Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Under the terms of a collective-bargaining agreement, the City of Newport provided health insurance benefits to its retired firefighters. After the City decided to modify those benefits, Local 1080, International Association of Firefighters, ALF-CIO (Union) filed grievances and sought arbitration. The City responded by seeking relief in the superior court to determine the arbitrability of disputes over changes to these benefits. The superior court determined that this dispute was not arbitrable. The Union disagreed and petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. The Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court, holding that the parties did not intend to arbitrate disputes regarding retiree healthcare, and therefore, such disputes must be resolved, if at all, judicially rather than through arbitration. View "City of Newport v. Local 1080, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, AFL-CIO" on Justia Law

LSED sought to rescind an agreement to purchase bond insurance from FGIC and recover its $13 million premium payment. LSED based its claim on failure of cause, a tenet of Louisiana law that required all contracts be supported by cause. Because the court found that the principal cause of the agreement between the parties was the purchase of bond insurance to protect the bondholders in the event of default, not to reduce the interest rate LSED paid to borrow money, the court affirmed the district court's decision. View "In Re: Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sought coverage under his homeowners' insurance policy issued by Insurer for damages allegedly caused by sheets of drywall manufactured in China that were installed in his home during its construction. Insurer denied Plaintiff's claim and brought an action in the U.S. district court, seeking a declaratory judgment that Plaintiff's homeowners policy did not provide coverage for such losses. The district court granted Insurer's motion for summary judgment on the basis that the policy did not provide coverage for the damages allegedly caused by the drywall because of certain policy exclusions. The U.S. court of appeals certified to the Virginia Supreme Court the question of whether the policy exclusions were applicable to Plaintiff's claimed losses. The Supreme Court answered in the affirmative, holding that the policy unambiguously excluded from coverage damage caused by the Chinese drywall installed in Plaintiff's residence. View "TravCo Insurance Co. v. Ward" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a motor vehicle collision involving Roger Linton and James Carey that resulted in Carey's death. At the time of the collision, Linton was driving a truck owned by Jonathan Jennings, for whom Linton worked as an independent contractor. Jennings's insurer, State Farm, filed a declaratory judgment action against Carey's Estate and Linton to determine whether it was responsible for liability coverage and obligated to defend and indemnify Linton for claims arising from the collision. The superior court entered a judgment in favor of State Farm, concluding that Linton was not an insured covered by Jennings's policy because his use of the truck was not within the scope of Jennings's consent. At issue on appeal was whether the superior court erred in its application of the minor deviation rule in determining that Linton's use of the truck exceeded the scope of Jennings's consent. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, clarified the applicable burdens associated with the minor deviation rule, and remanded for the superior court to apply the minor deviation rule as clarified. View "State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Estate of Carey" on Justia Law

Hospital purchased from Insurer a "builders risk" insurance policy which included a provision requiring Hospital to obtain Insurer's written consent before assigning a claim for an insured loss. Hospital contracted with Constructors for floors and subsurface work, which was later damaged. Hospital claimed a loss and sought recompense under the builders risk policy, but Insurer denied the claim. Hospital later assigned Constructors any claim or rights Hospital had against Insurer arising out of the insurance policy. Constructors, as Hospital's assignee, brought suit in federal court against Insurer seeking to recover payment due under the builder's risk policy. The Supreme Court granted the certification request of the federal court to answer a question of state law and concluded that, under Kentucky law, a clause in an insurance policy that requires the insured to obtain the insurer's prior written consent before assigning a claim for an insured loss under the policy is not enforceable or applicable to the assignment of a claim under the policy where the covered loss occurs before the assignment, and that such a clause would, under those circumstances, be void as against public policy. View "Wehr Constructors, Inc. v. Assurance Co. of Am." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs acquired a homeowners' insurance policy from Defendant effective as of the closing date of the home they had entered into a contract to purchase. The closing date was scheduled to take place on March 31 but was delayed until May 20. On May 15, a fire completely destroyed the house. Defendant disclaimed coverage on the pertinent grounds that the dwelling was unoccupied at the time of the loss, and therefore, it did not qualify as a "residence premises" under the policy. Supreme court granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint. The appellate division modified the order, concluding that the "residence premises" requirement in the policy failed to define what qualifies as "resides" for the purpose of attaching coverage and that the policy was ambiguous in the circumstances of this case, and otherwise denied summary judgment. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) there were issues of fact as to whether Plaintiffs' daily presence in the house, coupled with their intent to eventually move in, was sufficient to satisfy the policy's requirements; and (2) the term "residence premises" in the contract was ambiguous. View "Dean v. Tower Ins. Co. of N.Y." on Justia Law

Travelers Indemnity Company issued to Plaintiff an insurance policy covering direct physical loss of or damage to a building. The policy contained an exclusion for loss or damage caused by earth movement, which included earth sinking whether "naturally occurring or due to made made or other artificial causes." The building suffered cracks as a result of an excavation being conducted on the lot next door to it. Travelers rejected Plaintiff's claim, relying on the earth movement exclusion. Plaintiff sued for breach of the policy. Supreme court denied Travelers' motion for summary judgment, and the appellate division affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether Pioneer Tower Owners Ass'n v. State Farm, in which the Court held that an "earth movement" exclusion in an insurance policy did not unambiguously apply to excavation, applied in this case. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that because the policy in the instant case had added language expressly making the earth movement exclusion applicable to "man made" movement of earth, the exclusion was unambiguous and the loss caused by excavation was excluded from the policy. View "Bentoria Holdings, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co." on Justia Law

Insurer denied coverage for two unassembled wind turbines that were destroyed in a fire on Ranch's property. Insurer claimed that a policy exclusion for "fences, windmills, windchargers, or their towers" permitted it to deny coverage for the loss. Ranch sued Insurer, asserting Insurer committed a breach of contract and acted in bad faith in denying coverage for the unassembled wind turbines. The circuit court granted Insurer's motion for summary judgment, finding the policy exclusion applied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court correctly applied the law in determining Ranch's unassembled wind turbines were precluded from coverage under Insurer's policy exclusion, as the language of the exclusion was unambiguous and the plain and ordinary meanings of "windmill" and "windcharger" encompassed the unassembled wind turbines. View "Ass Kickin Ranch, LLC v. N. Star Mut. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Younglove Construction entered into a contract with PSD Development for the construction of a feed-manufacturing plant. When PSD withheld payment, Younglove brought this diversity suit against PSD and three other defendants. In its answer, PSD alleged it had sustained damages as a result of defects in a steel grain bin constructed by Custom Agri Systems, Inc. as a subcontractor. Younglove filed a third-party complaint against Custom Agri Systems, Inc. for contribution and indemnity. Custom turned to its insurer, Westfield Insurance Company, to defend and indemnify it in the litigation. Westfield intervened to pursue a judgment declaring it had no such duty under the terms of its commercial general liability (CGL) policy with Custom. At issue was whether the claims against Custom sought compensation for "property damage" caused by an "occurrence" under the policy. The district court granted summary judgment for Westfield. On appeal, the federal court of appeals certified questions of state law to the Supreme Court. The Court answered by holding that claims of defective construction or workmanship brought by a property owner are not claims for "property damage" caused by an "occurrence" under a CGL. View "Westfield Ins. Co. v. Custom Agri Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

After Mississippi Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co. (Farm Bureau) delayed payment of Robert Fulton's uninsured-motorist benefits, Fulton sued. The jury found Farm Bureau negligent for failing to timely investigate and pay Fulton's claim, awarding Fulton $10,000 in extracontractual damages. The jury did not find that Farm Bureau acted grossly negligent, reckless, or in bad faith and awarded no punitive damages. Following the jury's verdict, Fulton filed a post-judgment motion to amend, seeking $120,773 in attorney’s fees and expenses. The circuit court denied the motion, analyzing it under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) and finding that Fulton had not shown reason to amend. Fulton appealed the denial of his motion, arguing that attorney's fees were collateral to the final judgment and outside the scope of Rule 59(e). The Court of Appeals agreed and reversed the circuit court, holding that the court at least should have considered awarding them. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeals erred in classifying attorney’s fees as "collateral." Fulton had no post-judgment right to attorney's fees because the jury did not award punitive damages, and neither a statutory nor a contractual provision authorizes such fees. The circuit court, by properly applying a Rule 59(e) analysis, did not abuse its discretion in denying Fulton’s motion. Therefore, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated and affirmed the circuit court's decision. View "Fulton v. Mississippi Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co. " on Justia Law