Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Motel was insured under a policy issued by Insurer. The policy provided coverage for, as well as a duty to defend against, claims for bodily injury and personal and advertising injury liability. The policy expressly disclaimed coverage for both bodily injury and personal and advertising injury when the injury arose out of intentional conduct. Specifically, the policy excluded coverage for harm resulting from acts of sexual molestation by motel employees. After an off-duty motel employee molested a young motel guest, Insurer sought a declaratory judgment to enforce its reading of the contract disclaiming coverage for, and its duty to defend against, a civil complaint brought by the motel guest. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Insurer. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the abuse/molestation exclusion excluded from coverage the act of the employee, as the victim was in the "care" of the motel at the time of the molestation per the language of the exclusion. View "Holiday Hospitality Franchising, Inc. v. Amco Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Katherine and Michael, were living together in a home that was destroyed by a fire in 1998. Seeking to rebuild their home, Michael and Katherine completed an application for property insurance with American Family Mutual Insurance Company. American Family issued the policy. In 2003, Plaintiffs' garage was destroyed in a fire, and Plaintiffs filed a claim with American Family. During follow-up investigations, Michael disclosed the 1998 fire to American Family. American Family, treating the prior fire loss nondisclosure as a misrepresentation, voided the insurance policy ab initio and denied Plaintiffs' claim. Plaintiffs filed suit against American Family claiming breach of contract and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court granted summary judgment for American Family. Plaintiffs appealed, challenging the grant of summary judgment on grounds that American Family failed to return the premiums paid by Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs' assignment of error was not properly before the Court on appeal. View "Dodd v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Patients Abby Allen and Walter Moore sought medical treatment at Clarian North Hospital, which was owned by Clarian Health Partners. After Allen, who was uninsured and not covered by Medicare or Medicaid, received services, the hospital billed Allen its "chargemaster" rates in accordance with a contract between Allen and Clarian. Patients' class action complaint alleged breach of contract and sought declaratory judgment that the rates the hospital billed its uninsured patients were unreasonable and unenforceable. The trial court granted Clarian's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the issue of reasonableness required resolution by a fact-finder. The Supreme Court vacated the opinion of the court of appeals and affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that Patients' agreement to pay the hospital for the medical services they received in the context of a contract they formed with Clarian was not indefinite and referred to Clarian's chargemaster. As a result, the Court could not impute a "reasonable" price term into the contract. View "Allen v. Clarian Health Partners, Inc." on Justia Law

An encounter between a tenured professor at a private university and his department head turned into a formal complaint of harassment against the professor. After extensive internal proceedings, the professor's tenure was rescinded and he was dismissed from the university's faculty. The professor filed suit claiming breach of his employment contract and tenure agreement. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the university. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court, holding (1) the professor's conduct constituted harassment under the terms of his employment contract such that the university could dismiss him; (2) the university did not deny the professor the procedural entitlements afforded under the professor's employment contract's terms; and (3) the university did not deprive the professor of due process. View "Haegert v. Univ. of Evansville" on Justia Law

When Sean and Dee Anna Ryan divorced, they agreed to sell two properties they owned and divide the proceeds, subject to a proviso that neither party was required to accept a sale yielding net proceeds below specified minimums. When the properties could not be sold at or above the specified minimums, Dee Anna refused to waive the proviso. Sean filed a motion for relief from judgment, seeking a court order that the properties be sold at prevailing fair market value and the private agreement be declared of no further force and effect. The trial court denied Sean's request. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) general rules applicable to contract construction dictated that Dee Anna was not required to agree to sell the properties for net proceeds less than the amounts set forth in the parties' agreement; and (2) Sean was not entitled to relief under Trial Rule 60(B), under which a court may relieve a party from a judgment. View "Ryan v. Ryan" on Justia Law

The Indiana Department of Environmental Management (IDEM) informed Flexdar, Inc. that Flexdar would be liable for the costs of cleaning up trichloroethylene (TCE) contamination on a site where Flexdar previously had operations. State Automobile Mutual Insurance Company (State Auto), with whom Flexdar maintained general liability and umbrella insurance policies for the period when the contamination occurred, filed a declaratory judgment action, contending that coverage for the TCE contamination was excluded pursuant to a pollution exclusion in the policies. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Flexdar, concluding that the language of State Auto's pollution exclusion was ambiguous and therefore should be construed against State Auto and in favor of coverage. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the language of the pollution exclusion at issue was ambiguous, and therefore, in accordance with precedent, the policies were construed in favor of coverage.

An employee of a concrete subcontractor was injured in a workplace accident during the construction of a stadium. The employee sought to recover damages for negligence from the project's construction manager by whom she was not employed but whom she contended had a legal duty of care for jobsite-employee safety. The trial court ruled in the employee's favor that the construction manager could be held vicariously liable for the actions of the subcontractor. The Supreme Court granted transfer and reversed the trial court, holding (1) the construction manager was not vicariously liable to the worker for any negligence of the subcontractor because the construction manager and subcontractor did not have the requisite relationship; and (2) the construction manager did not have, either by the terms of its contracts or by its actions, a legal duty of care for jobsite-employee safety, and therefore the construction manager could not be held liable to the employee for negligence. Remanded.

The State entered into a contract with IBM, and the Governor signed the contract. IBM later terminated the contract, after which the State filed suit against IBM asserting breach of contract among other claims. IBM then served notice on the Governor to take his testimonial deposition. The State moved for a protective order, asserting that the Governor's deposition was prohibited based on the Governor's unqualified privilege from arrest on civil process, and from obeying any subpoena to testify, pursuant to Ind. Code 34-29-2-1. The trial court granted IBM's motion with certain limitations. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statute clearly precludes a deposition of a sitting Governor. The privilege afforded by the statute is absolute, the Court stated, and once it is invoked, any party protected by the privilege may not be compelled to give testimony.

Stephan Odders and Gerald Kerber were former employees of Loparex, a corporation in the release liner industry. Both employees were subject to a one-year noncompetition agreement upon termination of employment. After ceasing employment at Loparex, both employees began employment with MPI Release Technologies, a competitor in the release liner industry. Loparex sued Kerber and Odders (Defendants) in the U.S. district court, seeking injunctive relief under the Illinois Trade Secrets Act and damages resulting from Defendants' breach of the noncompetition agreement. Defendants filed amended answers and counterclaims accusing Loparex of blacklisting in violation of Indiana law. The Supreme Court accepted certification to answer questions of state law and held (1) Wabash Railroad Co. v. Young, which held that Indiana's Blacklisting Statute did not provide a cause of action to individuals who voluntarily leave their employment, is no longer good law and individuals who voluntarily leave employment are not barred from making a claim under the Blacklisting Statute; (2) attorney fees are not an element of compensatory damages under the Blacklisting Statute; and (3) an employer's suit against a former employee to protect trade secrets is not a basis for recovery under the Blacklisting Statute.

After an inspection revealed deplorable health conditions for its residents, an intermediate care facility for the developmentally disabled was decertified for Medicaid reimbursement. As a result, until the State appointed a receiver nine months later, the facility operated without receiving federal or state funds. This case was a common-law claim for expenses the facility laid out in the meantime for the individuals still residing there. The trial court denied the facility restitution for the unpaid months under a theory of quantum meruit, afforded relief under related breach of contract claims, but offset that judgment by the amount the State paid for its receiver. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ultimate judgment, which resulted in neither party taking anything from the action, holding (1) the facility exhausted its administrative remedies; (2) the facility's quantum meruit claim failed; and (3) the state was entitled to set off the amount owed to the facility on the breach of contract claim against the amount the State paid in operating the receivership of the facility and which the facility then owed.