits under the policy, Mr. Farr sued the insurance companies for breach of contract, fraud, misrepresentation, negligence, conspiracy, and bad-faith failure to pay an insurance claim. The trial court granted the companies' motion for summary judgment, finding that some of Mr. Farr's claims were barred by a two-year statute of limitations. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's judgment pertaining to Mr. Farr's tort claims. The Court found that those claims were indeed barred by a statute of limitations. The Court however found that the breach of contract and bad faith claims should not have been dismissed through summary judgment. The Court affirmed part and reversed part of the lower court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company (Nationwide) appealed a trial courtâs order that denied its "renewed motion for a judgment as a matter of law" in its case against J-Mar Machine & Pump. J-Mar is a repair shop that held a commercial liability and property insurance policy with Nationwide. In 2004, in anticipation of its policy renewal, Nationwide sent an inspector to the shop. In his report, the inspector noted several safety hazards and a messy shop. The insurance policy was renewed in March but several months later Nationwide cancelled the policy. Nationwide cited the inspectorâs report as reason for the cancellation. J-Mar management was not aware of the cancellation until late that year when shop property was stolen. When it tried to file a claim, Nationwide declined J-Marâs claim. A jury trial was held on the disputed policy cancellation and coverage. At the close of J-Marâs case, Nationwide moved the court for a "judgment as a matter of law" which was denied. Nationwide unsuccessfully motioned again at the close of all evidence. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found that the evidence J-Mar presented at trial was insufficient to support the jury verdict in its favor. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial courtâs judgment denying Nationwideâs motion and rendered a judgment in Nationwideâs favor.

Appellant Robert Petty is sole owner of Co-Appellant R.G. Petty Masonry. Appellants contracted with Respondent Blue Cross of Northeastern Pennsylvania (Blue Cross), a nonprofit hospital corporation that provides health insurance coverage for its employees. Appellants are covered under the group policy as subscribers. Appellants filed a four-count class action suit against Blue Cross, alleging that it violated the state Nonprofit Law by accumulating excessive profits and surplus well beyond the "incidental profit" permitted by statute. The second count alleged Blue Cross breached its contract with Appellants by violating the Nonprofit Law. The third count alleged Blue Cross owed appellants a fiduciary duty by virtue of their status as subscribers, and that duty was breached when it accrued the excess surplus. The fourth count requested an inspection of Blue Cross' business records. The trial court found Appellants lacked standing to challenge Blue Cross' alleged violations of the Nonprofit Law and dismissed the suit. The Commonwealth Court affirmed the trial court. Upon careful consideration of the briefs submitted by the parties in addition to the applicable legal authorities, the Supreme Court found that Appellants indeed lacked standing under the Nonprofit Law to challenge Blue Cross by their four-count complaint. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the lower courts' decisions and dismissed Appellants' case.

Respondent optometrist Steven Hobbs sublet space leased by Cole Vision Corporation (Cole Vision) from Sears Roebuck and Company (Sears) for his optometry practice. The sublease agreement between Hobbs and Cole Vision contained indemnity provisions whereby Hobbs agreed to defend Cole Vision and Sears against any and all liabilities arising from events occurring in Hobbs' business location or as a result of Hobbs' activities at the business. The agreement also purportedly required Cole Vision to retain copies of Hobbs' patient records. Pursuant to the agreement, Hobbs obtained professional liability insurance with NCMIC Insurance Company (NCMIC). Mary and John Lewis (the Lewises) sued Hobbs, Cole Vision, and Sears based on Hobbs' alleged malpractice in failing to properly diagnose and treat Mary Lewis. Cole Vision and Sears brought this action for declaratory relief after Hobbs and NCMIC refused to defend them in the malpractice suit. Although the Lewises' case was pending when Cole Vision brought this declaratory judgment action, it eventually settled. Cole Vision and Sears also sought judgment against Hobbs and NCMIC for defense costs and settlement amounts of the malpractice action brought by the Lewises. In response to the complaint, Hobbs filed a defense and counterclaim for negligent spoliation of evidence against Cole Vision and Sears stemming from the loss of Mary Lewis's patient profile sheet. Hobbs contended that Cole Vision lost the profile sheet, which was a key piece of evidence needed to defend the malpractice claim. According to Hobbs, he incurred costs and attorney fees as a result of his inability to adequately defend against the Lewises' claim for malpractice. Cole Vision filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that South Carolina does not recognize a cause of action for spoliation of evidence. The circuit court agreed and granted the motion to dismiss. Hobbs appealed the circuit court's order and the court of appeals reversed the circuit court, finding that Hobbs pled facts sufficient to constitute a general negligence cause of action. The court of appeals did not determine whether South Carolina recognizes a cause of action for negligent spoliation, instead reversing the circuit court based on its characterization of Hobbs' claim as a general negligence claim. Upon review of the record of the courts below, the Supreme Court found that Hobbs' claim that Cole Vision breached a contractual duty to maintain the document at issue remained a viable defense in his action for indemnification. The Court declined to recognize the tort of negligent spoliation of evidence and accordingly found that the circuit court properly dismissed it as a counterclaim. The Court reversed the appellate court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Stephen O'Bryant, a commercial truckdriver, was killed during the course of his employment as the result of a motor vehicle accident. Sylvia Devese, the representative of his estate, sought to recover under O'Bryant's occupational accident policy with Transguard Insurance Company of America. Transugard denied the claim on the ground that O'Bryant did not have a valid commercial driver's license (CDL) at the time of the accident, and the personal representative brought this action against Transguard for breach of contract and bad faith. The policy stated that no benefits would be paid for any claim resulting from any loss occurring while the insured person was operating a vehicle without a valid CDL. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Transguard. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that Neb. Rev. Stat. 44-358 applies so as to require a showing of causation between the breach and the loss, despite the language of the policy.

This lawsuit arose from the dispute between the parties about how much appellant was obligated to pay appellee for auto-glass goods and services rendered on behalf of appellant's insureds. Appellants appealed from the district court's orders dismissing its counterclaim that appellee violated Minnesota's anti-incentive statute, Minn. Stat. 325F.783, granting summary judgment in favor of appellee on appellant's counterclaim for breach of contract, and denying appellant's motion to vacate the arbitration award. The court held that, given the plain language of the statute and the ordinary meaning of the terms of rebate and credit, appellee's practice did not violate the anti-incentive statute. The court also held that even if the blast faxes at issue constituted offers to enter into unilateral contracts, appellee rejected the offers when its actions failed to conform to the terms of the offer. The court further held that the arbitration award did not require reversal or new proceedings because the award was based on the finding that appellant failed to pay the competitive price standard set forth in the applicable endorsement and Minnesota law.

After appellant Stephanie Riley, who was insured by State Farm, was involved in a car accident, Riley settled with the tortfeasor's insurer, GEICO. Riley asserted that State Farm filed a lien on her settlement before it knew whether she would be made whole by the settlement. After taking her case to trial court, Riley appealed with a Ark. R. Civ. P. 54(b) certification the dismissal of count one of her amended petition for declaratory judgment and complaint, which sought a declaratory judgment that appellee State Farm had failed to establish a legal lien or right to subrogation under Arkansas law. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the circuit court erred in interpreting Ark. Code Ann. 23-89-207 and the state's subrogation law. The subrogation lien cannot arise, or attach, until the insured has received the settlement proceeds or damage award and until there is a judicial determination that the insured has been made whole.

Gervis Sadler owned a house that he insured through a limited-peril policy issued by North Carolina Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company (Farm Bureau). Farm Bureau adjusters investigated the home on two separate occasions, but Sadler disagreed with the amount of loss and asked for a disinterested appraisal. In the disinterested appraisal, Farm Bureau's appraiser valued the loss at $31,561. The appraisal award calculated by Sadler's appraiser and the umpire valued the loss at $162,500. Farm Bureau filed a complaint for declaratory relief, alleging the appraisal award failed to itemize the damages so Farm Bureau could determine the covered losses. Sadler moved for partial summary judgment on his breach of contract counterclaim. The trial court granted Sadler's request for partial summary judgment. Farm Bureau appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in granting partial summary judgment in favor of Sadler because genuine issues of material fact needed to be resolved before the loss covered by the policy could be determined.