Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Gerald Kirchner accidentally shot and killed Robbie Bragg while both men were working for Grimmett Enterprises (Grimmett). Kirchner's mother, Barbara Surbaugh, filed a complaint against Bragg and Grimmett. The parties settled, after which Defendants assigned all claims they might have against their respective insurers for refusing to provide a defense and coverage. Thereafter, Surbaugh filed a declaratory judgment action against Grimmett's insurer, American States. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. At issue was whether an employee exclusion in the policy was ambiguous and whether the exclusion had been brought to the attention of Grimmett. The circuit court denied the motions. After a jury trial, the circuit court concluded that the employee policy exclusion was unenforceable because the exclusionary language had not been brought to the attention of Grimmett. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that summary judgment should have been granted in favor of American States, as American States established at the summary judgment stage that no material issue of fact was in dispute as to the exclusion being unambiguous and disclosed to Grimmett. Therefore, the exclusion was enforceable. View "Am. States Ins. Co. v. Surbaugh" on Justia Law

Defendants in this suit included the St. Labre Indian Education Association, Inc. and the St. Labre Home for Indian Children and Youth (collectively, St. Labre). After St. Labre experienced a decrease in government funding, St. Labor began a fundraising campaign that NCT asserted resulted in millions of dollars donated to St. Labre through efforts that marketed the plight and need of NCT. NCT filed suit against Defendants alleging (1) St. Labre's fundraising system created a constructive trust on behalf of NCT and St. Labre wrongfully converted those funds to its own use, thus unjustly enriching itself; (2) contract and fraud type issues; and (3) St. Labre unconstitutionally committed cultural genocide against NCT. The district court dismissed all of NCT's motions. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment on NCT's claim for unjust enrichment and the imposition of a constructive trust that may arise from St. Labre's fundraising activities after 2002; (2) reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment regarding St. Labre's fundraising activities before 2002; and (3) affirmed the court's grant of summary judgment on all of NCT's remaining claims. View "N. Cheyenne Tribe v. Roman Catholic Church" on Justia Law

Petitioners sought underinsured motorist coverage (UIM) under a policy issued by Auto-Owners Insurance Company (Owners) as a result of an automobile accident caused by an allegedly negligent driver of a rental vehicle owned by Avis Rent-a-Car (Avis). Avis, as a car rental company, was statutorily required to pay $50,000 as a result of the accident. Owners denied Petitioners' UIM claim, asserting that because Avis was a self-insurer, the rental vehicle was not an underinsured automobile under the terms of the policy. The circuit court ruled in favor of Owners, determining that Avis was unambiguously a self-insurer, and therefore, the Avis vehicle did not fall within the policy definition of underinsured automobile. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) as applied, the policy term "self-insurer" is ambiguous, and therefore, the policy is interpreted in favor of Petitioners to afford coverage; and (2) even if the term "self-insurer" appears to be unambiguous, interpreting it to exclude self-insured rental vehicles from coverage leads to an absurd result here. Remanded. View "Bethke v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Prime Realty, Inc. (Prime) acted as general partner for two limited partnerships (collectively, the Partnerships). Without the Partnerships' limited partners' knowledge, Prime took out two loans from a bank (the Bank) and, by deed of trust, secured the loans with Partnerships' property. The Bank ultimately sold the collateral and applied the proceeds to the loans. The Partnerships sued the Bank for conversion, alleging that the loans were for a nonpartnership purposes and, as such, Prime lacked authority to offer the Partnerships' property as collateral without the limited partners' consent under the Partnership agreements. The district court concluded that the Bank had converted the Partnerships' property and awarded the Partnerships damages and prejudgment interest. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Partnerships' complaint was timely; (2) the Bank converted the Partnerships' property; (3) the district court improperly awarded damages in the full amount of the proceeds applied to the loans because a portion of the first loan served a Partnership purpose; and (4) prejudgment interest was proper only in the amount the Bank applied to the second loan. View "Brook Valley Ltd. P'ship v. Mut. of Omaha Bank" on Justia Law

A Massachusetts corporation and its principals sued their quondam accountant and his firm (collectively, Defendants), alleging that Defendants negligently advised them to file amended corporate and personal tax returns that had the effect of substantially increasing the principals' liability and destabilizing the company. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants but rejected their request for attorneys' fees. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) concluding that a three-year statute of limitations applied to bar the maintenance of Plaintiffs' tort and contract claims; (2) dismissing Plaintiffs' unfair trade practices claim; and (3) denying Defendants' request for attorneys' fees. View "RTR Techs., Inc. v. Helming" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was employed by a staffing company and had been contracted to work at Gates Rubber Company (Gates) when he suffered an injury to his arm and hand, including the severing of fingers. Plaintiff alleged that Total Compliance Consultants, Inc. (TCC) had contracted with Gates to consult on safety-compliance issues and that TCC either breached its contract or was negligent. The circuit court dismissed the complaint, concluding that Plaintiff was a third-party beneficiary of the contract between TCC and Gates but that TCC was not negligent and did not breach its contract. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff's points on appeal were either not appealable or lacked merit. View "Meador v. Total Compliance Consultants, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging that, without their knowledge, the City had erected a sewer line across Plaintiffs' property. Plaintiffs contended that in doing so, the City damaged a water pipe owned by Plaintiffs and that the damaged culvert was the proximate cause of three washouts on their property. Plaintiffs alleged causes of action for negligence and inverse condemnation. The City filed a motion for summary judgment, which the circuit court denied. The City appealed, arguing that the circuit court mischaracterized Plaintiffs' claim as based on contract, rather than tort, and in so doing denied the City the immunity to which it was entitled. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court erred in finding Plaintiffs' negligence claim sounded in contract rather than tort; and (2) the City was entitled to statutory immunity as to the tort cause of action. View "City of Malvern v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

A construction crane owned and operated by a construction company (Jacobsmeyer) fell on a building. Jacobsmeyer's insurer (Travelers) reached a settlement agreement with the designer and manufacturer of the crane (Grove) wherein Grove agreed to pay Jacobsmeyer and Travelers (hereinafter referred to collectively as Jacobsmeyer) for a majority of their remaining losses associated with the accident. Jacobsmeyer subsequently sued Grove and its parent company (hereinafter referred to jointly as Manitowoc) for breach of the settlement agreement. Manitowoc filed third-party petition claims for contribution and/or indemnity against U.S. Steel, alleging that U.S. Steel's predecessor-in-interest provided the faulty steel for the crane. The trial court dismissed Manitowoc's third-party petition with prejudice because Manitowoc failed to satisfy pleading requirements where it did not admit its own liability as a joint tortfeasor in its third-party petition. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a party seeking contribution or indemnity need not admit its own fault in its third-party petition but rather can deny liability in its answer to the plaintiff's petition and assert in its third-party petition that if it is liable to the plaintiff, then the third-party defendant is liable to it. Remanded. View "Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am. v. Manitowoc Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Newton Dorsett, Donald Buffington, Richard Williamson, and Diamond Transport & Drilling were owners of an oil-drilling rig. After disputes arose among the owners, the parties entered into a compromise agreement. Buffington filed this action against Diamond Transport and Dorsett, alleging breach of contract, conversion, and fraud in connection with the compromise agreement. Dorsett filed a third-party complaint against Williamson, but the circuit court later granted Dorsett's motion to dismiss his third-party complaint. After the circuit court entered judgment in the case, Dorsett appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal without prejudice, holding that it lacked jurisdiction to decide the appeal because, where the circuit court failed to issue an order dismissing Williamson from the case, there was no final judgment as required by Ark. R. Civ. P. 54(b). View "Dorsett v. Buffington" on Justia Law

Respondent sued Appellants for negligence and resulting injuries sustained in a car accident. The parties entered into a tentative settlement subject to Respondent giving her underinsured motorist (UIM) carrier notice under Schmidt v. Clothier to preserve her potential UIM claim. The UIM carrier elected to substitute its check for the tortfeasor's check pursuant to Schmidt-Clothier. Respondent accepted the substitute check. The negligence claim proceeded to trial, where a jury found Appellants negligent. The district court entered judgment in favor of Respondent and the UIM carrier. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment for Respondent but reversed for the UIM carrier. The Supreme Court affirmed the reversal of the judgment in favor of the UIM carrier but reversed the court of appeals' decision affirming the judgment for Respondent, holding that an injured party may not continue to pursue a negligence claim against the tortfeasor after she has agreed to settle the negligence action under the Schmidt-Clothier procedure and has accepted the substituted check from the UIM carrier. View "Isaac v. Ho" on Justia Law