Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Injury Law
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Elgene Phillips was driving his truck when the truck hydroplaned, ran off the road, and rolled over. Phillips died as a result of the accident. As administratrix of the decedent's estate, petitioner Shelia Haynes filed a wrongful death action, alleging that the seatbelt in the decedent's trunk was defective. Chrysler, the manufacturer of the decedent's truck, and Autoliv, the manufacturer of the seatbelt, were named as defendants. The parties settled for $150,000, but the agreement did not contain an apportionment between the two defendants regarding who was responsible for that amount. After Chrysler declared bankruptcy, petitioner filed a motion to sever claims against Chrysler and a motion to compel Autoliv to pay the entire amount of the settlement. The circuit court denied petitioner's motions, and as a result petitioner received only $65,000 in settlement proceeds. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that (1) the terms of the contract were unambiguous, and Autolive was bound by the underlying agreement; and (2) by cashing Autolive's check for $65,000, the petitioner and Autolive did not reach an accord and satisfaction under the facts of the case.

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After appellant Stephanie Riley, who was insured by State Farm, was involved in a car accident, Riley settled with the tortfeasor's insurer, GEICO. Riley asserted that State Farm filed a lien on her settlement before it knew whether she would be made whole by the settlement. After taking her case to trial court, Riley appealed with a Ark. R. Civ. P. 54(b) certification the dismissal of count one of her amended petition for declaratory judgment and complaint, which sought a declaratory judgment that appellee State Farm had failed to establish a legal lien or right to subrogation under Arkansas law. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the circuit court erred in interpreting Ark. Code Ann. 23-89-207 and the state's subrogation law. The subrogation lien cannot arise, or attach, until the insured has received the settlement proceeds or damage award and until there is a judicial determination that the insured has been made whole.

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Randy Mace, as personal representative of the estate of Kathy Mace, appealed from an order of the circuit court dismissing his wrongful death lawsuit on the basis of forum non conveniens. Applying the forum non conveniens statute, the circuit court concluded that North Carolina, the state in which the action accrued, was a more convenient forum for Mace's claims. Mace argued, however, that he was unable to try his claims in North Carolina because they were barred by that state's statute of limitations. Thus, he argued, the circuit court erred in dismissing the case because it misinterpreted the forum non conveniens statute as permitting dismissal despite the lack of an alternate forum in which the claims may be tried. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Finding the language of the statute ambiguous, the Court construed the statute in a manner consistent with the Court's prior case law and the federal common law doctrine of forum non conveniens. Under this construction, the circuit court erred in its interpretation of the statute.

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Plaintiffs Mark and Karla Gibbs brought claims in the federal district court against, among other defendants, Corinthian Title, Jeffrey Brown, Shelley Hickson, and Christine Tueckes, for civil conspiracy. The above defendants argued that the federal district court did not have in personam jurisdiction over them because Arkansas's long-arm statute does not allow application of conspiracy jurisdiction. The federal district court certified to the Supreme Court the question of whether the use of the conspiracy theory of in personam jurisdiction violates the state's long-arm statute. The Court answered in the negative. Arkansas's long-arm statute does not limit the exercise of personal jurisdiction to certain enumerated circumstances and is therefore limited only by federal constitutional law. Because jurisdiction based on the conspiracy theory does not violate due process, the conspiracy theory of in personam jurisdiction does not violate Arkansas's long-arm statute.

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Megan Bradley, who was insured by State Farm, was injured in a motor-vehicle accident. State Farm paid $3844 in medical benefits to Bradley. State Farm then pursued a subrogation claim against the tortfeasor's insurer, Farmers Insurance. Bradley responded that the settlement with Farmers Insurance was not sufficient for her to be made whole. State Farm refused to release its subrogation claim. Bradley filed a petition for declaratory judgment and complaint for bad faith against State Farm and later filed an amended declaratory action to invalidate lien and complaint for injunctive relief, deceptive trade practices, bad faith and tortious interference with a contract. The circuit court dismissed count one of Bradley's amended pleading, finding (1) State Farm had a valid but unenforceable lien for sums paid to Bradley, (2) State Farm's right of subrogation arose at the time State Farm paid the medical benefits by operation of law, and (3) State Farm's right of subrogation is not enforceable until a subsequent judicial determination that Bradley was made whole by the settlement. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for the reasons set forth on the same day in Riley v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.

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Gary Hoff filed a complaint alleging contract and negligence claims against Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. and Lake County Abstract & Title Company. Countrywide failed to appear or answer within the 20 days permitted by Mont. R. Civ. P. 12(a), after which Hoff moved for entry of default against Countrywide. Countrywide later attempted to reverse the default proceedings with a motion to set aside the default pursuant to Mont. R. Civ. P. 55(c) and then a Mont. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion to set aside the entry of default for mistake or excusable neglect. The court denied the motions and entered a default judgment against Countrywide. Countrywide appealed and Hoff cross-appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in its judgment against Countrywide because pursuant to Cribb v. Matlock Commc'n, Inc., good cause did not exist to set aside the entry of default, and (2) the district court did not err as Countrywide's 60(b) motion was procedurally defective. Lastly, the Court concluded the district court correctly denied Hoff's request for attorneys fees because the contract did not entitle either party to attorneys fees under the circumstances.

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Michael Clark owns property on which he stores unused, abandoned, or broken vehicles. Joseph Doyle owns surrounding properties. After attempting for several years to get Clark to clean up the portion of Clark's property that was visible from Doyle's property, Doyle sued Clark and others, claiming that Clark breached a written and oral contract and created a public and private nuisance. A jury ruled in favor of Clark and the other defendants. Following the trial, the district court awarded costs to the defendants. Doyle appealed. The Supreme Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion (1) in excluding certain exhibits and testimony, (2) in refusing to give Doye's jury instructions on breach of contract and negligence theories, and (3) by limiting Doyle's counsel's closing argument with threats of a mistrial. The Court, however, found the court abused its discretion by awarding Clark his costs. The Court affirmed the judgment of the district court but with instructions to vacate the award of costs to Clark.

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In 2005, Southwest Emergency Physicians, Inc. (SWEP) and Alldredge entered into a contract under which SWEP's physician-employees staffed Lewis-Gale's emergency department. The contract provided that it could be terminated by either party without cause. In 2008, Alldredge became involved with some signatories to a letter addressed to the Lewis-Gale administration voicing work-related concerns. Certain Lewis-Gale administrators expressed concern that Alldredge had become involved in the hospital's personnel matters, and SWEP later terminated Alldredge's employment. Alldredge sued Lewis-Gale for tortious interference with her employment contract with SWEP, and the circuit court found in favor of Alldredge. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the administrators' statements of intimidation and animus toward Allredge did not rise as a matter of law to the level of "improper methods"- such as fraud, deceit, or defamation - necessary to establish a cause of action for tortious interference with contract expectancy when a contract is terminable at will.

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Plaintiff Denise Perrelli appealed a trial court decision in favor of Defendants Bridget and Paul Pastorelle. Plaintiff believed the last time she sent her car insurance company a check for coverage was in 2005. She believed she had coverage on August 4, 2006, the day she got into an accident with Defendants. Geovanni Velverde, a friend, was driving at the time of the accident. He died of his injuries, and Plaintiff suffered serious injuries. Plaintiff sued Defendants alleging that her injuries were caused by Defendants' negligence. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that as an uninsured motorist, Plaintiff had no right to sue. Upon careful consideration of the arguments and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision. The Court found that under the state's "No Fault Act," a person injured while a passenger in her on uninsured vehicle was barred from suing for her injuries.

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This case stemmed from a contract between the City of Rutland and the Vermont Swim Association (VSA). The City granted VSA use of a City facility for a swim meet. A child attending the swim meet was injured when she fell from a piece of playground equipment where the meet was held. The childâs parents, Plaintiffs David and Susan Southwick, sued the City, which then sued VSA. The City sought indemnity from VSA pursuant to the contract between them. The trial court entered a judgment in favor of the City, and awarded $700,000 on the indemnity claim. VSA appealed, arguing that the contract contained no express intent to indemnify the City for the Cityâs negligence. The Supreme Court found that the terms and circumstances of the agreement between the City and VSA demonstrated that VSA contracted to indemnify the City for claims such as those resulting from the Southwicksâ injury. The Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the City.