Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs were injured when their vehicle was struck by a vehicle driven by Ida Trayter. Trayter's insurer tendered its liability limits, after which Plaintiffs sought underinsured motorist coverage from their insurer, State Farm. State Farm advised Plaintiffs that its settlement offer would be based on the "net" value of the claim after reduction of the liability limits and medical payments already received by Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs filed suit against State Farm seeking a declaratory judgment that a non-duplication provision and reimbursement provision in State Farm's underinsured motorist policy violated W. Va. Code 33-6-31(b). The circuit court granted partial summary judgment to Plaintiffs, finding both provisions at issue violated the statute. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a non-duplication of benefits provision in an underinsured motorist policy, which permits an insurer to reduce an insured's damages by amounts received under medical payments coverage, does not violate the "no sums payable" language of section 33-6-31(b), and the circuit court erred in holding otherwise; and (2) the circuit court's consideration of and entry of summary judgment on the reimbursement provision was erroneous because the provision was not ripe for adjudication in this matter. View "State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Schatken" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs purchased a home along the Cedar River. At the time, they were told, incorrectly, that the property was not in a special flood hazard area and that flood insurance would not be required as a condition of their loan. Plaintiffs received the same erroneous information when they refinanced their loan to pay for remodeling. Years later, their loan servicer was advised that the property actually was in a special flood hazard area. However, this information was not passed along to Plaintiffs until after their home had flooded and it was too late to buy flood insurance. Plaintiffs brought suit against the lender as well as the loan servicer. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants. The Supreme Court (1) reversed in part, finding a claim could potentially exist based on Restatement (Second) of Torts, 551(2); and (2) affirmed the remainder of the district court's judgment. Remanded. View "Bagelmann v. First Nat'l Bank" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident with Stephen Stanton. At the time, Plaintiff was operating a vehicle owned by his employer, Bambardier Aerospace Corporation, and Stanton was driving a vehicle owned by his employer, the City of Elkins. Plaintiff and his wife filed an action against the City and Stanton to recover for injuries. Plaintiffs' personal automobile insurer, Westfield Insurance, filed a crossclaim against the City and Stanton and a third party claim against Bombardier and National Union Fire Insurance. The trial court entered an order finding (1) the City, Stanton, and National were immune from liability; (2) Bombardier and Westfield were subject to a payment of damages of not more than $20,000 each; and (3) Plaintiffs were not entitled to auto medical coverage under the policy covering Bombardier and the policy issued by Westfield. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the circuit court's order to the extent it held the uninsured motorist policies for Bombardier and Westfield were not enforceable above the mandatory limits of uninsured motorist coverage required by W. Va. Code 33-6-31; (2) reversed the court's order to the extent it denied Plaintiffs auto medical payment benefits under Bombardier's policy; and (3) affirmed the remainder of the court's judgment. View "Jenkins v. City of Elkins" on Justia Law

Randy and Trudi Poole filed an action against Darin Davis, dba Darin Davis Construction (Davis), alleging breach of contract, breach of warranty, and fraud. Davis counterclaimed for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and promissory estoppel. The jury found that the Pooles had prevailed only on the fraud claim and that Davis had not proved any of his counterclaims. The district court entered judgment in favor of the Pooles for damages on the fraud claim. The Pooles moved for attorney fees and costs, claiming that as the prevailing party in a dispute over a commercial transaction, they were entitled to fees pursuant to Idaho Code 12-120(3). The court determined that there was no prevailing party and denied the motion. The Pooles timely appealed, asking the Supreme Court to reverse the decision of the district court and find, as a matter of law, that the Pooles were the prevailing party and are entitled to attorney fees. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Poole v. Davis" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was severely injured in a workplace accident and sued Trail King, the custom manufacturer of the trailer involved in the accident. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a jury's finding that Defendant had not been negligent nor in breach of any warranty. In the trial court in that diversity case, Plaintiffs belatedly attempted to amend their complaint to add another claim, one under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A for unfair and deceptive trade practices. The trial judge denied the motion, finding the effort to amend untimely. Plaintiffs did not appeal this denial in their earlier appeal. This case concerned whether Plaintiffs may now maintain an independent suit for the ch. 93A claims against Trail King. The district court dismissed the claims with prejudice, finding that the doctrine of claim preclusion applied. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that ch. 93A, 9(8) provides an exception to the normal rules of res judicata. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that under the facts of this case, Plaintiffs may not now bring this ch. 93A claim because of the failure to appeal from the denial of the motion to amend. View "Hatch v. Trail King Indus., Inc." on Justia Law

HPD, LLC and TETRA Technologies Inc. entered into an agreement for HPD to supply equipment to be used in TETRA's future facility. The contract contained a provision for binding arbitration. After the construction of the plant was completed, TETRA filed a complaint against HPD, alleging that the equipment designed by HPD did not perform to expectations. TETRA also sought a declaratory judgment that the contract and the embedded arbitration clause were illegal and thus void because HPD performed engineering services without obtaining a certificate of authorization as allegedly required by Ark. Code Ann. 17-30-303. HPD moved to compel arbitration. After a hearing, the circuit court rule in TETRA's favor that it would determine the threshold issues of arbitrability before deciding whether the case must proceed to arbitration. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for the entry of an order compelling arbitration, holding that the circuit court erred by not honoring the parties' clear expression of intent to arbitrate the existing disputes. View "HPD LLC v. TETRA Techs., Inc." on Justia Law

After Appellant was treated for injuries at a medical center, Appellant filed a complaint against the Center, Phillips Hospital Corporation, and Exigence, LLC, alleging causes of action for negligence, breach of contract, and vicarious liability. Exigence had entered into an agreement with Phillips, under which Exigence had specifically contracted with the physician who treated Appellant to provide emergency medical services for the Center. The circuit court dismissed Appellant's complaint against Exigence based on the two-year statute of limitations of the Arkansas Medical Malpractice Act (AMMA). Appellant appealed, and Exigence cross-appealed. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed on cross-appeal, holding (1) Appellant served Exigence outside the time limit in which to serve process, and while Appellant obtained an extension of time for service of process from the circuit court, he did so without demonstrating good cause and, as such, that service was defective; and (2) therefore, the circuit court erred in denying Exigence's motion to dismiss for insufficiency of process and insufficiency of service of process. View "Baylark v. Helena Reg'l Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff owned and operated a ranch with an 18,000 square-foot lodge. Defendant was a custom manufacturer of high-end wood flooring from whom Plaintiff brought wood flooring while building the lodge. After it was installed, the wood flooring began buckling and had to be replaced. Plaintiff sued Defendant for negligent misrepresentation, breach of an implied warranty of suitability for a particular purpose, and violation of the Montana Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act (MCPA). The jury returned a verdict in Defendant's favor on all of Plaintiff's claims. The district court then granted Defendant attorney fees as the prevailing party under the MCPA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not abuse its discretion when it found good cause to amend the scheduling order to allow Defendant's late disclosure of an expert witness; and (2) did not err when it awarded Defendant attorney fees under the MCPA. View "B Bar J Ranch, LLC v. Carlisle Wide Plank Floors, Inc." on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a motor vehicle collision involving Roger Linton and James Carey that resulted in Carey's death. At the time of the collision, Linton was driving a truck owned by Jonathan Jennings, for whom Linton worked as an independent contractor. Jennings's insurer, State Farm, filed a declaratory judgment action against Carey's Estate and Linton to determine whether it was responsible for liability coverage and obligated to defend and indemnify Linton for claims arising from the collision. The superior court entered a judgment in favor of State Farm, concluding that Linton was not an insured covered by Jennings's policy because his use of the truck was not within the scope of Jennings's consent. At issue on appeal was whether the superior court erred in its application of the minor deviation rule in determining that Linton's use of the truck exceeded the scope of Jennings's consent. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, clarified the applicable burdens associated with the minor deviation rule, and remanded for the superior court to apply the minor deviation rule as clarified. View "State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Estate of Carey" on Justia Law

Defendant entered into an oral agreement with his sister, Defendant, for the bailment of farm animals and farm equipment on her land. After their cooperative effort to breed horses broke down, Defendant sold her farm and the horses. Plaintiff subsequently retrieved most of his equipment from the farm and sued Defendant for conversion and breach of the bailment contract. Defendant counterclaimed for the expenses of maintaining the equipment and caring for the horses. The district court awarded no damages. The court of appeals affirmed the rulings against Plaintiff but found the district court erred in denying sanctions against Plaintiff. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) Plaintiffs' action in tort was not barred by the statute of limitations; (2) the district court erred by rejecting Plaintiff's claim for conversion; (3) the court of appeals correctly found that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to award attorney fees as a sanction, but the question of attorney fees was remanded to the district court for determining the amount of fees to be awarded. View "Schoenholz v. Hinzman" on Justia Law