Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs leased an apartment from Defendant for thirteen months. Before the lease term expired, a dispute arose between the parties. Plaintiffs subsequently filed a complaint against Defendant, alleging breach of the terms of the lease, negligence, and negligence per se. The justice court found in favor of Plaintiffs. Defendant appealed, seeing a trial de novo. After a bench trial, the district court ruled in Plaintiffs' favor on their breach of lease claim and awarded them damages, costs, and attorney's fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed Plaintiffs to amend their complaint to add a claim that had not been pled during the justice court proceedings; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Defendant's motion in limine to prohibit any reference to the testimony and evidence presented during the justice court proceedings; and (3) because the district court's references to the prior proceedings did not suggest that the district court was unduly influenced by the justice court proceedings, Defendant was not denied her right to a trial de novo. View "McDunn v. Arnold" on Justia Law

KEC appealed from the district court's order denying its motion for a declaration and specific performance of the obligations of BorgWarner under the Master Settlement Agreement, the Merger Agreement, and the Cooperation Agreement. This case arose when plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging that KEC, BorgWarner, and others improperly disposed and negligently disposed of substances containing toxic chemicals at the Crystal Springs site, where KEC owned a facility manufacturing transformers, and such negligence resulted in injuries to plaintiffs. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court because the terms of the Merger Agreement and Cooperation Agreement were not incorporated into the Master Settlement Agreement, and BorgWarner fulfilled its obligations under the Master Settlement Agreement. View "Alford, et al v. Kuhlman Corp." on Justia Law

Kenneth Crum, who was horseback riding at the time, was struck and severely injured by a vehicle driven by Raymond Ousley. At the time, Ousley was test-driving the vehicle, an uninsured car titled to Rhonda Ward. Crum sued Ousley for personal injuries and later joined Ousley's auto liability insurer, Kentucky Farm Bureau, for no-fault benefits. Kentucky Farm and Crum settled the negligence claims against Ousley for $25,000. Later, the trial court declared by final order that Kentucky Farm was also required to pay basic reparation benefits (BRBs) to Crum for the motor vehicle accident. The trial court then entered a final order declaring coverage for Crum and ordering Kentucky Farm also to pay Crum the no-fault benefits. The court of appeals reversed, holding that Kentucky law did not allow Crum to recover and Ousley's policy excluded Crum. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a pedestrian struck by an uninsured vehicle being driven by an ininsured driver can recover no-fault benefits from the driver's insurance company; and (2) therefore, Crum was entitled to receive BRBs from Kentucky Farm. View "Samons v. Ky. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Respondent awarded Petitioner a contract to develop an affordable housing development project. The parties entered into a development services agreement (DSA) that contained a provision stating that the parties would proceed to arbitration under state law in the event of a dispute. Petitioner was subsequently terminated from the project. Respondent filed a complaint against Petitioner asserting several causes of action, including intentional misrepresentation and negligence. Petitioners counterclaimed. Petitioners later filed an arbitration motion, which the circuit granted. The intermediate court of appeals denied Petitioners' motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part, holding (1) the order compelling arbitration in this case was sufficiently final under the collateral order doctrine to be appealable under the general civil matters appeal statute; (2) the scope of the arbitration clause contained in the DSA encompassed all claims of Respondent and counterclaims of Petitioners; and (3) the circuit court correctly granted the motion to compel alternative dispute resolution and to stay proceedings. Remanded. View "County of Hawaii v. UniDev, LLC" on Justia Law

This case arose from the water loss claims Appellant Roger Daniel Rizzo made under Respondent State Farm Fire and Casualty Company's homeowners insurance policy. All of Appellant's claims were for water damage to his home's basement. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurance company, effectively dismissing all of Appellant's causes of action because his homeowner's policy did not cover his water damage claims. Appellant also appealed the district court's denial of his motion to amend his complaint to include various new causes of action and the district court's grant of State Farm's motion for protective order against certain overbroad discovery requests. Finding no error in the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of State Farm, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decisions. View "Rizzo v. State Farm Insurance" on Justia Law

Maria Marusa was driving her car when it was struck by a police cruiser driven by a police officer (Officer). Marusa and her daughter (collectively, Appellants) were injured in the accident. Appellants filed suit against Marusa's insurer (Insurer), seeking damages to compensate for medical expenses and pain and suffering. Insurer answered that it was not obligated to pay damages because even though the policy included uninsured-motorist coverage and the officer was an uninsured motorist, Appellants were not "legally entitled to recover" because Officer was immune under the Ohio Political Subdivision Tort Liability Law (OPSTLL). The trial court granted summary judgment for Insurer, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the language of the policy unambiguously provides uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage when the insured is injured by an owner or operator who is immune under the OPSTLL. View "Marusa v. Erie Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In an attempt to avert the foreclosure of her home, Plaintiff sought to modify the terms of her mortgage pursuant to the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), a federal initiative that incentivizes lenders and loan servicers to offer loan modifications to eligible homeowners. When Plaintiff's efforts did not result in a permanent loan modification, she sued Wells Fargo Bank and American Home Mortgage Servicing, alleging that their conduct during her attempts to modify her mortgage violated Massachusetts law. The district court dismissed Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim. The First Circuit Court of Appeal (1) affirmed the district court's judgment as to the dismissal of Plaintiff's claims of breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress; and (2) vacated the dismissal of Plaintiff's other breach of contract claim, Plaintiff's unfair debt collection practices claim under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, and her derivative claim for equitable relief. Remanded. View "Young v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

A husband and wife applied for life insurance policies from Farm Bureau Life Insurance Company and later sued Farm Bureau for its alleged negligence in failing to notify them of their HIV-positive status. Farm Bureau settled the negligence claims, sued its insurers for indemnity, and sued its insurance broker for breach of contract and negligence in failing to provide timely notice to the insurers. The district court granted summary judgment (1) in favor of the insurers on the ground that Farm Bureau had failed to give them timely notice of the applicants' liability claims, and (2) in favor of the broker after concluding that even if the insurers had been given timely notice of the applicants' tort claims against Farm Bureau, coverage for those claims would have been precluded under two separate exclusions. In this appeal, Farm Bureau challenged the judgment in favor of the broker. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the underwriting exclusion would have precluded coverage for the applicants' claims even if the insurers had been timely notified under the policy's notice requirement. View "Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co. v. Holmes Murphy & Assocs., Inc." on Justia Law

In 2005, the Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) hired Plaintiff. In 2007, the DEQ terminated Plaintiff on the ground that he improperly incurred $2,500 in personal charges on a state-issued cell phone. Plaintiff challenged his termination, claiming the ground was pretext, and the Office of Administrative Hearings reinstated Plaintiff to his original position. The DEQ sought review of that position in district court and made an offer to settle, to which Plaintiff did not respond. The DEQ subsequently notified Plaintiff it was accepting his resignation because he had taken a job in Montana. The DEQ then withdrew its petition for review. In 2009, Plaintiff filed suit in federal district court, claiming the DEQ's failure to comply with the conditions of his proffered resignation constituted wrongful termination. The federal court dismissed the lawsuit. Plaintiff then filed suit in district court, alleging, inter alia, breach of contract and breach of the purported settlement agreement. The district court dismissed the case, ruling that Plaintiff's claims were time-barred. The Supreme Court dismissed Plaintiff's appeal for failure to follow the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure. View "Armstrong v. Wyo. Dep't of Envtl. Quality" on Justia Law

A minor plaintiff commenced a civil action against the Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn and one of its priests alleging sexual molestation by the priest. The Diocese settled the action for $2 million and additional consideration. At issue on appeal was a dispute between the Diocese and one of its insurance carriers (National Union) regarding the Diocese's demand for reimbursement for the settlement. The Diocese sought a declaratory judgment that National Union was required to indemnify the Diocese for the settlement and certain defense costs and fees. Supreme Court granted summary judgment for the Diocese. At issue on appeal was whether the incidents of sexual abuse constituted a single occurrence or multiple occurrences that spanned several years and several policy periods. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding that the alleged acts of sexual abuse constituted multiple occurrences and that the settlement amount should be allocated on a pro rata basis over the seven policy periods. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the incidents of sexual abuse constituted multiple occurrences and that any potential liability should be apportioned among the several insurance policies, pro rata. View "Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh" on Justia Law