Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Appellants hired Respondent as the general contractor to build a seasonal residence on Appellant's property. Respondent purchased a general liability insurance policy from Midwest Family Mutual Insurance Company that included an absolute pollution exclusion. Respondent later purchased a boiler for Appellant's home that bore a label warning that the boiler was designed to run on natural gas only. Respondent connected the boiler to a liquid propane line. Appellants were later transported to hospital due to carbon monoxide poisoning from the boiler. Appellants brought litigation against Respondent. Midwest initiated a declaratory judgment action, requesting that the district court find Midwest had no duty to defend or indemnify Respondent because coverage was barred under the absolute pollution exclusion. The district court denied Midwest's motion for summary judgment, concluding that it would be inappropriate to rule as a matter of law that the absolute pollution exclusion barred coverage under the facts in this case since Respondent did not cause any environmental pollution. The court of appeals reversed, holding that carbon monoxide constitutes a pollutant in the Midwest policy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that carbon monoxide released from a negligently installed boiler is clearly a "pollutant" that is subject to the absolute pollution exclusion of the Midwest policy. View "Midwest Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wolters" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs purchased property from Charles Johnson. During the pendency of the sale of the property, Johnson misrepresented the condition of the property and failed to disclose its prior use as a junkyard. Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Johnson alleging various causes of action and seeking damages for loss of investment, undisclosed physical problems with the property, and emotional distress. While he owned the disputed property, Johnson maintained a homeowners insurance policy with Allstate Insurance Company. Allstate refused to defend or indemnify Johnson on Plaintiffs' complaint. Plaintiffs and Johnson subsequently reached an agreement resolving the underlying complaint, and the superior court entered a judgment against Johnson for $330,000. Plaintiffs then initiated a reach and apply action against Allstate. The trial court granted summary judgment for Johnson, determining that the policy did not cover the damages Plaintiffs suffered. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs' damages did not constitute covered "bodily injury" or "property damage" pursuant to the Allstate homeowners insurance policy. View "Langevin v. Allstate Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Although the court usually may not review voluntary dismissals of claims or denials of motions for summary judgment, this case presented the unusual situation in which the court was asked to review the voluntary dismissal of a claim following a denial of a motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that its review was appropriate in these circumstances because (1) the district court rejected the legal basis for appellants' counterclaim; (2) the district court disposed of all claims with prejudice; and (3) appellants consented to the final judgment solely to obtain immediate appeal of the prior adverse decision, without pursuing piecemeal appellate review. The court also interpreted several "excess" liability insurance policies, which provided insurance protection beyond the protection provided by underlying policies. The court concluded that the plain language of the insurance policies supported the view of the insurer appellees that the excess liability coverage was only triggered when liability payments reached the attachment point. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Ali v. Fed. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

This case involved an insurance-coverage dispute governed by Massachusetts substantive law. Plaintiffs filed a claim with their insurance company after a storm caused a pile of soil to slide down a hill and into and over a retaining wall, damaging one of the buildings on Plaintiffs' property. The insurance company denied coverage. Plaintiffs sued for breach of the insurance contract and violation of the Massachusetts consumer-protection act. The insurance company counterclaimed, seeking a declaration that the policy did not cover the claimed loss. The magistrate judge granted the insurance company's motion for summary judgment, noting that the policy excluded damages from landslides. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the insurance company acted well within its rights in denying coverage, and the magistrate judge properly granted summary judgment for the insurance company on all claims. View "Stor/Gard, Inc. v. Strathmore Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Charles Honeycutt was injured in an automobile accident involving a Mississippi state trooper. He sued the state trooper and two automobile-insurance providers, Atlanta Casualty Company and American Premier Insurance Company. The trial court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment. Plaintiff filed a writ of certiorari, seeking to appeal the grant of summary judgment for American Premier: (1) whether the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred by finding an insurance agent does not have a duty to explain uninsured-motorist coverage; (2) whether summary judgment was granted improperly. The Supreme Court found that, in order to obtain a knowing and voluntary waiver of uninsured-motorist coverage (UM coverage), an insurance agent does have a duty to explain UM coverage to the insured. The Court also found that summary judgment was not proper in this case. Thus, the Court reversed both lower courts' judgments and remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Honeycutt v. Coleman" on Justia Law

Plaintiff's young son was injured by an uninsured motorist while he was a passenger in his daycare provider's van. Plaintiff filed a petition on behalf of her son against the daycare provider's insurance company, Shelter Mutual, alleging that her child was an "insured" under the uninsured motorist provisions of the policy. The policy defined "insured" to include owners, operators, and other users who exercise physical control of the right of control of the vehicle. The trial court granted summary judgment to Shelter. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the uninsured motorist statute requires coverage of all passengers within the definition of "user." The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff's child was not an insured because (1) Plaintiff's child was not included in the definition of "insured" under the policy itself; (2) the financial responsibility law implies coverage as a matter of law in a policy for owners, operators and users to the extent that liability may be imposed on them under Missouri law for damages arising out of such ownership, operation, or use; and (3) Plaintiff's child did not come within this scope of coverage. View "Steele v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the widow of the insured, filed this action under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(1)(B), after AUL, the insurer, refused to pay accidental death and dismemberment (AD&D) benefits. The district court affirmed the denial of benefits on the grounds that the death was not accidental because the fatal crash was an "anticipated and expected" result of driving while intoxicated. The insurance policies did not define the term "accident" despite its critical importance for determining eligibility for AD&D benefits. Because "accident" was susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, the court construed it against AUL, the drafting party, and concluded that a reasonable plan participant under similar circumstances would have understood the insurer's alcohol-related crash to be an "accident" under the policy language. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Johnson v. American United Life Ins." on Justia Law

Landlord and Tenant signed a lease agreement for a rental property that required Tenant to obtain a liability and renter's insurance policy at his expense. Tenants obtained a renter's protection policy of insurance. The house was later damaged by fire caused by a child using a lighter. Landlord's insurer (Insurer) paid for the loss. This subrogation action was brought against Tenants in Landlord's name. The district court dismissed the action, concluding (1) the lease provision requiring Tenant to obtain renter's insurance did not permit Landlord or Insurer to bring a subrogation action against Tenants; and (2) Tenants were coinsureds under Landlord's fire insurance policy, and Insurer could not subrogate against its coinsureds. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the terms of the lease did not overcome the presumption that Tenant was coinsured under Landlord's fire insurance policy, Landlord and Insurer could not bring a subrogation action against Tenants. View "Beveridge v. Savage" on Justia Law

Kenneth Crum, who was horseback riding at the time, was struck and severely injured by a vehicle driven by Raymond Ousley. At the time, Ousley was test-driving the vehicle, an uninsured car titled to Rhonda Ward. Crum sued Ousley for personal injuries and later joined Ousley's auto liability insurer, Kentucky Farm Bureau, for no-fault benefits. Kentucky Farm and Crum settled the negligence claims against Ousley for $25,000. Later, the trial court declared by final order that Kentucky Farm was also required to pay basic reparation benefits (BRBs) to Crum for the motor vehicle accident. The trial court then entered a final order declaring coverage for Crum and ordering Kentucky Farm also to pay Crum the no-fault benefits. The court of appeals reversed, holding that Kentucky law did not allow Crum to recover and Ousley's policy excluded Crum. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a pedestrian struck by an uninsured vehicle being driven by an ininsured driver can recover no-fault benefits from the driver's insurance company; and (2) therefore, Crum was entitled to receive BRBs from Kentucky Farm. View "Samons v. Ky. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

This case arose from the water loss claims Appellant Roger Daniel Rizzo made under Respondent State Farm Fire and Casualty Company's homeowners insurance policy. All of Appellant's claims were for water damage to his home's basement. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurance company, effectively dismissing all of Appellant's causes of action because his homeowner's policy did not cover his water damage claims. Appellant also appealed the district court's denial of his motion to amend his complaint to include various new causes of action and the district court's grant of State Farm's motion for protective order against certain overbroad discovery requests. Finding no error in the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of State Farm, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decisions. View "Rizzo v. State Farm Insurance" on Justia Law