Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

ACT brought this suit against PCI and First National, alleging claims of breach of contract, quantum meruit, and recovery on a payment bond under the Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. 3131(b). Because United States ex rel. Celanese Coatings Co. v. Gullard was clearly irreconcilable with intervening higher authority, the court overruled it and held that the Miller Act's statute of limitations was a claim-processing rule, not a jurisdictional rule. Because nothing on the face of ACT's complaint indicated that it did not work on the project or rent equipment to PCI within one year of the date it filed the complaint, the complaint could not have been dismissed if the district court had treated the Miller Act's statute of limitations as a claim-processing rule. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Air Control Tech. v. Pre Con Indus." on Justia Law

X Tech filed suit against Geotest, alleging breach of an exclusive teaming agreement to submit a teamed bid on a USAF solicitation for testing equipment by teaming with another partner, Raytheon, on a competing bid. The jury found that Geotest breached an agreement with X Tech to "exclusively team to jointly pursue" the USAF solicitation and the district court entered judgment in favor of X Tech. The court concluded that the district court properly disposed of the parties' motions for directed verdict; concluded that the evidence proffered at trial was sufficient to support the jury's findings; affirmed the judgment of the district court and remanded to allow the district court to adjudge and award appellate attorney's fees; and denied X Tech's opposed motion to file a supplemental reply brief and Geotest's motion to file a supplemental brief as moot. View "X Technologies, Inc. v. Marvin Test Systems, Inc." on Justia Law

The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court in this case centered on the interplay between the Subcontractors' and Suppliers' Payment Protection Act (SPPA), the Tort Claims Act (TCA), and the Court's opinion in "Sloan Construction Co. v. Southco Grassing, Inc. (Sloan I)," (659 S.E.2d 158 (2008)). When subcontractors Shirley's Iron Works, Inc. and Tindall Corporation (collectively Respondents) did not receive full payment from the general contractor Gilbert Group, LLC for their work on a public construction project for the City of Union, they filed suit, asserting the City failed to comply with the statutory bond requirements pertaining to contractors working with subcontractors on public projects found in the SPPA. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the City. The court of appeals reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals decision, and affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. Furthermore, the Court clarified "Sloan I" and held that a governmental entity may be liable to a subcontractor only for breach of contract for failing to comply with the SPPA bonding requirements. View "Shirley's Iron Works v. City of Union" on Justia Law

Woodard & Curran, Inc. ("W&C") sued the City of Baldwin seeking damages on claims of breach of contract and quantum meruit. After a trial, a jury awarded W&C $203,000 in a general verdict that did not specify the basis for the damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider two issues: (1) whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that quantum meruit was an available remedy against a municipality when the claim is based on a municipal contract that is ultra vires; and (2) whether the Court of Appeals erred in determining that the jury was properly allowed to consider the breach of contract claim based on an agreement the parties entered in May 2009. Upon review, the Court concluded that the Court of Appeals erred in both respects, and therefore reversed its judgment. View "City of Baldwin v. Woodard & Curran, Inc." on Justia Law

General Dynamics entered into fixed-price contracts, fixed-price incentive contracts, cost-plus-fixed fee contracts, cost-plus-award-fee contracts, and time-and-materials contracts with the Department of Defense. Many require compliance with Cost Accounting Standards (CAS), which provide uniformity in how contractors measure, assign, and allocate costs to government contracts, including guidance for determining and measuring the components of pension cost, CAS 412-20(a). The Defense Contract Management Agency notified General Dynamics in 2006 that its use of a blended rate using partial-year valuations did not comply with CAS 412. The Contracting Officer issued notice of noncompliance in 2007. General Dynamics then submitted a compliant retirement plan, but, in 2008, again submitted a plan using the blended rate for the base year. The CO issued a second determination of noncompliance. The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals denied General Dynamics’ appeal, determining that use of partial-year asset data reflected short-term fluctuations that could and did introduce distortion prohibited by CAS 412-50(b)(4) and that substitution of a midyear value and a blended rate in place of the 8 percent long-term estimate rate constituted “actuarial assumptions” because they were “estimate[s] of future conditions affecting pension cost” and were encompassed by the prohibitions of CAS 412-50(b)(4). The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. Panetta" on Justia Law

In 2005, Curtis McGhee and another individual brought claims against the City alleging violations of civil rights sounding in malicious prosecution. The City sought coverage under insurance policies issued by CIC and Columbia. On appeal, the City and McGhee challenged the district court's order granting summary judgment to CIC and Columbia, on CIC's and Columbia's declaratory judgment claims concerning coverage under the various insurance policies. The court concluded that the district court correctly refused to consider and correctly denied additional discovery of extrinsic evidence. The court also concluded that the alleged malicious prosecution and resulting personal injuries occurred when the underlying charges were filed against McGhee in 1977. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment that the following policies did not afford coverage to the City for the malicious prosecution claims: the two excess liability policies issued by CIC; four of the special excess liability policies issued by Columbia; and the commercial umbrella liability policy issued by Columbia. As to the 1977-78 special excess liability policy issued by Columbia, the court reversed the district court's judgment regarding the applicability of the reasonable expectations doctrine. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Chicago Ins. Co., et al v. City of Council Bluffs, et al" on Justia Law

In 1983, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act established a plan for spent nuclear fuel (SNF) generated by nuclear power plants, 42 U.S.C. 10101–10270. The Act made utilities responsible for SNF storage until the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) accepts the material. The Secretary of Energy entered into contracts with nuclear utilities to accept SNF in return for payment of fees. The Act provided that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission “shall not issue or renew a license” to any nuclear utility unless the utility has entered into a contract with DOE or DOE certifies ongoing negotiations. Nuclear utilities, including the owner of the Entergy nuclear power stations, entered into contracts and began making payments, which have continued. By 1994, DOE knew it would be unable to accept SNF by the Act’s January 31, 1998 deadline. In 1995, DOE issued a “Final Interpretation” that took the position that it did not have an unconditional obligation to begin performance on that date. Entergy sued, asserting that DOE’s partial breach caused it to incur additional costs for SNF storage. The claims court struck an unavoidable delay defense, based on a prior decision rejecting DOE’s argument that its failure was “unavoidable” under the contract. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Entergy Nuclear Fitzpatrick, LLC v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2008, the legislature enacted legislation to establish the Idaho Education Network (IEN), which was to be a high-bandwidth telecommunications distribution system for distance learning in every public school in the state. Syringa Networks, LLC (Syringa), an Idaho telecommunications company, entered into a “teaming agreement” with ENA Services, LLC (ENA). Pursuant to their agreement, ENA submitted a proposal in response to a request-for-proposals (RFP) with the Department of Administration, although the cover letter stated that both ENA and Syringa were responding jointly to the proposal. Qwest Communications Company, LLC, and Verizon Business Network Services, Inc., also submitted responsive proposals. The proposals were then scored based upon specific criteria; the ENA and Qwest proposals received the highest scores. The Department issued a letter of intent to award contracts to Qwest and ENA. One month later, it issued amendments to the two purchase orders to alter the scope of work that each would perform. Qwest became "the general contractor for all IEN technical network services" (providing the “backbone”) and ENA became "the Service Provider." The effect of these amendments was to make Qwest the exclusive provider of the backbone, which was what Syringa intended to provide as a subcontractor of ENA. Syringa filed this lawsuit against the Department, its director, the chief technology officer, ENA and Qwest. The district court ultimately dismissed Syringa’s lawsuit against all of the Defendants on their respective motions for summary judgment. Syringa then appealed the grants of summary judgment, and the State Defendants cross-appealed the refusal to award them attorney fees. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment dismissing all counts of the complaint except count three seeking to set aside the State's contract with Qwest on the ground that it was awarded in violation of the applicable statutes. Furthermore, the Court reversed Qwest’s award of attorney fees against Syringa. We remand to the trial court the determination of whether any of the State Defendants were entitled to an award of attorney fees against Syringa for proceedings in the district court. The Court awarded costs and attorney fees on appeal to ENA. Because the State Defendants and Syringa both prevailed only in part on appeal, the Court did not award them either costs or attorney fees on appeal. View "Syringa Networks v. Idaho Dept of Admin" on Justia Law

Sharp, a federal supply contractor, submitted a termination compensation claim to the Department of the Army contracting officer, and later brought a Contracts Dispute Act claim before the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, claiming that, because the Army failed to exercise the entirety of the last option year under a delivery order, Sharp was entitled to premature discontinuance fees under its General Services Administration schedule contract. The ASBCA dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, concluding that the Federal Acquisition Regulation, does not permit ordering agency contracting officers to decide disputes pertaining to schedule contracts. The Federal Circuit affirmed. Under FAR 8.406-6, only the GSA contracting office may resolve disputes that, in whole or in part, involve interpretation of disputed schedule contract provisions. View "Sharp Elec. Corp. v. McHugh" on Justia Law

In 2001, U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement awarded Northrop a contract for lease and support of Oakley network monitoring software for one base year and three option years at about $900,000 per year. To obtain Oakley’s software, Northrop was required to pay $2,899,710, so Northrup assigned its payment rights to ESCgov for $3,296,093. ESCgov assigned its rights to Citizens, but the government was not notified. In 2005, ICE decided not to exercise the first option. Northrop sent the contracting officer a “Contract Disputes Act Claim for not Exercising Option,” citing the Contract Disputes Act, 41 U.S.C. 601. The letter did not mention the two assignments. The CO denied Northrop’s claim. The Court of Federal Claims dismissed, holding that Northrop had not supplied the CO “adequate notice” because it failed to reference potential application of the Anti-Assignment Act and Severin doctrine. While the matter was pending, Northrop filed a second claim, including documents on the financing arrangements. The CO determined that Northrop’s second claim was the same claim and declined to issue a final decision. The Claims Court again held that it lacked jurisdiction. The Federal Circuit consolidated the cases and reversed, finding that the first letter constituted a valid claim. View "Northrop Grumman Computing Sys., Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law