Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Bill Head, doing business as Bill Head Enterprises (Head), hired Petroleum Solutions, Inc. to manufacture and install an underground fuel system at the truck stop Head owned and operated. After a major diesel-fuel leak occurred, Respondents sued Petroleum Solutions for its damages. The trial rendered judgment in favor of Head and in favor of third-party defendant Titeflex, Inc., the alleged manufacturer of a component part incorporated into the fuel system, on Titeflex’s counterclaim against Petroleum Solutions for statutory indemnity. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the judgment as to Head, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the sanctions of charging the jury with a spoliation instruction and striking Petroleum Solutions’ statute-of-limitations defense, and the trial court’s abuse of discretion was harmful; and (2) affirmed the judgment as to Titeflex’s indemnity claim, holding that Titeflex was entitled to statutory indemnity from Petroleum Solutions. Remanded for further proceedings between Respondents and Petroleum Solutions. View "Petroleum Solutions, Inc. v. Head" on Justia Law

Velicia Carter was injured in an automobile collision with Jeova Oliviera. It was alleged that Oliviera was under the influence of alcohol at the time. Oliviera had an auto liability insurance policy with GEICO General Insurance Company with a $30,000 per person liability limit. Carter was insured by Progressive Mountain Insurance Company, including uninsured/underinsured motorist (UM) coverage of $25,000 per person. Carter sued Oliviera and served Progressive as her UM carrier, and entered into a settlement in which GEICO paid the $30,000 limit of Oliviera's policy, and Carter executed a limited liability release. It allocated $29,000 of GEICO's payment to punitive damages and $1,000 to compensatory damages. Progressive answered the suit as Carter's UM carrier and sought summary judgment on the UM claim, which the trial court granted, ruling that, by imposing the condition that $29,000 of the liability coverage limit be allocated to the payment of punitive damages, Carter failed to meet a prerequisite for recovery of the UM benefits. The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that, by allocating a portion of the payment to punitive damages, rather than allocating all of the payment to compensatory damages, Carter failed to exhaust the limits of Oliviera's liability policy, and, therefore, forfeited the ability to make a claim on her UM policy. The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals to determine if that Court properly applied the motor vehicle insurance limited liability release provision of OCGA 33-24-41.1. Finding that the Court of Appeals erred, the Supreme Court reversed that Court's judgment. View "Carter v. Progressive Mountain Ins." on Justia Law

Charles Blackmon and Dexter Booth sued Malaco, Inc.; N.J. Pockets, Inc.; and Callop Hampton (owner of Hamp’s Place Night Club) on a premises-liability claim. Plaintiffs settled with Malaco. At trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Hampton. Hampton filed a post-trial motion, requesting the trial court to impose sanctions against Blackmon, Booth, and their attorney for filing a frivolous lawsuit and to award attorney fees. The motion was denied, and Hampton appealed that judgment to the Supreme Court. Finding no abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Hampton v. Blackmon" on Justia Law

This appeal involved Empire Fire and Marine Insurance Company's obligations under an "Insurance for Non-Trucking Use" policy issued to Drielick Trucking. The policy contained a business-use exclusion, which included two clauses that Empire argued precluded coverage in this case. The Court of Appeals agreed that the first clause precluded coverage when the covered vehicle was not carrying property at the time of the accident, was in this case. Thus, the Court of Appeals expressly declined to address the second clause relating to leased covered vehicles. The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in its interpretation of the first clause. The case to the trial court for further fact-finding to determine whether Drielick Trucking and Great Lakes Carriers Corporation (GLC) entered into a leasing agreement for the use of Drielick Trucking’s semi-tractors as was contemplated under the policy's clause related to a leased covered vehicle. View "Estate of Eugene Hunt v. Drielick" on Justia Law

Patrick O’Basuyi filed suit against several defendants (collectively, “TriStar”) for breach of contract, quantum meruit and fraudulent conveyance. TriStar responded by filing a counterclaim for malicious prosecution. O’Basuyi filed a motion for separate trial of TriStar’s counterclaims. The trial court overruled the motion for separate trial, determining that Mo. R. Civ. P. 55.06, which governs joinder of claims, authorized its denial of O’Basuyi’s motion for separate trial of the malicious prosecution claim. O’Basuyi subsequently sought a writ of prohibition. The Supreme Court granted the request writ, holding (1) Rule 55.06 does not permit either joinder or trial of a malicious prosecution counterclaim with the underlying claim; and (2) therefore, the trial court erred in permitting the joint trial of the defendants’ counterclaim and O’Basuyi’s claims. View "State ex rel. O'Basuyi v. Hon. David Lee Vincent III" on Justia Law

An owner contracted with an Architect to prepare plans and specifications for the construction of a light rail. A General Contractor was awarded the contract to construct the project. The Architect and General Contractor had no contract with each other. Because the Architect’s plans were full of errors, the General Contractor lost nearly $14 million on the project. The General Contractor filed a tort suit against the Architect, alleging negligent misrepresentation. The trial court rendered judgment for the General Contractor for $2.25 million plus interest. The Architect appealed, arguing that the economic loss rule barred the General Contractor’s claim. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the economic loss rule applied in this case to preclude the General Contractor from recovering delay damages from the Architect. View "LAN/STV v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Facing asbestos-related personal injury lawsuits filed in the 1980s, a group of producers of asbestos and asbestos-containing products formed the Center for Claims Resolution to administer such claims on behalf of its Members. About 20 Members negotiated and signed the Producer Agreement, which established and set forth the mechanics of the Center and the obligations of the Members. After G-I failed to pay its contractually-calculated share of personal injury settlements and Center expenses, U.S. Gypsum and Quigley were obligated to pay additional sums to cover G-I’s payment obligations. G-I filed for bankruptcy and the Center, U.S. Gypsum, and Quigley each filed a proof of claim, seeking to recover for G-I’s nonpayment under the Producer Agreement. The Center settled its claim with G-I. The Bankruptcy Court granted summary judgment in G-I’s favor. The district court affirmed. The Third Circuit vacated, holding that the Producer Agreement permits the Former Members to pursue a breach of contract action against G-I for its failure to pay contractually-obligated sums due to the Center, in light of their payment of G-I’s share. View "In re: G-I Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Thomas P. Whelan, Jr.'s decedent father, Thomas P. Whelan, Sr., was in Plaintiff's parked truck when it was hit by a moving vehicle. The collision allegedly resulted in severe injuries and medical costs in excess of $100,000 and ultimately in the decedent's death a few years later. At the time of the accident, occupants of Plaintiff's truck were insureds under the terms of a $50,000 liability policy issued by State Farm, facially providing no UM/UIM coverage. In the Supreme Court's decision in "Jordan v. Allstate Ins. Co.," the effective rejection of an insured's statutory rights to UM/UIM coverage equal to liability limits had to be made in writing and as part of the insurance policy delivered to the insured. Because the result in "Jordan" was foreshadowed by other precedents, the Supreme Court declined to make Jordan applicable only to cases arising in the future, and held that policies that failed to comply with Jordan's rejection requirements would be judicially reformed to provide full statutory coverage. In 2011, following the 2010 issuance of Jordan, Plaintiff made a demand on his insurer State Farm for reformation of his policy that was in effect at the time of the accident. Relying on a clause in the policy that purported to bar UM/UIM claims made more than six years after the date of the underlying accident, State Farm rejected the claim. Plaintiff then instituted a declaratory judgment action against State Farm for reformation of the policy. Upon review of this matter, the Supreme Court held that a limitations clause based solely on the date of the accident without consideration of the actual accrual of the right to make a UM/UIM claim was unreasonable and unenforceable as a matter of law. But addressing the merits of Plaintiff's action, the Court also held that judicial reformation under Jordan did not extend to historical insurance contracts formed before another precedential opinion was issued in 2004. Because the policy in this case was issued before that date, it was not subject to retroactive reformation of its facial lack of UM/UIM coverage. View "Whelan v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff purchased a new vehicle from Dealer that was subject to Manufacturer’s limited warranty. Plaintiff later filed a complaint against Manufacturer and Dealer (together, Defendants), alleging that the vehicle was defective and that Defendants failed to repair or remedy the defects under the warranty. Dealer demanded that Manufacturer reimburse Dealer for the attorney’s fees it incurred in defending against Plaintiff’s claims and indemnification for and liability incurred. Plaintiffs claims against Defendants were disposed of through summary judgment and voluntary dismissal. The judge also found that Dealer was not entitled to indemnificationt. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that because Plaintiff’s allegations alleged the fault or negligence of both Manufacturer and Dealer, Manufacturer did not have a duty to defend under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93B, 8(a). View "Ferreira v. Chrysler Group LLC" on Justia Law

After an oil drilling rig owned by BP Exploration & Production, Inc. and BP America Production Company (collectively, BP) sank of the Gulf Coast of Louisiana and caused a massive oil spill, Packagen, a manufacturer of packaging products, sought to sell containment boom to BP. Packagen began producing boom after the oil spill, but BP never paid for any of the boom manufactured by Packagen. Packagen filed a five-count complaint against BP in federal district court, invoking diversity jurisdiction and alleging various state-law claims. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of BP. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on Packagen’s negligent and intentional misrepresentation claims, breach of contract claim, unjust enrichment and quantum meruit claim, and promissory estoppel claim. View "Packgen v. BP Exploration & Prod., Inc." on Justia Law