Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Health Law
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The plaintiff, Yarnell, filed a wrongful death action against Clinton No. 1, Inc., a healthcare and rehabilitation center, alleging that Clinton's negligence led to her mother's death from COVID-19. The Missouri Supreme Court addressed whether Clinton's proposed theories of immunity barred Yarnell's claims, which were based on the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness (PREP) Act and two Missouri acts.Yarnell's mother had contracted with Clinton for a private room, but Clinton placed her with a roommate, which Yarnell claimed exposed her mother to COVID-19, violated their agreement, and ultimately led to her mother's death. Clinton argued that Yarnell's claims were barred by the PREP Act, which provides immunity for healthcare providers administering or using covered countermeasures during a public health emergency, and Missouri laws granting immunity to healthcare providers during an emergency declared by the governor and in COVID-19 exposure actions.The court found that Yarnell's petition did not implicate a covered countermeasure under the PREP Act, as it made no reference to the administration or use of a diagnostic test or any other covered countermeasure. The court also found that Clinton failed to demonstrate it agreed to be deployed during the emergency or that the governor or any state agency acted on such agreement and deployed Clinton, which would have entitled it to immunity under Missouri law. Lastly, the court noted that Yarnell had adequately alleged her harm was caused by Clinton's recklessness, and the two COVID-19 statutes would not foreclose relief if Yarnell were able to prove such recklessness. Therefore, the court quashed its preliminary writ of mandamus, allowing Yarnell's case to proceed. View "State ex rel. Clinton No. 1 vs. Baker" on Justia Law

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Salvatore Baglione, insured under Health Net of California Inc. through his employer, the County of Santa Clara, brought a lawsuit against Health Net alleging breach of contract and bad faith. This followed Health Net's inconsistent authorization of a medication prescribed for Baglione's chronic condition. Health Net moved to compel arbitration of Baglione's claims based on an arbitration provision in the enrollment form Baglione had signed. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Health Net's motion, finding that the agreement between Health Net and the County did not satisfy the disclosure requirements of Health and Safety Code section 1363.1, and therefore, the arbitration provision was unenforceable. Health Net appealed the decision.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, affirmed the trial court's order. The appellate court ruled that the enrollment form did not comply with the requirements of section 1363.1. It found that the form was not clear in its disclosure of which disputes were subject to arbitration, particularly with references to additional documents and laws that did not pertain to the arbitration agreement. Furthermore, the form did not place the arbitration provision immediately before the signature line, as required by the statute. The court also agreed with the lower court that the agreement between Health Net and the County was non-compliant. It ruled that an arbitration agreement, which is part of a health plan, is not enforceable unless both the enrollment form and the County agreement are compliant. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court's order denying Health Net's motion to compel arbitration. View "Baglione v. Health Net of Cal." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court directing that while Plaintiff may pursue his claims against Ball State University based on its response to the COVID-19 pandemic on his on behalf, he may not pursue a class action on behalf of other students, holding that there was no error.Plaintiff, a university student, sued the University for breach of contract and unjust enrichment after the university switched to providing only online instruction for the 2020 spring semester, seeking to recover tuition and fees for in-person instruction and services allegedly promised by the university. Plaintiff sought to litigate his claims as a class action, but after he filed his action, Public Law No. 166-2021 was signed into law, prohibiting class action lawsuits against postsecondary educational institutions for contract and unjust enrichment claims arising from COVID-19. The trial court denied class certification based on this new law. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court correctly concluded that the law was constitutional and precluded a class action in this case. View "Mellowitz v. Ball State University" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court dismissed this interlocutory appeal of a vacated class certification order and directed the circuit court to remand the case to address motions to compel arbitration, holding that this appeal was moot.Plaintiffs, who represented the estates of former residents of fourteen different nursing homes, alleged breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims against the nursing homes, in violation of the Arkansas Civil Rights act and the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act. The nursing homes moved to compel arbitration for all but two of the named plaintiffs, after which the plaintiffs moved for class certification. The circuit court granted Plaintiffs' motion for class certification without ruling on the motions to compel arbitration. The nursing homes brought an interlocutory appeal of the class-certification order and petitioned for writ of prohibition, mandamus, and certiorari. The Supreme Court granted the writ petition, vacating the order granting class certification, and ordered the circuit court to rule on the motions to compel before ruling on class certification, holding that the interlocutory appeal of the vacated class-certification order was moot. View "Reliance Health Care, Inc. v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

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In this action arising out of the curtailment of classes and services at the University of Rhode Island (URI) during the COVID-19 pandemic, the First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing some of Plaintiffs' claims early in the litigation and granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant on the remaining claims, holding that the district court did not err.Plaintiffs, students who remained enrolled at URI during the pandemic, filed separate putative class actions against URI alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment. Specifically, Plaintiffs argued that URI had breached its contract when it stopped providing in-person, on-campus instruction. The district court dismissed certain claims and then, following the completion of discovery, granted summary judgment on the remaining claims. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs failed to make out a genuine issue of material fact as to whether URI had either an express or implied contract to provide in-person services and activities. View "Burt v. Bd. of Trustees of University of R.I." on Justia Law

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The insurer, in this case, had notice of the hospital’s lien for treatment provided to the patient and, pursuant to a settlement agreement with the patient, gave him a check for the lien amount made payable to both him and the hospital. The hospital, Long Beach Memorial Medical Center, claims this action did not comply with the Hospital Lien Act (HLA) and sued the insurer who wrote the check, Allstate Insurance Company, for violating the HLA. The trial court granted Allstate’s motion for summary judgment, ruling Allstate’s two-payee check, which was never cashed, satisfied its obligation under the HLA.   The Second Appellate District reversed. The court concluded that merely delivering to the patient (or, in this case, his attorney) a check for the lien amount, made payable to both the patient and the hospital, is not a payment in satisfaction of the hospital’s lien under the HLA. The court explained Allstate maintains that it made this payment to the Medical Center concurrent with payment to the patient and that, therefore, the Medical Center cannot establish Allstate made a settlement payment to the patient without paying the Medical Center the amount of its lien. The court explained that Allstate declined to specify which check made payable to the Medical Center as copayee—the February 2020 check or the March 2021 check— Allstate claims satisfied its payment obligation to the Medical Center. However, neither check was a payment to the Medical Center. Moreover, Allstate does not invoke the exception to the general rule here. View "Long Beach Memorial Medical Center v. Allstate Ins. Co." on Justia Law

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On appeal from the trial court's denial of a motion to compel arbitration in this wrongful death lawsuit brought against Defendant, a nursing home, the Supreme Court held that Defendant did not meet the requirements for limited statutory immunity from civil liability under either Tennessee's Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care Act, Tenn. Code Ann. 34-6-201 to -218, or the Health Care Decisions Act, Tenn. Code Ann. 68-11-1801 to -1815.After a resident of the nursing home died his estate brought the underlying wrongful death suit. Defendant moved to compel arbitration based on an arbitration agreement executed by Plaintiff on the decedent's behalf pursuant to a durable power of attorney for health care (POA) form. Plaintiff objected, arguing that the decedent did not have the mental capacity to appoint an agent when he executed the POA. The trial court concluded that the POA was invalid. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court erred in looking beyond the face of the POA to determine whether Defendant had the mental capacity to execute it. The Supreme Court reversed and affirmed the trial court, holding that the trial court did not err in considering evidence on whether the principal had the requisite mental capacity to execute the POA. View "Welch v. Oaktree Health & Rehabilitation Center LLC" on Justia Law

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Michael Andary, conservator and guardian of Ellen Andary; Ronald Krueger, guardian of Philip Krueger; and Moriah, Inc., doing business as Eisenhower Center, brought an action against USAA Casualty Insurance Company and Citizens Insurance Company of America, seeking a declaratory judgment that the Michigan Legislature’s 2019 amendments of the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq., that placed new limitations on in-home family-provided attendant care in MCL 500.3157(10) and the non-Medicare fee schedule of MCL 500.3157(7) could not be applied to limit or change plaintiffs’ rights to benefits under the insurance policies defendants had issued to them before the 2019 amendments. Andary and Krueger, suffered traumatic injuries in automobile accidents before 2019, had been provided uncapped lifetime medical care covered by personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits under insurance policies and the no-fault act in effect at the time of their injuries. Plaintiffs argued that the retroactive application of the 2019 amendments to them was improper and would also violate their constitutional rights under the Contracts Clause of Const 1963, art 1, § 10 and their due-process and equal-protection rights. Additionally, plaintiffs all challenged the prospective application of the 2019 amendments on behalf of future motor vehicle accident victims and medical providers. Defendants moved to dismiss the case, and the trial court granted defendants’ motion. Plaintiffs appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case to the circuit court. The Michigan Supreme Court found that the 2019 no-fault amendments of MCL 500.3157 did not impact services and care that were already being provided to Andary and Krueger and that had been reimbursable prior to the amendments. Andary’s and Krueger’s rights to the PIP benefits at issue in this case were both contractual and statutory in nature, and the 2019 no-fault amendments did not retroactively modify their vested contractual rights. Plaintiffs’ constitutional challenges to prospective application of the amended statutes were dismissed. View "Andary v. USAA Casualty Insurance Company" on Justia Law

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A healthcare provider contended it was underpaid for substance abuse treatment that it rendered to 29 patients. Seeking to recover the difference directly from the insurance company, the provider filed suit alleging the insurer entered into binding payment agreements during verification of benefits and authorization calls with the provider and otherwise misrepresented or concealed the amounts it would pay for treatment. The trial court entered summary judgment against the provider. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the court did not err in determining one or more elements of the provider’s causes of action could not be established. View "Aton Center v. United Healthcare Ins. Co." on Justia Law

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Google and the University of Chicago Medical Center collaborated to develop software capable of anticipating patients’ future healthcare needs. The University delivered several years of anonymized patient medical records to Google, to “train” the software’s algorithms. An agreement restricted Google’s use of the records to specific research-related activities and prohibited Google from attempting to identify any patient whose records were disclosed. Dinerstein sued on behalf of himself and a class of other patients whose anonymized records were disclosed, claiming that the University had breached either an express or an implied contract traceable to a privacy notice he received and an authorization he signed upon each admission to the Medical Center. Alternatively, he asserted unjust enrichment. Citing the same notice and authorization, he alleged that the University had breached its promise of patient confidentiality, violating the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act. Against Google, he claimed unjust enrichment and tortious interference with his contract with the University. He brought a privacy claim based on intrusion upon seclusion.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the case. To sue in federal court, a plaintiff must plausibly allege (and later prove) that he has suffered an injury in fact that is concrete and particularized, actual or imminent, and traceable to the defendant’s conduct. The injuries Dinerstein alleges lack plausibility, concreteness, or imminence (or some combination of the three). View "Dinerstein v. Google, LLC" on Justia Law