Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff was withdrawing money from an ATM when Tortfeasor struck her with his car. Tortfeasor was insured under a policy written by Insurer to a limit of $100,000 for bodily injury to one person. Plaintiff and several of her family members brought this action against Tortfeasor and his brother, the named insured on the policy, (collectively, Tortfeasor) and Insurer. The district court originally entered judgment ordering Insurer and Tortfeasor to pay one-and-a-half million dollars to Plaintiffs. Insurer paid into court $75,000, the remainder of its policy limit. The district court later amended its judgment, holding Tortfeasor and Insurer liable for six million dollars in damages. Plaintiffs then unsuccessfully sought to compel Insurer to pay postjudgment interest on the full judgment. The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the deniial of Plaintiff's request for postjudgment interest, holding that Insurer was responsible for postjudgment interest from the date of entry of the original judgment and the date of the deposit of the policy limit. View "Vazquez-Filippetti v. Cooperativa de Seguros Multiples de P.R." on Justia Law

Advance installs and services signs. It alleges that it entered into a contract to sell Optec’s electronic messaging signs to foodservice customers. Advance claims that Optec agreed not to sell directly to the foodservice companies. Rogers, a franchisee of Sonic Restaurants, was a long-time Advance customer. Advance and Optec undertook a pilot project to install signs at Sonic corporate-owned locations and Rogers’s franchises. Advance claimed that Optec violated the agreement by negotiating with Sonic directly. Advance and Optec entered a second agreement by phone, with Optec to pay Advance 12 percent of net on sales made by Optec to customers introduced by Advance. Advance sent a letter memorializing the terms; Optec made a minor change, unrelated to commission; Advance incorporated the change and returned the letter. Optec refused to sign. Following additional negotiations, Optec signed a two-year agreement with Sonic and installed signs at 1,400 locations, without Advance being involved. A jury found in favor of Advance on breach-of-contract claims and a claim for tortious interference and awarded damages of $3,444,000 for breach of the telephone agreement. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims that: there was no meeting of the minds for the telephone agreement; Ohio’s Statute of Frauds precluded enforcement; Advance did not prove its tortious interference claim; and that the evidence did not support the damages awards. View "Advance Sign Grp., LLC v. Optec Displays, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff purchased certain batches of concrete from Defendant that were allegedly defective. Plaintiff used the concrete to pour outdoor installations at various properties. When problems arose with the installations, several property owners transferred their putative right to sue Defendant over to Plaintiff. Plaintiff then sued Defendant in both its own name and in that of the assignees, alleging tort and contract claims, among others. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Defendant, concluding, inter alia, (1) Plaintiff's claims through the property owners and its tort claims were barred by the economic loss doctrine, and (2) damages were insufficiently established to support the remaining claims. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed but on different grounds, holding (1) the court of appeals erred in determining that the claims Plaintiff asserted through the assignments were valid when, with two exceptions, the economic loss doctrine barred the homeowners from suing Defendant and thus barred Plaintiff from suing in their name; but (2) the court of appeals correctly reversed the circuit court for finding all of the asserted damages speculative. Remanded with directions to dismiss the claims asserted through the assignments and to allow the remaining claims to proceed to trial. View "United Concrete & Constr., Inc. v. Red-D-Mix Concrete, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant hosted an underage drinking party in which one of the guests known to become belligerent when intoxicated assaulted and seriously injured another guest. The victim sued Defendant and his insurer (Insurer) for damages for his injuries. Insurer disputed coverage, arguing that it had no duty to defend and indemnify Defendant because there was no "accident" or "occurrence" under Defendant's family's homeowner's insurance policy where Defendant's actions were intentional. The circuit court granted summary judgment to Insurer. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that there was an occurrence because the assault was an accident when viewed from the standpoint of the injured person or Defendant, the insured. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) viewed from the standpoint of a reasonable insured, Defendant's intentional actions in setting up a drinking party and procuring alcohol for underage guests, including one known to become belligerent when intoxicated, created a direct risk of harm resulting in bodily injury; and (2) thus, the victim's bodily injury was not caused by an "occurrence" within the meaning of the policy, and Insurer was not obligated to provide insurance coverage for Defendant. View "Schinner v. Gundrum" on Justia Law

Rick and Lisa Graham filed a petition for a protection from stalking order against Elizabeth Jones in 2006. Jones counterclaimed for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, fraud, and conversion. On June 27, 2007, while her counterclaims against the Grahams were pending, Jones died. On April 17, 2008, the Grahams filed a motion to dismiss the lawsuit. Angela Herring, who was appointed as administratrix of Jones's estate, filed a motion to substitute the estate as the claimant against the Grahams. The district court dismissed the action based upon its determination that substitution was untimely under Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-225(a)(1). The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed and provided an analysis to determine whether a substitution motion was filed within a reasonable time, holding (1) the relevant time period for determining the reasonableness of a delay in substituting a party begins with the statement noting the death and ends with the filing of the motion for substitution; and (2) the standard for determining whether a substitution motion has been made within a reasonable time is to consider the totality of the circumstances, which can include the fact of whether another party would be prejudiced by the substitution. Remanded. View "Graham v. Herring" on Justia Law

Precision Gear Company, Precision Gear LLC, and General Metal Heat Treating, Inc. were granted permission to appeal an interlocutory order denying their motion to dismiss the third-party claims against them filed by Continental Motors, Inc. The trial court certified a question to the Supreme Court of whether, in a suit for non-contractual indemnification arising from an accident and alleged damage that occurred out of state, Alabama's six year statute of limitation for implied contract actions controlled because the foreign jurisdiction's law considered its common law and statutory claims for indemnity as claims based upon contract implied in law or quasi-contract, or whether Alabama's two year statute of limitation for tort actions controlled. Upon review, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded that Alabama's two-year statute of limitations applied in this case and that Continental Motors' claims against the gear manufacturers were time-barred. View "Precision Gear Co. v. Continental Motors, Inc. " on Justia Law

Appellant received treatment at Hospital for injuries she sustained in an automobile accident. Appellant granted two statutory liens to Hospital on settlement proceeds she obtained from the tortfeasor for hospital services rendered. Appellant subsequently settled her case against the tortfeasor, and the tortfeasor's insurer (Insurer) agreed to pay Appellant $1.3 million in exchange for Appellant's agreement to indemnify Insurer from all healthcare provider liens. Hospital subsequently sued Insurer, and Appellant tendered to Hospital all money it asserted was due. Appellant then filed a complaint against Hospital, alleging that Hospital overcharged her pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 439B.260(1), which provides that hospitals must reduce charges by thirty percent to inpatients who lack insurance "or other contractual provision for the payment of the charge by a third party." The district court entered judgment in favor of Hospital, finding that Appellant's settlement agreement with the tortfeasor rendered Appellant ineligible for the thirty percent statutory discount. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that a patient's eligibility is determined at the commencement of hospital services, and therefore, a later settlement agreement with a third party for the payment of such services does not disqualify the patient for the statutory discount. View " Bielar v. Washoe Health Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a construction company, agreed by contract to perform site work for Hoffman Enterprises on several parcels of property. Plaintiff later filed this action against Hoffman Enterprises and Jeffrey Hoffman for negligent misrepresentation, among other claims. The trial court granted Hoffman's motion to strike the negligent misrepresentation claim. The appellate court reversed. Hoffman appealed, asserting that Plaintiff could not, as a matter of law, satisfy the detrimental reliance element of its claim because Hoffman's apparent authority to bind Hoffman Enterprises contractually meant that Plaintiff could not have relied to its detriment on Hoffman's statements. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the fact that allegations pleaded in a complaint might also state a contractual claim against a corporate entity under the apparent authority doctrine does not preclude a separate claim of negligent misrepresentation against a principal of that corporate entity as a matter of law; and (2) Plaintiff pleaded a legally sufficient claim of negligent misrepresentation. View "Coppola Constr. Co. v. Hoffman Enters. Ltd. P'ship" on Justia Law

These consolidated appeals comprised two putative class actions brought by skycaps affiliated with two major airlines. After Defendants, the airlines, each introduced a $2 per bag fee for curbside service for departing passengers at airports that did not inure to the benefit of the skycaps, Plaintiffs sued the airlines for unjust enrichment and tortious interference, among other claims. The district court dismissed the unjust enrichment and tortious interference claims as preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA). Plaintiffs appealed, contending that the ADA does not preempt common-law claims. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed after an analysis of statutory language, congressional intent, and case law, holding that the ADA preempted Plaintiffs' common-law claims. View "Brown v. United Airlines, Inc." on Justia Law

The Leonards entered into contracts with Centennial for the sale of a log home kit and construction of a custom log home. The Leonards later released Centennial from any claims for damages for defective construction or warranty arising out of the home's construction. Greg and Elvira Johnston held a thirty-six percent interest in the property at the time the release was signed. Eventually, all interest in the property was transferred to the Elvira Johnston Trust. A few years later, because of a number of construction defects affecting the structural integrity of the house, the Johnstons decided to demolish the house. The Johnstons sued Centennnial for negligent construction, breach of statutory and implied warranties, and other causes of action. The district court granted summary judgment for Centennial, finding that the Johnstons' claims were time-barred and were waived by the Leonards' release. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the court's ruling that the Johnstons' claims were time-barred and directed that the decision on remand apply only to the interest owned by the Johnstons at the time the release was executed; and (2) affirmed the district court's conclusion that the release was binding on the Leonards' sixty-four percent interest, later transferred to the Trust. View "Johnston v. Centennial Log Homes & Furnishings, Inc." on Justia Law