Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed suit against West County Motor Company for violation of the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act (MMPA) and for conversion. Each plaintiff paid a deposit to West County to secure the purchase of a vehicle and signed a vehicle buyer's order providing that "all deposits are non refundable." However, all plaintiffs but one alleged that West County told them their deposits were refundable if the purchase was not completed. When Plaintiffs decided not to purchase their vehicles, West County told them their deposits would not be refunded. The trial court dismissed the MMPA claims for failure to state a claim. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the trial court's dismissal of that portion of Plaintiffs' claims alleging violations of the MMPA based on violations of Mo. Rev. Stat. 364.070.4; and (2) reversed the trial court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims alleging violations of the MMPA based on conversion, lack of good faith, and an illegal liquidated damages clause, as Plaintiffs' allegations of conversion, unlawful liquidated damages, and lack of good faith were sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. View "Ward v. W. County Motor Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Steine was a subcontractor for installation of thermal units at a Wal-Mart store in Gas City, Indiana. Steine rented a boom lift from NES. Steine foreman Crager signed a one-page, two-sided NES “Rental Agreement” with a signature line is at the bottom of its front side. Above the signature line, the Agreement states: “Signer acknowledges that he has read and fully understands this rental agreement including the terms and conditions on the reverse side” and “Please note that there are important terms on the reverse side of this contract, including an indemnification provision.” Menendez, a Steine employee, died from injuries he suffered while operating the 40-foot boom lift. His family filed sued NES and others, alleging negligence. NES sought indemnification from Steine. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Steine. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The indemnification clause in the rental agreement does not expressly state, in clear and unequivocal terms as Indiana law requires, that Steine agreed to indemnify NES for NES’s own negligence. View "NES Rentals Holdings, Inc.l v. Steine Cold Storage, Inc." on Justia Law

Upon Marcus Degen's purchase of a home, Marcus purchased a homeowner's insurance policy with Hanson Farm Mutual Insurance Company of South Dakota (HFMIC). Marcus, Tina Sellers, and Tina's two daughters moved into the house. One evening, while Marcus was leveling dirt on the property with a skid loader, Marcus hit and killed one of the girls, Adrianna. Tina pursued a wrongful death action against Marcus a year later. HFMIC filed a declaratory judgment action asking the trial court to determine whether it had an obligation to indemnify or defend Marcus in the underlying wrongful death action. The trial court ruled in favor of HFMIC, determining that Adrianna was in Marcus's care and was therefore excluded from coverage under a household exclusion contained in the policy. Both Tina, as the personal representative of her daughter's estate, and Marcus appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court correctly concluded that the phrase "in your care" was unambiguous and in concluding that Adrianna was in Marcus's care; and (2) because she was in Marcus's care, Adrianna was excluded from coverage under the household exclusion contained in the policy. View "Hanson Farm Mut. Ins. Co. of S.D. v. Degen" on Justia Law

Respondents were involved in the development and construction of Holcomb Condominiums (Condos). Appellant was the homeowners' association for Condos. Appellant filed, on behalf of itself and all condominium homeowners, a constructional defect complaint against Respondents, alleging a variety of defects and claims for negligence and breach of warranty. The district court dismissed Appellant's complaint as time-barred by the two-year contractual limitations period found in nearly identical arbitration agreements attached to each of the homeowners' purchase contracts. The court also denied as futile Appellant's request to amend its complaint to add causes of action for willful misconduct and fraudulent concealment based on missing roof underlayment, finding that the claim would also be time-barred by the contractual limitations period. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) arbitration agreements containing a reduced limitations period that are attached to and incorporated into purchase contracts are unlawful; (2) the district court erred in finding Appellants' negligence-based claims and breach of warranty claims were time-barred; and (3) because the contractual limitations provision was unenforceable, the district court's denial of the motion to amend on this basis was improper. View "Holcomb Condo. Homeowners' Ass'n v. Stewart Venture, LLC" on Justia Law

Law Firm, located in Virginia, leased a vehicle from Company. Tortfeasor, who was driving the car with permission by Law Firm, collided with a car driven by Plaintiff. The day before the accident, the insurance policy on the vehicle lapsed for nonpayment. Plaintiff filed suit in Florida against Law Firm, Tortfeasor, and Company, alleging that because Company had failed to comply with the insurance requirements of Fla. Stat. 324.021(9)(b)(1), Company was vicariously liable for Tortfeasor's negligent operation of the car under Florida's dangerous instrumentality doctrine. Company moved for summary judgment, contending that its liability should be based on Virginia tort law and that if Florida law applied, section 342.021(9)(b)(1) was preempted by the Graves Amendment, a federal law providing that the owner of a motor vehicle who leases the vehicle shall not be vicariously liable from harm that results from the operation of the vehicle during the lease. The trial court concluded that Florida law applied but that the Graves Amendment did preempt section 324.021(9)(b)(1). The court of appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court approved the decision, holding that the Graves Amendment preempts section 324.021(9)(b)(1). View "Rosado v. Daimlerchrysler Fin. Servs. Trust" on Justia Law

Plaintiff (HOA) was a condominium owners' association that brought suit on its own behalf and on behalf of its members against various individuals and corporations seeking damages arising from the alleged defective development, negligent construction, and misleading marketing of a condominium complex. The complex consisted of dozens of units owned by members of the HOA. The circuit court granted Respondents' motion to join all unit owners, denied the HOA's motion for a protective order, and certified six questions to the Supreme Court. The Court answered only one of the questions, finding it unnecessary to address the remaining questions, holding (1) a unit owners' association is an adequate representative when a lawsuit is instituted by a unit owners' association on behalf of two or more unit owners pursuant to the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act and the damages sought include unit specific damages affecting only individual units; and (2) this case should proceed in accordance with W. Va. Trial Court R. 26. View "Univ. Commons Riverside Home Owners Ass'n v. Univ. Commons Morgantown, LLC" on Justia Law

Klein-Becker USA and Klein-Becker IP Holdings sued Patrick Englert and Mr. Finest, Inc., for trademark infringement, copyright infringement, false advertising, and unfair competition under the Lanham Act; false advertising under the Utah Truth in Advertising Act; unfair competition under the Utah Unfair Practices Act; fraud; civil conspiracy; and intentional interference with existing and prospective business relations. The action arose from Englert's unauthorized selling of "StriVectin" skin care products: he posed as a General Nutrition Center (GNC) store to purchase the products at below wholesale rates. Englert then sold the products through eBay and other commercial web platforms, including his own, "mrfinest.com." Englert was sanctioned several times for failing to comply with court orders and discovery schedules. The third and final sanction resulted in the entry of default judgment for Klein-Becker on all remaining claims. Englert appealed the district court's entry of default judgment against him, determination of his personal liability and the amount of damages owed, grant of a permanent injunction, denial of a jury trial, and refusal to allow him to call a certain witness. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found no fault in the district court's analysis or judgment and affirmed. View "Klein-Becker USA v. Englert" on Justia Law

Brothers Thomas and Michael Tessier allegedly swindled brothers Frederick and Thaddeus Jakobiec and the estate of their mother out of millions of dollars. This lawsuit covered the Tessiers' theft of almost $100,000 in life insurance proceeds due to a trust benefitting Thaddeus. Thaddeus and various persons affiliated with the trust and estate (collectively, Plaintiffs) filed this action against Merrill Lynch, the company that issued the life insurance policy, claiming that Merrill Lynch made out the insurance proceeds check to the wrong trust entity in breach of the insurance contract, thus allowing the Tessiers to steal the money. The First Circuit Court of Appeals granted summary judgment for Merrill Lynch, concluding that even if Merrill Lynch did breach the contract, its breach was not the cause of Plaintiffs' losses because the Tessiers would have stolen the money even if the check had been made out correctly. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) because the extensive groundwork laid by the Tessiers for their criminal scheme, they could have and would have stolen the insurance money regardless of how Merrill Lynch made out the check; and (2) therefore, the district court correctly granted summary judgment for Merrill Lynch. View "Jakobiec v. Merrill Lynch Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In a wrongful death action against a nursing home, the nursing home moved to compel arbitration, arguing that the nursing home resident was the third-party beneficiary to the admission and arbitration agreements signed by his sister. The trial court denied the motion, finding that no valid contract was signed by someone with the legal authority to do so, and the nursing home appealed. Because the resident's sister lacked the authority to contract for him, and thus no valid contract existed, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion to compel arbitration. View "GGNSC Batesville, LLC v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was an additional insured on a commercial general liability insurance policy, which was issued to Plaintiff's tenant (Tenant) by Defendant, Travelers Property Casualty Company (Travelers). Plaintiff sought to invoke Travelers' duty to defend under the policy after Sarah Middeleer was injured in a fall on Plaintiff's property and brought the underlying action against Plaintiff. Plaintiff's insurer, the Netherlands Insurance Company (Netherlands), provided a defense to Plaintiff after Travelers denied any duty to defend Plaintiff in the underlying action. Plaintiff then brought the present action claiming Travelers had a duty to defend Plaintiff in the underlying action and Travelers was obligated to reimburse Netherlands for the defense costs it had expended. The trial court granted Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. The appellate court reversed, concluding that Middeleer's injuries did not arise out of the use of the leased premises under the terms of the policy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court correctly construed the governing policy language and properly concluded that Travelers did not have a duty to defend Plaintiff. View "Misiti, LLC v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am." on Justia Law