Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

In this case the Supreme Court addressed several issues arising from a dispute over a series of property transactions. Plaintiffs sued Defendants under various theories of liability, including breach of contract and fraud. Defendants countersued for, inter alia, negligent misrepresentation and fraud by concealment. Defendants also brought a claim against Plaintiffs under Nev. Rev. Stat. 645.257, which provides a statutory cause of action for the victim of a real estate licensee's breach of the various duties imposed by Nev. Rev. Stat 645.252-.254. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court, holding (1) compromise offers are not admissible for the purpose of demonstrating a failure to mitigate damages under Nev. Rev. Stat. 48.105; (2) although Nev. Rev. Stat. 645.251 does not, in all instances, shield real estate licensees from common law forms of liability, it precludes such liability when the type of conduct complained of is covered by sections 645.252-.254; and (3) punitive damages may not be recovered under section 645.257, but compensatory damages are recoverable under the statute in accordance with the measure of damages that appropriately compensates the injured party for the losses sustained as a result of the real estate licensee's violations. Remanded.

Appellants, a clinic study center and three medical doctors, filed an action against Appellees, Dr. Samuel and Marilyn Boellner, alleging breaches of contract for a covenant not to compete, tortious inteference with a business expectancy, defamation, and injunctive relief. Appellees counterclaimed for breach of contract, wrongful termination, and declaratory judgment on the noncompete agreement. The trial court returned verdicts in favor of both Appellants and Appellees. Appellants later caused a writ of garnishment to be issued to reach assets of Marilyn Boellner held in an Individual Retirement Account (IRA). Appellants moved to declare the IRA statute unconstitutional. The circuit court denied Appellants' motion and quashed the writ of garnishment. Appellants appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statute was constitutional, as the IRA exemption provided in Ark. Code Ann. 16-66-220(a)(1) is not an absolute exemption of all personal property, and, as such, does not offend Ark. Const. art. IV, section 2.

After a landslide damaged their home, homeowners Timothy Jackowski and Eri Takase (the Jackowskis) sued the sellers of the home, seeking rescission or, in the alternative, damages for fraud, fraudulent concealment, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of contract. The homeowners also sued the sellers' broker and agent, alleging fraud, fraudulent concealment, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of common law fiduciary duties. They leveled similar claims against their own broker and agent together with a claim for breach of statutory fiduciary duties. The trial court entered summary judgment dismissing all of the Jackowskis' claims, except the fraudulent concealment claims against the sellers and the sellers’ broker and agent regarding cracks in the concrete basement floor. The Court of Appeals affirmed that decision in part and reversed it in part. The sellers and the homeowners’ broker and agent then sought review by the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

This case was a consolidation of three separate wrongful death lawsuits. Each lawsuit arose from a nursing home's attempt to compel a plaintiff to participate in arbitration pursuant to a clause in a nursing home admission contract. The Supreme Court (1) ruled that the arbitration clauses were unconscionable and unenforceable in two of the cases, and (2) held that the Nursing Home Act could not be relied upon to bar enforcement of the arbitration clause in the third case. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed and remanded to consider whether the arbitration clauses were enforceable under state common law principles that were not specific to arbitration and pre-empted by the FAA. On remand, the Supreme Court (1) held that the doctrine of unconscionability that the Court explicated in Brown I was a general, state, common-law, contract principle that was not specific to arbitration and did not implicate the FAA; (2) reversed the trial courts' prior orders compelling arbitration in two of the cases and permitted the parties to raise arguments regarding unconscionability anew before the trial court; and (3) found the issue of unconscionability in the third case was not considered by the trial court but may be raised on remand.

Respondents Kelly Rhoden and her daughters, Ashley Arrieta and Emerlynn Dickey, were involved in a motor vehicle accident while riding in a vehicle owned and operated by Arrieta. The parties stipulated that the Respondents are relatives residing in the same household, and that Arrieta's insurance policy with Nationwide did not provide UIM coverage. Rhoden owned two vehicles that she also insured through Nationwide under a policy that did provide UIM coverage. Rhoden's policy contained a term specifying that the insurance it provided was primary when the covered vehicle was involved in the accident but excess when the involved vehicle was not the covered vehicle but was owned by the policyholder or a resident relative. Nationwide brought a declaratory judgment action seeking a determination that UIM coverage was not available to any of the Respondents under Rhoden's policy. Nationwide contended that because Arrieta's policy had no UIM coverage, clause 3(b), a portability limitation clause, operated to prevent any Respondent from recovering under Rhoden's policy. The trial court held that UIM coverage under Rhoden's policy was available to all three Respondents because such coverage is personal and portable, and Respondents were either named insureds or resident relatives under Rhoden's policy. Nationwide appealed the decision to the court of appeals, which reversed the trial court with regard to Arrieta, and affirmed the trial court's ruling that UIM coverage was available to Rhoden and Dickey under Rhoden's policy. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether public policy was offended by the portability limitation clause preventing non-owner resident relatives from importing UIM coverage from an at-home vehicle's policy when the involved vehicle lacked UIM coverage. The Supreme Court held that South Carolina's public policy that UIM coverage is personal and portable requires UIM coverage to be provided to Rhoden and Dickey, who did not own the vehicle involved in the accident, while denied to Arrieta, who owned the vehicle involved in the accident but chose not to purchase UIM coverage. The Court affirmed the court of appeals' decision.

Plaintiff brought suit against Deerbrook for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Plaintiff was injured in an accident caused by Deerbrook's insured and after plaintiff received a judgment against the insured, the insured assigned his bad faith claim to plaintiff. Plaintiff argued that Deerbrook breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing owed to its insured when Deerbrook did not attempt to reach a settlement of plaintiff's claims after the insured's liability in excess of the policy limit became reasonably clear. Plaintiff subsequently appealed the district court's rejection of his request to instruct the jury that it could consider Deerbrook's failure to effectuate a settlement in determining whether Deerbrook breached the implied covenant. The court concluded that plaintiff's proposed jury instruction was consistent with the law but that there was no evidentiary basis for the instruction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

MT Technology Enterprises, LLC filed an amended complaint against Cristol, LLC, several members of Cristol's board of managers, and an employee of Cristol, Cristol's attorney, and the attorney's firm, alleging, inter alia, statutory conspiracy, tortious interference with economic expectancy in MT technologies, and breach of contract and unjust enrichment. The trial court imposed sanctions against Cristol, its board, and its employee (Defendants) for discovery violations. The case proceeded to a jury against Defendants, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of MT. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the trial court did not err in its interpretation of Va. Code Ann. 13.1-1057(A) and in concluding that MT satisfied the registration requirements of the statute; (2) the trial court did not err in imposing a sanction for discovery abuses; but (3) the trial court abused its discretion by forbidding cross-examination of witnesses regarding damages. Remanded for further proceedings on damages only.

Perot Systems Government Services filed an amended complaint against Defendants, 21st Century Systems, Inc, and several individuals, alleging that Defendants, all of whom were former Perot employees, conspired for the purpose of willfully and maliciously attempting to destroy Perot and steal away Perot business by unfairly and improperly using Perot's confidential and proprietary information. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Perot on all claims. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the trial court abused its discretion when it denied defense motions to strike testimony regarding lost goodwill damages, and accordingly, the court erred when it refused to set aside the jury's award of lost goodwill damages based upon that testimony; (2) the court did not err when it refused to set aside the jury's award of both punitive and treble damages in favor of Perot; and (3) the court did not err when it refused to set aside the jury's award of computer forensics damages.

This case presented the question of whether an individual who made voluntary expenditures based on a mother's fraudulent representation that the individual had fathered her child has a cause of action against the mother for recovery of those payments. The district court granted the mother's motion to dismiss the action. The Supreme Court reversed the district court, holding that such a cause of action may be pursued because it is consistent with traditional concepts of common law fraud, there is no prevailing public policy reason against recognizing such a cause of action, and Iowa's statutes do not speak to the issue. Remanded.

Sixty-six plaintiffs filed the underlying lawsuit in Tennessee against Morrow Valley Land Company and Ben Cain (Appellees) and others, alleging that Defendants owned and operated a concentrated animal-feeding operation that constituted a nuisance and a continuing trespass. After Appellees' insurer, Scottsdale Insurance Company, refused to provide defense or indemnification coverage under its insurance policy with Appellees, Appellees filed a petition for declaratory judgment in an Arkansas circuit court against Scottsdale and seeking damages for breach-of-contract claims. The circuit court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Appellees, concluding that Scottsdale had a duty to defend Appellees as its insured in the action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in finding that the pollution exclusion provision in the insurance policy was ambiguous and that Appellees were entitled to summary judgment on the duty to defend because there was a possibility that the injury or damage may fall within the policy coverage.