Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed a breach of contract claim against Zenith after Santana Morales, Jr. was crushed to death by a palm tree while working as a landscaper for Lawns. The Florida Supreme Court answered the following certified questions in the affirmative: (1) Does the estate have standing to bring its breach of contract claim against Zenith under the employer liability policy? (2) If so, does the provision in the employer liability policy which excludes from coverage "any obligation imposed by workers' compensation... law" operate to exclude coverage of the estate's claim against Zenith for the tort judgment? and (3) If the estate's claim is not barred by the workers' compensation exclusion, does the release in the workers' compensation settlement agreement otherwise prohibit the estate's collection of the tort judgment? The court concluded that, given the Florida Supreme Court's resolution of the certified issues, the district court correctly determined that the workers' compensation exclusion in Part II of the policy barred Zenith's coverage of the tort judgment against Lawns. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Zenith. View "Morales v. Zenith Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Gordon Westergren was involved in a lawsuit regarding the purchase of highly desired property. The lawsuit went to mediation, which resulted in National Property Holdings, L.P. (NPH) agreeing to purchase the property. Separately, in exchange for Western’s agreement to settle the lawsuit, Russell Plank, the consultant for NPH, orally promised Westergren that he would receive $1 million plus an interest in the profits from NPH’s future sale of the property. Westergren subsequently signed a release stating that he agreed to relinquish all interest in the property and all claims against NPH and other listed parties in exchange for a total payment of $500,000. Westergren then filed suit, alleging, inter alia, breach of the oral contract and fraud. Defendants asserted that Westergren had released all claims by signing the release and that the oral contract was unenforceable. The jury found in Westergren’s favor on all claims, concluding that Plank fraudulently induced Westergren to sign the release. The Supreme Court held (1) Westergren’s fraudulent inducement failed as a matter of law because he had a reasonable opportunity to read the release before he signed it and elected not to do so; and (2) the oral side agreement did not satisfy the statute of frauds. View "Nat’l Prop. Holdings, L.P. v. Westergren" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Kathryn Kipling sued State Farm Automobile Insurance Company in Colorado federal district court for breach of contract because it did not pay her benefits under four insurance policies issued in Minnesota. The court determined that she would be entitled to benefits under Colorado law but not under Minnesota law. It then applied tort conflict-of-laws principles to rule that Colorado law governed. After its review, the Tenth Circuit held that the court erred by not applying contract conflict-of-laws principles. The district court was reversed and the matter remanded for further consideration. View "Kipling v. State Farm Mutual Automobile" on Justia Law

Bill Head, who owns and operates the Silver Spur Truck Stop in Pharr, Texas, hired Petroleum Solutions, Inc. to manufacture and install an underground fuel system. After the discovery that a major diesel-fuel release leak had occurred, Head sued Petroleum Solutions for its resulting damages. Petroleum Solutions filed a third-party petition against Titeflex, Inc., the alleged manufacturer of a component part incorporated into the fuel system, claiming indemnity and contribution. Titeflex filed a counterclaim against Petroleum Solutions for statutory indemnity. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Head and in favor of Titeflex. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court (1) reversed as to Head’s claims against Petroleum Solutions, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by charging the jury with a spoliation instruction and striking Petroleum Solutions’ defenses, and the abuse of discretion was harmful; and (2) affirmed as to Titeflex’s indemnity claim, holding that Titeflex was entitled to statutory indemnity from Petroleum Solutions and that any error with respect to the indemnity claim was harmless. View "Petroleum Solutions, Inc. v. Head" on Justia Law

This dispute arose from Plaintiff’s purchase from David Bisson of seventy heifers whose health certifications were incorrect and origin could not be determined. As a result, the heifers had to be quarantined for approximately five months. Plaintiff sued Defendants, including Bisson, Mihm Transportation Co. and Paul Radloff, alleging fraudulent misrepresentation and deceit and civil conspiracy. The circuit court entered a default summary judgment against Bisson for fraudulent misrepresentation and deceit in the amount of $100,004 in actual damages and $1 million in punitive damages. After a trial on the remaining claims, the jury found in favor of Plaintiff on the civil conspiracy claim as to Mihm and Radloff. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in failing to impose upon Bisson, Mihm, and Radloff joint and several liability for the totality of the summary judgment award, including punitive damages; and (2) did not err in denying Plaintiff’s motion for judgment as a matter of law against defendant Rod Spartz. View "Huether v. Bisson" on Justia Law

Gail and Scott Helm filed a personal injury action against Gallo Realty, Inc., one of its real estate agents, and 206 Massachusetts Ave, LLC (owner of the property). The Helms rented a beach house at 206 Massachusetts Avenue in Lewes for a week in 2010. As Gail descended the stairs, she fell and sustained injuries. Gail sought to recover damages based on claims of negligence and breach of contract; Scott claimed loss of consortium. The Superior Court granted defendants' motions for summary judgment, dismissing the Helms' claims. The Helms appealed, arguing: (1) the Superior Court erred in granting defendants' motion for summary judgment on the issue of primary risk assumption and comparative negligence as a matter of law; (2) the Superior Court erred in holding that an indemnification clause provision in the lease protected defendants from liability; and (3) the Superior Court erred in granting summary judgment on the contract claims. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the Superior Court applied both the doctrine of primary assumption of risk and the doctrine of comparative negligence incorrectly. The record reflected that the Superior Court never specifically based its decision on the indemnification clause. The Superior Court's initial ruling in favor of defendants was only on the negligence claims. Furthermore, the Supreme Court found that the record reflected that the Superior Court's dismissive rulings on the Helms' contract claim was "cursory and inextricably intertwined" with its erroneous rulings on the negligence claims. As such, the Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Helm v. 206 Massachusetts Avenue,LLC" on Justia Law

In 2007, Jared Wolfe was injured when his vehicle was hit from behind by an automobile driven by Karl Zierle. Wolfe attributed blame to Zierle and demanded $25,000 from Zierle’s insurer carrier, Appellant Allstate Property and Casualty Insurance Company, equating to half the liability limits under the applicable policy. Allstate counteroffered $1,200, which Wolfe refused. Wolfe then instituted a personal injury action against Zierle seeking compensatory damages grounded in negligence. Allstate assumed Zierle’s defense while maintaining its additional right, under the policy, to effectuate a settlement. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court accepted certification from a federal appeals court to clarify whether, under Pennsylvania law, an insured may assign the right to recover damages from his insurance company deriving from the insurer’s bad faith toward the insured. The Court concluded that the entitlement to assert damages under Pennsylvania law may be assigned by an insured to an injured plaintiff and judgment creditor such as Wolfe. Having answered the certified question, the Court returned the matter to the federal court. View "Allstate Prop & Casualty Ins Co. v. Wolfe" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Quicken Loans, Inc., alleging that Quicken committed common law fraud and violated the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act in connection with a loan agreement between Plaintiff and Quicken. The circuit court found in favor of Plaintiff on all but one of her claims. The Supreme Court reversed in part, concluding that the circuit court improperly cancelled Plaintiff’s obligation to repay the loan principal, failed to support its punitive damages award with the correct analysis, and failed to offset the compensatory damages award against Plaintiff’s pretrial settlement with defendants who did not proceed to trial. After remand, the circuit court entered an opinion and order. The Supreme Court again reversed, holding that the circuit court (1) improperly created a lien on Plaintiff’s property; (2) erred in increasing the compensatory damages award to Plaintiff; (3) erred in awarding attorney fees and costs for both the first appellate proceeding and the post-appellate proceedings; (4) improperly increased the punitive damages award; and (5) erred in refusing to offset Plaintiff’s award of attorney fees and costs by a pretrial settlement between Plaintiff and the codefendants. Remanded. View "Quicken Loans, Inc. v. Brown" on Justia Law

Petitioners Susan and Peter White appealed a superior court order denying their petition for a declaratory judgment that respondent Charles Matthews was covered under a homeowner's insurance policy issues to his mother by respondent Vermont Mutual Insurance Company. Matthews' dog bit Mrs. White while Matthews was staying with friends at the mother's home in Moultonborough. The policy defined an "insured" to include "residents of your household who are… your relatives." Matthews’s mother also owns a home in Naples, Florida, where she lives for approximately half of the year, and where Matthews usually visits only at Christmas. The petitioners and Matthews claim that the Florida residence is Matthews’s mother’s primary residence, but they do not claim that Matthews is a resident of the Florida home. Matthews testified that he lived in Massachusetts for 80% or more of the year. However, he had not changed his voting registration since he first registered to vote when he was eighteen, and he was still registered to vote in Moultonborough (he voted in Moultonborough in the 2012 election, a month before the hearing in this case). Matthews also held a New Hampshire driver’s license and his vehicle was registered in New Hampshire (his decision to register his car in New Hampshire was motivated by his desire to avoid buying automobile insurance, which is required in Massachusetts). Matthews typically notifies his mother in advance of using the Moultonborough house for permission to stay there. Following the 2011 incident involving Matthews' dog, petitioners sought a declaratory judgment that Vermont Mutual was responsible for any damages that might recover from Matthews. After a bench trial, the court denied the petition and the subsequent motion for reconsideration, finding that the policy did not contemplate Matthews as a resident of the Moultonborough house. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's judgment. View "White v. Vermont Mutual Insurance Company" on Justia Law

This case concerned a dispute between an insurance carrier (Plaintiff) and its insured (Defendant) regarding Plaintiff’s obligation to pay underinsured motorist benefits. An arbitration panel concluded that the issue of whether the relevant policy provisions provided coverage for the claim should be resolved under the choice of law rules governing claims sounding in tort, rather than claims sounding in insurance and contract, and therefore, that New Jersey law rather than Connecticut law governed Defendant’s claim for uninsured motorist benefits under the policy. The trial court vacated the arbitration award, and the Appellate Court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Appellate Court, in its opinion adopting the decision of the trial court, properly applied sections 6(2), 188 and 193 of the Restatement (Second), contract choice of law, to determine that Connecticut law governed the claim.View "Gen. Accident Ins. Co. v. Mortara" on Justia Law