Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case was a retention pond constructed in a subdivision for the purpose of catching water runoff. Patrick and Melinda Sterner, who owned property in the subdivision, contracted with WHR Group (WHR) to handle the sale of their home. Petitioners subsequently entered into a contract to purchase the property. Petitioners later filed an action against WHR, the Sterners, and Sahley Realty Company, the subdivision developer (collectively, Respondents), asserting claims for fraud, constructive fraud, negligence, and breach of implied contract, alleging that a “slip” occurred on the retention bond prior to their purchase of the lot, which allowed the pond to cross the common boundary line onto their property. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Respondents. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the circumstances of this action, the circuit court acted properly in granting Respondents’ motions for summary judgment. View "Dickens v. Sahley Realty Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that the Citibank defendants engaged in tortious conduct and breached contractual obligations owed to him in connection with private equity investments in Brazil. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's dismissal of the complaint. The court held that the district court had jurisdiction to hear the case under the Edge Act, 12 U.S.C. 632, because plaintiff's claims arose out of a foreign financial operation. The court also concluded that the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's tort and contract claims against the Citibank defendants under Rule 12(b)(6). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Wilson v. Dantas" on Justia Law

Ember Buckley was a passenger in a motor vehicle driven by Harvey Betts when the vehicle was involved in an accident. Buckley, who sustained injuries in the accident, settled with GEICO, Betts’ insurer, for the full policy limits and signed a full release of all claims against Betts and a hold harmless agreement in favor of GEICO. Buckley then attempted to recover for the remainder of her outstanding medical bills under her uninsured/underinsured motorist (“UM”) policy with The Brethren Mutual Insurance Company (“Brethren”), which denied coverage. Buckley filed suit, alleging breach of contract and seeking the policy limit in compensatory damages. The circuit court entered summary judgment for Brethren, concluding that the release was a general release, and thus released all entities from future claims, regardless of whether they were a party to the release. The court of special appeals reversed, holding that the general release did not prejudice Buckley’s claim against Brethren. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the broad, all-inclusive language of the release must be read with an eye toward the parties’ overall intent; and (2) that the court of special appeals correctly held that the release did not waive Buckley’s UM claim against Brethren. View "Brethren Mut. Ins. Co. v. Buckley" on Justia Law

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Clarke Circuit Court to vacate its order denying State Farm's motion to transfer this case to the Mobile Circuit Court and to enter an order granting the motion. The underlying action arose from an automobile accident that occurred in Mobile County in 2010. Sandra Banks, a resident of both Clarke and Mobile Counties, sued Robert Spray, a resident of Baldwin County, and State Farm. Banks alleged that she suffered injuries as a result of the wrongful, negligent, and/or wanton conduct of Spray when the vehicle he was driving and owned struck her vehicle. Additionally, Banks alleged that at the time of the accident she had a policy of insurance with State Farm, which included uninsured-/underinsured-motorist coverage, and that she was due proceeds under her coverage. Because both the "convenience of parties and witnesses" and the "interest of justice" prongs of the doctrine of forum non conveniens compelled the transfer of this case from Clarke County to Mobile County, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to transfer the action. Therefore, the Court granted State Farm's petition and issued a writ directing the Clarke Circuit Court to vacate its order and to enter an order granting the motion. View "Banks v. Spray" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Honduran citizen who suffered a back injury while employed as a mason aboard one of Carnival's ships, filed suit against Carnival in state court asserting claims of Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 30104, negligence, unseaworthiness, and failure to provide adequate maintenance and cure. Plaintiff alleged that the physician chosen and paid by Carnival negligently performed his back surgery. Carnival removed to federal court. On appeal, plaintiff appealed the district court's order compelling arbitration of his claims under the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (CREFAA), 9 U.S.C. 201-208. Plaintiff argued that his Jones Act claim did not fall within his employment contract ("Seafarer's Agreement") with Carnival and, therefore, was not within the scope of the contract's arbitration clause. The court concluded that the order compelling plaintiff to arbitrate his claims was "a final decision with respect to arbitration," and the court had appellate jurisdiction. The court also concluded that plaintiff's dispute with Carnival clearly arose out of or in connection with the Seafarer's Agreement and was subject to arbitration. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order. View "Martinez v. Carnival Corp." on Justia Law

Appellant was injured while working for Employer, which had an insurance policy issued by Zurich American Insurance Company. The policy included an underinsured motorist (UIM) endorsement. After settling with the tortfeasor, Appellant sought damages from the UIM coverage in the Zurich policy. After Zurich refused Appellant’s claim, Appellant sued Zurich. Ultimately, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Zurich on the grounds that the UIM coverage included in the policy was the result of a mutual mistake in the making of the insurance contract. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for entry of an order granting Appellant’s motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of UIM coverage, holding that reformation of the insurance contract on the grounds of mutual mistake was improper because (1) the facts did not establish that at the time the insurance contract was formed, the minds of the contracting parties met with the common intent to execute a policy that excluded UIM coverage; and (2) Zurich did not assert the mistake or deny the existence of UIM coverage until after Appellant had released the tortfeasor. View "Nichols v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured when one negligent driver and (shortly thereafter) another negligent driver collided with the truck in which plaintiff was a passenger. The underinsured motorist benefits available to plaintiff under the terms of the insurance policy that she purchased from turned on the meaning of the term "accident" as that term was used in that policy and is used in corresponding Oregon financial responsibility statutes. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded that the legislature intended that the term "accident" have its ordinary meaning, and that plaintiff presented evidence from which a jury could find that her injuries had been incurred in more than one "accident." Under the facts of this case, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Wright v. Turner" on Justia Law

In 2010, Mary Gwyther was in a multi-vehicle accident while driving a pickup she co-owned with her mother, Peggy Gwyther, who died in the accident. The claimants allegedly suffered injuries and property damage as a result of the accident. The Gwyther vehicle was insured under a policy issued by Nodak Mutual Insurance Company, issued to Peggy as the named insured. Peggy lived in a home she co-owned with Mary in Bismarck. Although Mary was listed as a co-owner of the Bismarck property, she had never actually lived in the home, and had not lived with her parents since 1972. Mary had been living in Switzerland since 2000. She owned a business in Switzerland, owned and insured a vehicle there, and had a Swiss driver's license and residence permit. However, Mary voted by absentee ballot in North Dakota as a resident, declaring in applications and affidavits that she was a resident at her mother's Bismarck address. She also designated the Bismarck address as her permanent home address with the State Department. Nodak brought an interpleader action seeking a declaration it was only liable to pay the reduced step-down policy limits because Mary was not a resident of Peggy's household at the time of the accident and therefore was not a "family member" under the policy. The case was tried as a bench trial on stipulated facts. The district court found Mary was not a resident of Peggy's household, concluded the policy did not violate North Dakota law, and concluded Nodak was required to pay only the lower step-down policy limits. The claimants appealed that decision, but the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the district court's finding was not clearly erroneous and the step-down endorsement to the insurance policy did not violate North Dakota law. View "Nodak Mutual Insurance Co. v. Bahr-Renner" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a seven-count complaint against Defendants, asserting claims related to the alleged breach of various agreements involving the sale of aviation equipment. Ultimately, a jury trial was held, and the jury awarded Plaintiff $1,112,476 in damages. After dismissing the jury, the parties filed several post-trial motions, which the district court resolved partially in favor of Plaintiff and partially in favor of Defendants. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s orders, holding that the district court did not err in (1) finding that Defendants did not breach a support agreement with Plaintiffs as a matter of law; (2) holding that Plaintiff waived the issue of prejudgment interest; and (3) upholding the jury’s award of damages for Plaintiff’s claim alleging breach of a purchase agreement. View "Atlantech Inc. v. Am. Panel Corp." on Justia Law

Filippo Gallina and his wife (Plaintiffs) commenced a personal injury action against Preferred Trucking Services Corp. Preferred Trucking was insured by County-Wide Insurance Company under a policy that required insureds to cooperate with Country-Wide in its investigation of a claim or defense against a lawsuit. The next year, Country-Wide disclaimed its obligation to defend and indemnify Preferred Trucking based upon Preferred Trucking’s refusal to cooperate in the defense. Supreme Court subsequently awarded judgment to Plaintiffs. Thereafter, Country-Wide filed this action against Preferred Trucking and Plaintiffs seeking a declaration that it was not obligated to defend and indemnify Preferred Trucking in the underlying action. Supreme Court concluded that Country-Wide was obligated to defend and indemnify Preferred Trucking. At issue on appeal was whether Country-Wide’s disclaimer was timely as a matter of law. The Appellate Court affirmed, concluding that Country-Wide’s disclaimer was untimely because it came four months after Country-Wide learned of the ground for the disclaimer. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Country-Wide was not obligated to defend and indemnify Preferred Trucking, as Country-Wide established as a matter of law that its delay was reasonable. View "Country-Wide Ins. Co. v. Preferred Trucking Servs. Corp. " on Justia Law