Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Glenn Mosell was a commercial real estate broker in investment sales and a land developer who owned about 290 acres of property in Canyon County. He planned to develop this property and other land that he had an option to purchase into a destination resort which would include, among other things, resort-based residences; a state-of-the-art winery; a luxury 4-star boutique hotel; a world class day spa; a gourmet restaurant; an event and business conference center; polo fields; an equestrian center; a sporting and athletic club; and an amphitheater for music events and concerts. He contacted restaurateur John Berryhill to see if he would be interested in building the restaurant in the development. Berryhill was the owner and president of Berryhill & Company, which operated a restaurant and catering business. Berryhill agreed to participate in the proposed development, but not to build the restaurant. In 2007, Berryhill & Company signed a lease of space in downtown Boise in order to move his restaurant from a strip mall to that space. Mosell and Berryhill both signed a personal guaranty of Berryhill & Company's obligations under the lease. Berryhill & Company then began making tenant improvements to the leased property. Mosell Equities paid Berryhill & Company by check. The word "loan" was written on the memo line of the check. Over the next ten months, Mosell Equities issued nine additional checks to Berryhill & Company, each had the word "loan" written on the memo line except for two. The restaurant opened in August 2007. Because of the economic downturn, Mosell decided not to proceed with the polo project and did not launch the intended sales effort in 2008. Later that year, Mosell Equities stopped paying the rent on additional space, and Mosell and Berryhill ended their relationship. In 2009, Mosell Equities filed suit against Berryhill & Company on multiple claims: (1) breach of an express contract; (2) breach of an implied contract; (3) unjust enrichment; (4) conversion; (5) fraud; and (6) piercing the corporate veil. The case was tried to a jury, and the verdict was in favor of Berryhill. Mosell moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict citing insufficient evidence, and the district court granted that motion. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court erred in concluding that there was insufficient evidence to support the verdict, and that the district court erred in granting the motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Mosell Equities v. Berryhill & Co." on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a dispute in district court over two liens on real property: a deed of trust and a mortgage. Appellants (Insight, LLC and several other companies) are assignees of a mortgage secured by 160 acres of real property owned by Summitt, Inc., which included an 18-acre parcel Summitt purchased from Respondents Patrick and Monica Gunter. The Respondents held a deed of trust on the 18-acre parcel. Summitt defaulted on its obligations to both Insight and the Gunters. Insight filed suit naming Summitt's principals and the Gunters as defendants. The Gunters denied that their deed of trust was junior to the Insight-Summitt mortgage. The district court denied Insight's motion for summary judgment because there was an issue as to who was the initial encumbrancer. After trial, the district court found that the closing of the Gunter-Summitt deed of trust was separate and independent from the Insight-Summitt mortgage. Furthermore, the court found that the Gunters' deed of trust effectively encumbered the Gunter property at the time the transaction between Summitt and the Gunters closed. However, it found that the Insight mortgage on the combined 160-acre parcel did not create an encumbrance on the Gunter property until the Gunter-Summitt transaction closed. On appeal, Insight argued that the mortgage had priority as a matter of law because it was a purchase money mortgage that was first recorded. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court's finding that Insight had notice of the Gunters' deed of trust was clearly erroneous. Further, the Insight-Summitt mortgage was a purchase money mortgage , and that the court erred in concluding the deed of trust took priority. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the district court's judgment in this case and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Insight LLC v. Gunter" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Gary Duspiva, a well driller, filed suit against Defendants-Appellees Clyde and John Fillmore to recover money that he claimed was owed to him for well drilling services. The Fillmores counterclaimed, alleging Duspiva violated the Idaho Consumer Protection Act (ICPA). The matter proceeded to trial. The district court found that Duspiva's conduct violated the ICPA and granted judgment in favor of the Fillmores. Duspiva appealed to the Supreme Court. Finding no error or abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision. View "Duspiva v. Fillmore" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case arose from a commercial lease dispute. Boise Mode, LLC leased space in its building to Donahoe Pace & Partners, Ltd. (DPP). Timothy Pace executed a personal guarantee for the lease. During the term of the lease, Boise Mode remodeled part of the building for another tenant. After raising concerns to Boise Mode about the adverse effects of the construction to its business, DPP eventually stopped paying rent and vacated the premises prior to the end of the lease. Boise Mode then brought an action against DPP, alleging breach of contract, and against Pace for breaching the guarantee. DPP counterclaimed, alleging that the disruption caused by the construction constituted breach of contract and constructive eviction. After Boise Mode moved for summary judgment on all claims and counterclaims, DPP requested a continuance to complete discovery. The district court denied DPP's motion and ultimately granted Boise Mode's motion for summary judgment. DPP appealed the grant of summary judgment as well as the district court's denial of its request for a continuance. Upon review, and finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Boise Mode, LLC v. Donahoe Pace" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a dispute in district court over two liens on real property: a deed of trust and a mortgage. Appellants (Insight, LLC and several other companies) are assignees of a mortgage secured by 160 acres of real property owned by Summitt, Inc., which included an 18-acre parcel Summitt purchased from Respondents Patrick and Monica Gunter. The Respondents held a deed of trust on the 18-acre parcel. Summitt defaulted on its obligations to both Insight and the Gunters. Insight filed suit naming Summitt's principals and the Gunters as defendants. The Gunters denied that their deed of trust was junior to the Insight-Summitt mortgage. The district court denied Insight's motion for summary judgment because there was an issue as to who was the initial encumbrancer. After trial, the district court found that the closing of the Gunter-Summitt deed of trust was separate and independent from the Insight-Summitt mortgage. Furthermore, the court found that the Gunters' deed of trust effectively encumbered the Gunter property at the time the transaction between Summitt and the Gunters closed. However, it found that the Insight mortgage on the combined 160-acre parcel did not create an encumbrance on the Gunter property until the Gunter-Summitt transaction closed. On appeal, Insight argued that the mortgage had priority as a matter of law because it was a purchase money mortgage that was first recorded. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court's finding that Insight had notice of the Gunters' deed of trust was clearly erroneous. Further, the Insight-Summitt mortgage was a purchase money mortgage , and that the court erred in concluding the deed of trust took priority. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the district court's judgment in this case and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Insight LLC v. Gunter" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case arose from a commercial lease dispute. Boise Mode, LLC leased space in its building to Donahoe Pace & Partners, Ltd. (DPP). Timothy Pace executed a personal guarantee for the lease. During the term of the lease, Boise Mode remodeled part of the building for another tenant. After raising concerns to Boise Mode about the adverse effects of the construction to its business, DPP eventually stopped paying rent and vacated the premises prior to the end of the lease. Boise Mode then brought an action against DPP, alleging breach of contract, and against Pace for breaching the guarantee. DPP counterclaimed, alleging that the disruption caused by the construction constituted breach of contract and constructive eviction. After Boise Mode moved for summary judgment on all claims and counterclaims, DPP requested a continuance to complete discovery. The district court denied DPP's motion and ultimately granted Boise Mode's motion for summary judgment. DPP appealed the grant of summary judgment as well as the district court's denial of its request for a continuance. Upon review, and finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Boise Mode, LLC v. Donahoe Pace" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Gary Duspiva, a well driller, filed suit against Defendants-Appellees Clyde and John Fillmore to recover money that he claimed was owed to him for well drilling services. The Fillmores counterclaimed, alleging Duspiva violated the Idaho Consumer Protection Act (ICPA). The matter proceeded to trial. The district court found that Duspiva's conduct violated the ICPA and granted judgment in favor of the Fillmores. Duspiva appealed to the Supreme Court. Finding no error or abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision. View "Duspiva v. Fillmore" on Justia Law

A bail bond company challenged the district court's decision affirming an order of the Director of the Idaho Department of Insurance. That order, which was based on I.C. 41-1042, prohibited a bail bond company from contemporaneously writing a bail bond and contracting with a client to indemnify the company for the cost of apprehending a bail jumper. It also prohibited a bail bond company from later requiring a client to agree to such indemnification as a condition of the bond's continuing validity. While the proceedings before the district court were pending, the Director promulgated I.D.A.P.A. 18.01.04.016.02, which by rule expressed the Final Order. Upon review of the applicable statutory authority and the trial court record below, the Supreme Court concluded that: (1) the plain text of I.C. 41-1042 permits a bail bond company to contemporaneously write a bail bond and contract with a client to indemnify the company for the cost of apprehending a defendant who jumps bail; and (2) the Director's interpretation of I.C. 41-1042 prejudiced PetitionerTwo Jinn's substantial rights. The Court reversed the district court's memorandum decision and remanded the case for further review. View "Two Jinn, Inc. v. Idaho Dept of Insurance" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case stemmed from the grant of summary judgment in favor of an insurance company. The insureds contended that the liability coverage provision in their homeowner's policy required the insurer to defend a lawsuit brought by a contractor they hired to repair fire damage to their home and to remodel the home, and that the insurer was required to indemnify against any recovery by the contractor. Upon review of the policy underlying this case, the Supreme Court found no such duties as the insureds contended and affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Linford v. State Farm Fire & Casualty" on Justia Law

Ida-Therm, LLC appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Bedrock Geothermal, LLC, which held that a reservation of "all the oil, gas, and minerals, in, on, or under the surface of [deeded] lands," in a 1946 warranty deed included the geothermal resources underlying the property. The district court determined that the Deed's mineral reservation severed the mineral estate from the surface estate, and that geothermal resources were included in the scope of the mineral estate. Because the Supreme Court found that the term "mineral" was ambiguous with respect to the deed in question, and because ambiguous grants in deeds are construed against the grantor, the Court construed the grant in favor of Ida-Therm and reversed the district court. View "Ida-Therm v. Bedrock Geothermal" on Justia Law