Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

After Mississippi Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co. (Farm Bureau) delayed payment of Robert Fulton's uninsured-motorist benefits, Fulton sued. The jury found Farm Bureau negligent for failing to timely investigate and pay Fulton's claim, awarding Fulton $10,000 in extracontractual damages. The jury did not find that Farm Bureau acted grossly negligent, reckless, or in bad faith and awarded no punitive damages. Following the jury's verdict, Fulton filed a post-judgment motion to amend, seeking $120,773 in attorney’s fees and expenses. The circuit court denied the motion, analyzing it under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) and finding that Fulton had not shown reason to amend. Fulton appealed the denial of his motion, arguing that attorney's fees were collateral to the final judgment and outside the scope of Rule 59(e). The Court of Appeals agreed and reversed the circuit court, holding that the court at least should have considered awarding them. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeals erred in classifying attorney’s fees as "collateral." Fulton had no post-judgment right to attorney's fees because the jury did not award punitive damages, and neither a statutory nor a contractual provision authorizes such fees. The circuit court, by properly applying a Rule 59(e) analysis, did not abuse its discretion in denying Fulton’s motion. Therefore, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated and affirmed the circuit court's decision. View "Fulton v. Mississippi Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co. " on Justia Law

At issue in this dispute over a mortgage was whether statutes of limitations apply to actions for declaratory judgment. The court of appeals reversed in part the district court's grant of summary judgment to Defendant based on the applicable statute of limitations, holding that to the extent Plaintiff's complaint sought declaratory relief, it was not barred by the statute of limitations. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act is a procedural device through which parties may vindicate substantive legal rights, an action for declaratory judgment is barred by an applicable statute of limitations to the same extent that the same cause of action would be barred in a nondeclaratory proceeding. Remanded. View "Weavewood, Inc. v. S & P Home Invs., LLC" on Justia Law

This case involved a residence that the plaintiff homeowners allege contained "major structural defects." After discovering these defects and notifying the builder, the parties entered a "tolling agreement" to toll the applicable limitations period, so they could "engage in a review and analysis of the structural settlement issues to determine an agreed upon repair." After the builder refused to correct the defects, the plaintiffs filed suit averring breach of the New Home Warranty Act (NHWA); breach of the implied warranty of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose; implied warranty of construction performed in a workmanlike manner; negligence; and fraud/misrepresentation/and/or omission of fact. In response, the defendant builder asserted the claims were time-barred and that the tolling agreement was void. This appeal arose from the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's ruling that the tolling agreement was void: "Parties should not be discouraged from honest efforts to settle and/or compromise disputes, and thereby avoid incurring the attendant expenses and uncertainty of litigation and further burdening the courts – all laudable and desired goals. . . .parties should be allowed to agree to extend statutes of limitations (or repose) if they believe this to be in their best interest; however, the limitation period should not be shortened, absent an act of the Legislature." View "Townes v. Rusty Ellis Builder, Inc." on Justia Law

In July 2001, Kaye Hankins entered into a home-construction contract with Elite Homes, Inc. ("Elite"). An August 2001 soil-test report on the subject property recommended that "a stabilizing blanket of natural silty clays . . . and/or compacted fill soils having a maximum 7-foot thickness" was required "to minimize the Yazoo Clay . . . swell or heave potential to within limits tolerable to a strong slab foundation . . . ." Hankins received assurances from Elite that the Yazoo clay "was nothing to be concerned about." She moved into the new home in April 2002. During Hankins's first year in the home, she reported to Elite numerous cracks, leaks, and difficulties in closing doors and windows. In September 2009, Hankins filed a complaint against Elite averring "that the damage which has occurred to said house . . . would not have occurred except for the negligence" of Elite. Thereafter, a "Default Judgment" of was entered against Elite. In August 2010, Hankins filed a "Suggestion for Writ of Garnishment" against Elite's commercial general liability ("CGL") insurer, Maryland Casualty Company/Zurich American Insurance Company ("Maryland Casualty"). In October 2010, a default judgment was entered against Maryland Casualty. Subsequently, Maryland Casualty filed a "Motion to Suspend Execution of Default Judgment against Maryland Casualty and For Leave to File Answer to Writ of Garnishment," which argued, inter alia, that because its CGL policy "exclud[ed] coverage for property damage caused by earth movement," then it "has no property or effects in its possession belonging to" Elite. Maryland Casualty then filed a "Motion for Summary Judgment" on the same basis. The circuit court concluded that the "earth movement" endorsement "excludes the damages suffered by [Hankins] from coverage under the policy." Based thereon, the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurance company, and set aside the default judgment. Upon review, the Supreme Court found Maryland Casualty's "earth movement" endorsement was unambiguous and operated to exclude the property damage Hankins suffered from coverage under the CGL policy. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the circuit court's order granting summary judgment to the insurance company, and the setting aside of the default judgment. View "Hankins v. Maryland Casualty Company" on Justia Law

In December 2005, Charles Baggett and Diana Morris were involved in an automobile accident, as a result of which Baggett was injured. Baggett sued Morris, who was insured by Sagamore Insurance Company. Baggett added his underinsured-motorist ("UIM") carrier, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company as a party to the action. The limit of State Farm's UIM policy was $60,000. Before Baggett commenced the action against Morris, State Farm paid Baggett $25,000, the limit of the liability policy issued by Sagamore to Morris, to protect its potential subrogation interest against Morris. At the time State Farm advanced the $25,000 to Baggett, Baggett executed an agreement entitled an "Advancement of Funds to Protect Future Subrogation Rights." State Farm opted out of the action. Following a jury trial, Baggett obtained a judgment against Morris for $181,046. Therefore, Baggett was entitled to $85,000--the total of the limits of both the Sagamore policy ($25,000) and the State Farm policy ($60,000). Sagamore paid $25,000; State Farm, rather than paying Baggett $35,000 and receiving credit pursuant to the "Advancement of Funds" agreement for the $25,000 it had advanced, mistakenly paid $60,000, resulting in an overpayment to Baggett of $25,000. As a result of the overpayment, the trial court ordered Baggett to reimburse State Farm $25,000, less a one-third attorney fee under the common-fund doctrine. State Farm appealed. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment, without an opinion. State Farm petitioned the Supreme Court seeking review of the application of the common-fund doctrine. Upon review, the Court found that State Farm was entitled to a refund of the overpayment, and that if an attorney fee was due Baggett's attorney with respect to all or part of the $85,000 actually owed in the aggregate by Sagamore and State Farm, then the fee should be taken from the $85,000, not from the $25,000 State Farm overpaid and as to which it was entitled to be reimbursed. View "State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Baggett" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the estate of Tore Myhra, brought suit against Royal Caribbean, seeking damages for Mr. Myhra's injuries and death. It alleged that a bacterial infection that he had acquired while on board Royal Caribbean's vessel had caused the tragic events. On appeal, the estate contended that the forum-selection clause should be invalidated both because it was against the statutorily expressed public policy of the United States and because its terms were not reasonably communicated to the Myhras. The court concluded that 46 U.S.C. 30509(a) did not prevent Royal Caribbean from including the forum-selection clause in the Myhras' contract. Nor did the court perceive any procedural or substantive error in the district court's conclusion that the clause was reasonably communicated to the Myhras. Accordingly, the decision of the district court to dismiss the case was correct and the court affirmed the judgment. View "The Estate Of Tore Myhra v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd." on Justia Law

This appeal came before the Supreme Court from a declaratory judgment action brought by Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho (Farm Bureau). Farm Bureau brought suit in response to a claim for insurance benefits filed by the personal representatives of the estate of a deceased policyholder (the Estate). Farm Bureau requested a judgment declaring that the Estate was not an "insured" under the decedent's insurance policy and was therefore not entitled to payment of wrongful death damages under the Policy's underinsured motorist coverage. The district court granted the Estate's motion for summary judgment, determining that Idaho's wrongful death statute, entitled the insured's Estate to recover damages for wrongful death and that the Policy provided coverage for those damages. Farm Bureau appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed: as to the Estate, the Court determined that under the plain language of the wrongful death statute, the Estate was not legally entitled to recover damages for itself, but only to bring an action on behalf of the heirs to recover their damages. "The Estate stepped into [the decedent's] shoes for those claims, and Farm Bureau made those payments to the Estate. Farm Bureau's payment of these legitimate claims under the insurance contract does not constitute a change of position or an admission that coverage exists for other claims. We hold that these payments do not prevent Farm Bureau from arguing that it is not required to pay the Estate for damages that [the decedent] was not legally entitled to recover." View "Farm Bureau v. Estate of Eisenman" on Justia Law

Certain individuals who worked for American Chemical Society (ACS) founded Leadscope Inc. and later received a patent for technology similar to that on which they worked while at ACS. ACS filed a lawsuit against Leadscope. A newspaper subsequently published an article about the suit quoting ACS's counsel. In pertinent part, the jury returned verdicts in favor of Leadscope on its counterclaims for defamation and unfair competition. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court (1) upheld the appellate court's decision affirming the trial court's denial of ACS's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) on the unfair competition claim, holding (i) a party alleging a claim for unfair competition must show the action is baseless and the opposing party had the intent to injure the party's ability to be competitive, and (ii) the jury instructions here did not meet that test, but the jury could not reasonably have made any other determination with proper instructions; and (2) reversed the appellate court's finding that the trial court properly overruled ACS's motion for JNOV on Leadscope's counterclaim for defamation, holding (i) ACS's statements were not defamatory, and (ii) a client is vicariously liable for its attorney's defamatory statements only if the client ratified the statements. View "Am. Chem. Soc'y v. Leadscope, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Christina Brooksby demanded payment from Defendant GEICO General Insurance Company, her father's liability insurer, alleging that he negligently injured her by crashing the car in which she was riding. After GEICO refused Plaintiff's demand pursuant to an exclusion in its insurance policy with Father, she sued GEICO for a declaratory judgment establishing coverage. The district court dismissed Plaintiff's complaint for lack of standing, holding that Idaho has no common-law direct-action rule that would give an injured third party standing to sue her tortfeasor’s insurer absent some statutory or contractual authorization, and that Idaho's Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act does not confer standing where it does not otherwise exist. Plaintiff appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s grant of GEICO’s Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) because the Court concluded Plaintiff lacked standing to seek a declaratory judgment against GEICO. View "Brooksby v. GEICO" on Justia Law

These companion appeals arose out of a dispute between a government contractor, Preferred Systems Solutions, Inc. (PSS) and one of its subcontractors, GP Consulting, LLC (GP). PSS sued GP following GP's termination of its contract with PSS and its commencement of a subsequent contract with a PSS competitor. PSS alleged breach of contract, misappropriation of trade secrets, and tortious interference with contract, seeking injunctive as well as monetary relief. PSS was ultimately awarded $172,396 in compensatory damages based on the circuit court's finding that GP breached the noncompete clause in the parties' contract. Both parties appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in (1) awarding damages to PSS for lost profits as a result of GP's breach of the noncompete clause; and (2) refusing to grant PSS injunctive relief, in concluding that PSS failed to prove tortious interference, and in dismissing PSS' trade secret claim. View "Preferred Sys. Solutions, Inc. v. GP Consulting, LLC" on Justia Law