Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

In 2016, a suicide bombing occurred at the U.S. military base in Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan. The bomber, an Afghan national employed by a subcontractor of Fluor Corporation, detonated an explosive vest, injuring Specialist Winston Tyler Hencely, among others. Hencely sued Fluor, alleging negligence in supervision, entrustment, and retention of the bomber, and breach of contract with the U.S. Government.The U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina granted judgment to Fluor on all claims. The court found that federal law preempted Hencely’s tort claims and that he was not a third-party beneficiary entitled to enforce the Government’s contract with Fluor. Hencely appealed these decisions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that the Federal Tort Claims Act’s combatant activities exception preempted Hencely’s state-law tort claims. The court concluded that Fluor was integrated into combatant activities and that the military retained command authority over Fluor’s supervision of Local Nationals at Bagram Airfield. The court also held that Hencely was not an intended third-party beneficiary of the contract between Fluor and the U.S. Government, as the contract did not express an intent to benefit individual soldiers or confer upon them the right to enforce its provisions.Thus, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, precluding Hencely’s tort claims and denying his breach of contract claim. View "Hencely v. Fluor Corporation" on Justia Law

Richard Andrew Justice filed a claim against the Georgia Department of Public Safety (DPS) for breach of an employment contract, alleging that DPS failed to pay him for overtime hours as required under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Justice argued that the FLSA provisions were incorporated into his employment contract. The central issue was whether Justice had demonstrated the existence of a written contract sufficient to overcome DPS’s motion to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds.The trial court allowed limited discovery and reviewed documents submitted by Justice, including a written offer of employment and subsequent communications. The trial court ultimately granted DPS’s motion to dismiss, finding that the documents did not constitute a valid written contract and that there was no meeting of the minds regarding FLSA overtime compensation provisions. The Court of Appeals reversed this decision, concluding that the documents did form a written contract that included FLSA provisions, thereby waiving sovereign immunity.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and determined that Justice had shown the existence of a written contract with DPS, which established a waiver of sovereign immunity under the ex contractu clause of the Georgia Constitution. The Court held that the question of whether the FLSA obligations were part of the written contract was a merits question, not a sovereign immunity question, and thus was not properly before the trial court on a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision in part, vacated it in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY v. JUSTICE" on Justia Law

The Boeing Company filed a complaint against the United States, challenging a contracting officer's decision that required Boeing to pay over $1 million due to changes in its cost accounting practices. Boeing argued that the government's demand violated the relevant Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and Cost Accounting Standards (CAS) provisions, which should offset increased costs with decreased costs, resulting in no net increase. Boeing's complaint included three contract claims and an illegal exaction claim.The United States Court of Federal Claims dismissed Boeing's contract claims without prejudice, stating it lacked jurisdiction to review the validity of the regulation under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The court also dismissed the illegal exaction claim with prejudice, despite acknowledging jurisdiction, because it believed it lacked the authority to consider the claim under the Contract Disputes Act (CDA).The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that the Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction under the CDA to resolve the contract dispute, including the validity of the underlying regulation. The court also held that the Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction over Boeing's illegal exaction claim under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1), and that the CDA does not preclude this jurisdiction. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these holdings. View "BOEING COMPANY v. US " on Justia Law

The case involves a bid protest action initiated by Oak Grove Technologies, LLC against the United States Department of the Army's award of a contract to F3EA, Inc. The contract, known as SOF RAPTOR IV, was for procuring training services for special forces. Oak Grove, a competing bidder, alleged that the bidding process was flawed and that F3EA had an unfair advantage due to an organizational conflict of interest involving the chairperson of the Source Selection Evaluation Board (SSEB), RM.The Court of Federal Claims reviewed the case and agreed with Oak Grove, finding that the Army's evaluation process was flawed. The court enjoined the Army from proceeding with the contract award to F3EA and ordered the Army to either restart the procurement process or reopen it to accept revised proposals. The court also sanctioned the government for failing to include material evidence in the administrative record, which delayed the proceedings and increased costs for Oak Grove.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and vacated the judgment and injunction issued by the Court of Federal Claims. The appellate court held that Oak Grove had waived its argument that the Army was required to hold discussions with bidders, that F3EA was not required to include teaming agreements in its proposal, and that the Army's investigation into RM's alleged misconduct was adequate. The court also found that the Court of Federal Claims erred in determining that Lukos, another bidder, was financially irresponsible and ineligible for the contract. However, the appellate court affirmed the sanctions imposed on the government for failing to compile a complete administrative record. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court's opinion. View "OAK GROVE TECHNOLOGIES, LLC v. US " on Justia Law

Advanced Benefit Concepts, Inc. (ABC) filed a breach of contract lawsuit against Access Health, Inc., Preferred Care Services, Inc., and Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama (collectively, Access Health). ABC alleged that Access Health failed to pay fees owed under an agreement where ABC helped Access Health secure a contract with the State of Louisiana’s Office of Group Benefits (OGB). Access Health countered that the contract was null and void because ABC did not register as a lobbyist as required by the Louisiana Executive Branch Lobbying Act.The district court ruled in favor of Access Health, declaring the contract void due to ABC’s failure to register as a lobbyist. The court granted Access Health’s motion for summary judgment, dismissing ABC’s breach of contract claim. ABC’s exceptions of lack of subject matter jurisdiction and prescription were overruled. ABC appealed the decision.The Louisiana Court of Appeal, First Circuit, reversed the district court’s decision, holding that the Board of Ethics had exclusive jurisdiction to determine the validity of the contract under the Lobbying Act. The appellate court concluded that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to declare the contract void and reversed the summary judgment.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the case and reversed the appellate court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that the district court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear the contractual dispute, including the affirmative defense of nullity based on the Lobbying Act. The court emphasized that the Executive Branch Lobbying Act does not deprive the district court of jurisdiction and that the district court can consider whether the contract is an absolute nullity under Louisiana Civil Code article 2030. The case was remanded to the appellate court to consider the exception of prescription and the merits of the summary judgment motion. View "ADVANCED BENEFIT CONCEPTS, INC. VS. BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD OF ALABAMA" on Justia Law

In a procurement dispute, the Honolulu Board of Water Supply (BWS) solicited bids for a well-drilling project and disqualified Alpha, Inc. for not having the required contractor’s license. Alpha challenged the decision administratively and judicially, arguing that its bid was responsive and that the winning bidder, Beylik/Energetic A JV, was nonresponsive. BWS maintained that the administrative hearings officer and courts lacked jurisdiction to hear the protest because Alpha did not meet the statutory requirement that the protest concern a matter worth at least ten percent of the contract’s value.The Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) concluded that the ten percent requirement was not jurisdictional and had jurisdiction to hear Alpha’s appeal. On the merits, OAH found that Alpha’s bid was nonresponsive due to the lack of a required subcontractor listing. The Circuit Court of the First Circuit affirmed OAH’s decision, agreeing that BWS could require a C-27 license for tree removal and that Alpha’s bid was nonresponsive. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) also affirmed, holding that the ten percent requirement related to standing, not jurisdiction, and that Alpha had standing to appeal.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i reversed the ICA’s decision, holding that the ten percent requirement is jurisdictional. The court concluded that Alpha did not meet this requirement, and therefore, OAH and the courts lacked jurisdiction to review BWS’s decision. The court also provided guidance on the merits, affirming BWS’s disqualification of Alpha’s bid for not listing a required subcontractor and not having the proper license for tree removal. View "Alpha Inc. v. Board of Water Supply" on Justia Law

3M Company operates a manufacturing facility in Cordova, Illinois, producing chemical products containing PFAS. The State of Illinois sued 3M, alleging that PFAS from the Cordova Facility contaminated the Mississippi River, violating state environmental laws. The State's complaint specifically excluded PFAS contamination from any other source, including AFFF used by the U.S. military at the nearby Rock Island Arsenal.The case was initially filed in Illinois state court. 3M removed it to the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois, citing the federal officer removal statute, arguing that some contamination might have come from AFFF provided to the military, thus invoking a federal government contractor defense. The State moved to remand the case back to state court. The district court granted the motion, finding that the State's complaint excluded AFFF-related contamination, focusing solely on PFAS from the Cordova Facility.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that 3M could not satisfy the fourth element required for removal under the federal officer removal statute, which necessitates a colorable federal defense. The court noted that the State had unequivocally conceded that it would not seek relief for mixed PFAS contamination and that any recovery would be barred if contamination was not solely from the Cordova Facility. Consequently, 3M's government contractor defense was deemed irrelevant under the State's theory of recovery. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to remand the case to state court. View "Raoul v. 3M Company" on Justia Law

During Winter Storm Uri, Southwest Power Pool, Inc. (Southwest) contacted Associated Electric Cooperative, Inc. (the Cooperative) to purchase emergency energy. The Cooperative provided the energy, and Southwest compensated the Cooperative according to their existing written contract, known as the Tariff, filed with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). The Cooperative claimed the payment was insufficient and not in line with a separate oral agreement made during the storm. Southwest refused to pay more than the Tariff rate, leading the Cooperative to file a lawsuit in federal district court for breach of contract and equitable claims.Southwest petitioned FERC for a declaratory order asserting primary jurisdiction over the dispute and confirming that the payment was appropriate under the Tariff. FERC agreed, and the Cooperative's petition for rehearing was denied. The Cooperative then sought review from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which denied the petitions, affirming FERC's primary jurisdiction and the applicability of the Tariff rate.The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri granted Southwest’s motion to dismiss the Cooperative’s complaint, agreeing with FERC’s jurisdiction and the Tariff’s control over the payment terms. The district court also denied Southwest’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs. The Cooperative appealed the dismissal, and Southwest appealed the denial of attorneys’ fees.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo and affirmed the decision, agreeing that FERC had primary jurisdiction and the Tariff controlled the payment terms. The court also affirmed the district court’s denial of attorneys’ fees, finding that the relevant contract provision did not apply to this dispute and that the district court did not abuse its discretion. View "Associated Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Southwest Power Pool, Inc." on Justia Law

During Winter Storm Uri, Southwest Power Pool, Inc. (Southwest) contacted Associated Electric Cooperative, Inc. (the Cooperative) to purchase emergency energy. The Cooperative provided the energy and was subsequently paid by Southwest according to their existing written contract and the rates filed with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). The Cooperative claimed that the payment was insufficient and not in accordance with a separate oral agreement made during the storm. Southwest refused to pay more than the rate in the written contract, leading the Cooperative to file a lawsuit in federal district court for breach of contract and equitable claims.Before the district court made any determinations, Southwest petitioned FERC for a declaratory order asserting that FERC had primary jurisdiction over the dispute and that Southwest had properly compensated the Cooperative. FERC agreed, stating it had primary jurisdiction and that Southwest had appropriately compensated the Cooperative according to the filed rate. The Cooperative then petitioned for review of FERC’s order and the denial of rehearing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the emergency energy transaction was governed by the existing written contract and the rates filed with FERC, not by any separate oral agreement. The court found that FERC had properly exercised primary jurisdiction over the dispute and correctly applied the filed rate doctrine, which mandates that no seller of energy may collect a rate other than the one filed with and approved by FERC. Consequently, the court denied the Cooperative’s petitions for review, affirming that Southwest had not breached its contractual obligations. View "Associated Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. FERC" on Justia Law

The North Central Montana Regional Water Authority (the Authority) was created in 2000 through an interlocal agreement among several municipalities and county water and sewer districts. The Town of Kevin, a small municipality with fewer than 175 residents, did not sign the original agreement but signed several later documents attempting to join the Authority. The Town later sought to sever ties with the Authority, which resisted these attempts. On May 29, 2020, the Town sued the Authority, seeking a declaratory judgment under the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act (UDJA) that it was not, and never had been, a member of the Authority, and also sought attorney fees.The Twelfth Judicial District Court held a bench trial and issued an order on November 10, 2022, declaring that the Town was not a member of the Authority and granting other relief. Subsequently, the Town filed a motion for attorney fees under the UDJA. On March 30, 2023, the District Court found that equitable factors supported awarding attorney fees to the Town, noting the significant disparity in resources between the Town and the Authority. The Authority appealed this order.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court affirmed the District Court's decision, holding that the UDJA provides a legal basis for awarding attorney fees between governmental entities when appropriate. The court found that the parties were not similarly situated, as the Town had significantly fewer resources compared to the Authority. The court also applied the "tangible parameters test" and concluded that the Authority possessed what the Town sought, it was necessary for the Town to seek a declaration, and the declaratory relief was necessary to change the status quo. Therefore, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney fees to the Town. The Supreme Court affirmed the award of attorney fees to the Town. View "Town of Kevin v. North Central Montana Regional Water Authority" on Justia Law