Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Appellant was injured when she was involved in a motor vehicle accident. The other vehicle involved in the accident, a truck, was listed on two different insurance policies: an Allstate policy issued to Jeremy Lucas and a Mountain West policy issued to Wyoming Electric Company. Appellee, Mountain West, filed a complaint for declaratory judgment, requesting that the district court find Mountain West did not have to cover the truck under the policy. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Mountain West, finding that the owner of Wyoming Electric had given the truck to Lucas and, therefore, the truck was no longer covered under the company's insurance policy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that although the truck was titled and registered in the name of Wyoming Electric and was still listed as a specific vehicle on the Mountain West Policy, Mountain West was not required to pay under the policy because, on the date of the accident, Wyoming electric no longer owned the truck and the truck was no longer covered under the Mountain West insurance policy.

After Employer and Employee settled a suit Employee brought against Employer, Employer's Insurer paid the policy's maximum of $2 million pursuant to an oral funding agreement. Insurer then filed an action against Employer, seeking a declaration that its policies provided no coverage for Employee's claim and reimbursement of the $2 million. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Employer on March 26, but the parties agreed to delay entry of a final judgment. On July 8, the circuit court entered a final judgment. Insurer appealed on August 12. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal as untimely, concluding that the circuit court's March 26 decision and order was the final order for purposes of appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Insurer's appeal was timely because although the March 26 order arguably disposed of the entire matter in litigation between the parties, it did not unambiguously do so, and therefore, the July 8 judgment was final for purposes of appeal; (2) the funding agreement was an enforceable contract; (3) under these circumstances, an insurer cannot recover payments based on an unjust enrichment theory; and (4) Insurer's asserted mistake of fact did not provide grounds for voiding the contract.

When Client allegedly failed to pay Firm as agreed under their contract, Firm sued Client for breach. Client counterclaimed for breach of contract and negligence. Client also filed a third-party complaint against Firm's Owner, alleging that Owner was Firm's alter ego and seeking to hold Owner liable for any judgment entered against Firm. The trial court entered (1) a directed verdict on the third-party complaint, and (2) judgment in favor of Client on Firm's breach of contract claim and on Client's counterclaim against Firm. Owner later sought attorney fees under the reciprocal attorney fees statute, Utah Code Ann. 78B-5-826, arguing that, as the prevailing party in the third-party action, he was entitled to a fee. The trial court denied Owner's request, concluding that Owner was not a party to the contract as required to trigger the statute. The court also denied Owner's request for costs. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the court of appeals' decision as to attorney fees under its analysis in Hooban v. Unicity International Inc.; but (2) reversed the court of appeals' decision as to costs based on its reading of Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d). Remanded.

At issue in this consumer protection case was which Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure applied to a motion that sought relief from a default judgment of liability on a counter-complaint, where the motion was filed within thirty days of entry of the default, the trial court did not expressly direct the entry of judgment on the counter-complaint pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.02, and neither liability on the original complaint nor damages on the counter-complaint were determined. The trial court entered default judgment in favor of the consumer on her counterclaims against Discover Bank and awarded the consumer damages. The court of appeals upheld the default judgment, vacated the award of damages, and remanded the case for a new hearing on damages. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Rule 54.02, rather than Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02, applies in this situation, but the same test applies to motions seeking relief from default judgment, under either rule, on the basis of "excusable neglect"; and (2) actual damages are recoverable for loss of available credit under Tennessee Consumer Protection Act where the plaintiff suffers a demonstrable loss of credit, proximately caused by the defendant, resulting in actual harm.

Lowell Burris and his wife commenced a product liability action against Menard, Versa, and Versa's affiliate in Minnesota state court. After Menard removed the action to federal court, which had diversity jurisdiction, Gulf commenced this action seeking a judgment declaring "that the policy issued by Gulf to [the named insureds] does not afford coverage to them or Menard, Inc. for any claim made by [Burris] under the terms of the Gulf Policy." The district court granted Gulf's motion for a summary declaratory judgment on the ground that Versa' dissolution after expiration of the policy meant that the insured "cannot meet its obligations under the SIR" (Self-Insured Retention endorsement), a material breach that terminated Gulf's obligations under the policy. Burris appealed. The court concluded that summary judgment for Gulf was factually unwarranted and the declaratory judgment action was dismissed with prejudice.

Plaintiff, Jeremy Mayfield, a professional race car driver, appealed the district court's dismissal of his complaint against NASCAR for conduct arising out of a positive drug test. Plaintiff filed suit against defendants, asserting claims for defamation, violation of North Carolina's disability statute, unfair and deceptive trade practices, breach of contract, and negligence, when one of the defendants, Brian France, held a press conference where he indicated that plaintiff had been suspended because he took a "performance enhancing" or "recreational" drug. The court found that the district court properly dismissed the case and there was no abuse of discretion in denying plaintiff's motions to reconsider and to amend. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Lisa Krebs sued Carmen McReynolds and GM for serious injuries she received when McReynold's car struck the GM vehicle in which Krebs was a passenger. McReynolds subsequently appealed the trial court's rulings. The court granted certiorari to consider two questions: (1) Did the Court of Appeals correctly construe OCGA 51-12-33 to require a trier of fact to apportion an award of damages among multiple defendants when the plaintiff was not at fault?; and (2) Did the Court of Appeals correctly find that McReynolds's insurer made a counteroffer in response to Krebs's settlement demand? The court answered both questions affirmatively. The court held that in applying section 51-12-33, the trier of fact must "apportion its award of damages among the persons who were liable according to the percentage of fault of each person" even if the plaintiff was not at fault for the injury or damages claimed. In light of this holding, there was no error in the dismissal of McReynolds's cross-claims for contribution and set-off against GM. The court construed the response by McReynolds's insurer to Krebs's settlement offer, proposing to resolve the hospital and other liens "as part of this settlement," as a counteroffer rather than an unconditional and unequivocal acceptance. Accordingly, no binding settlement was formed.

As a team building exercise, Plaintiff-Appellant Paul Morrison's employer wanted him and his coworkers to participate in a program at Defendant-Respondent Northwest Nazarene University that included a climbing wall activity. Several days prior to doing so, Plaintiff's employer required him to sign an agreement prepared by the University holding it harmless from any loss or damage he might incur due to the University's negligence or that of its employees. This appeal arose from the district court's grant of summary judgment that held Plaintiff's action for personal injuries suffered when he fell from the climbing wall was barred by the hold harmless agreement. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court did not err in dismissing Plaintiff's negligence claim because he was barred by the hold harmless agreement.

Michael Bryant, an owner and employee of Prime Cut Meat Market, assaulted another motorist, Francis Latanowich, in an apparent incident of road rage. Prime Cut and its employees were insured by a policy issued by The Travelers Indemnity Company. Latanowich and his wife sued Bryant and Prime Cut. Prime Cut successfully moved for summary judgment, and Bryant and the Latanowiches agreed to a settlement that included Bryant assigning all of his rights related to potential insurance coverage to the Latanowiches. Travelers later filed a complaint against Bryant and the Latanowiches seeking a declaratory judgment that it had no duty to indemnify Bryant for claims arising from the altercation because Bryant was not an insured under its policy issued to Prime Cut for purposes of that conduct. The superior court concluded that the policy language did not cover the incident, and it granted Travelers's motion for summary judgment. The Latanowiches appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, pursuant to the unambiguous language of the policy, the court correctly concluded that Bryant's assault of Latanowich was not covered by the policy and properly entered summary judgment.

An employee of a concrete subcontractor was injured in a workplace accident during the construction of a stadium. The employee sought to recover damages for negligence from the project's construction manager by whom she was not employed but whom she contended had a legal duty of care for jobsite-employee safety. The trial court ruled in the employee's favor that the construction manager could be held vicariously liable for the actions of the subcontractor. The Supreme Court granted transfer and reversed the trial court, holding (1) the construction manager was not vicariously liable to the worker for any negligence of the subcontractor because the construction manager and subcontractor did not have the requisite relationship; and (2) the construction manager did not have, either by the terms of its contracts or by its actions, a legal duty of care for jobsite-employee safety, and therefore the construction manager could not be held liable to the employee for negligence. Remanded.