Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Government & Administrative Law
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The case involves Purpose Built Families Foundation, a Florida nonprofit that received federal grants from the Department of Veterans Affairs to serve veterans and their families. In 2022, the Department notified the Foundation that activities and payments under five grants would be terminated or withheld due to "major fiscal mismanagement activities". The Foundation sued the Secretary of Veterans Affairs under the Administrative Procedure Act and received a temporary restraining order. Subsequently, the Department withdrew the challenged notices and the Secretary moved to dismiss the action as moot. The district court granted the motion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court. The court held that the case was moot, as the Department's withdrawal of the notices meant the Foundation's claims could not provide meaningful relief. It also ruled that neither the voluntary-cessation nor the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exceptions to mootness applied. The court stated that the Department's subsequent actions, including a more robust process and new termination notices, were materially different from the original notices. Therefore, a lawsuit challenging the new termination notices would involve materially different allegations and answers. The court concluded that the Foundation would have ample opportunity for judicial review of the legality of the new terminations, once the administrative process was completed. View "Purpose Built Families Foundation, Inc. v. USA" on Justia Law

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This case involves Avue Technologies Corporation ("Avue") and the Secretary of Health and Human Services and the Administrator of the General Services Administration. Avue is a software development company that sells its software to private and government entities, which helps them automate administrative tasks while complying with statutory, regulatory, and policy requirements. Avue does not sell its software licenses directly to federal agencies. Instead, it sells annual subscriptions through third party Carahsoft Technology Corporation (“Carahsoft”), an authorized reseller that has a Federal Supply Schedule (“FSS”) contract with the General Services Administration (“GSA”).Avue tried to govern its relationship with end users of its software through an end-user licensing agreement ("EULA"), which is incorporated into the FSS contract between Carahsoft and the GSA. In 2015, the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") placed a task order for a subscription to Avue's software under the FSS contract. However, in 2016, the FDA chose not to renew its subscription, leading Avue to claim that the FDA had violated its EULA.The Civilian Board of Contract Appeals ("Board") dismissed Avue's appeal for lack of jurisdiction, stating that even if the EULA established a contract between Avue and the U.S. Government, the Board lacked jurisdiction because the EULA was not a procurement contract within the meaning of the Contract Disputes Act ("CDA"). Avue appealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.The court disagreed with the Board's decision, stating that Avue only needed to allege non-frivolously that it had a contract with the U.S. Government to establish the Board's jurisdiction, and it didn't need to prove the existence of such a contract. The court held that Avue's allegation that it was part of a procurement contract was non-frivolous and sufficient to establish the Board's jurisdiction. Therefore, the court vacated the Board's dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings on the merits. View "AVUE TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION v. HHS " on Justia Law

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In this case, the plaintiffs, Stowe Aviation, LLC and Stowe Airport Investment, LP, appealed from a denial of their motion to reopen a breach-of-contract case with the Vermont Agency of Commerce and Community Development. The plaintiffs had signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the Agency in 2014, outlining their intention to develop and expand the Morrisville-Stowe State Airport using funds secured through the EB-5 program. However, the Agency later transferred its obligations under the MOU to the Department of Financial Regulation (DFR) without informing the plaintiffs, leading to the failure of the airport project.The plaintiffs filed a complaint against the Agency, alleging that the Agency breached its contract by failing to perform under the MOU and by transferring its obligations to the DFR without notice. The trial court dismissed the claims, and the case was closed. The plaintiffs then moved to reopen the case and amend their complaint, but the trial court denied their motion. The plaintiffs appealed this order.The Supreme Court of Vermont reversed the order and remanded the case, holding that the trial court had abused its discretion in denying the plaintiffs' motion to reopen the case. The Supreme Court reasoned that plaintiffs could potentially obtain relief to cure a pleading deficiency under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), and it was inappropriate for the trial court to deny relief simply because plaintiffs did not request leave to amend in their opposition papers before the court entered judgment. On remand, the plaintiffs must demonstrate a valid basis to vacate the previously entered judgment to prevent manifest injustice before they can file their amended complaint. View "Stowe Aviation, LLC et al. v. Agency of Commerce & Community Development" on Justia Law

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In this case, Fred Zackery sought access to confidential settlement agreements between the Water Works and Sewer Board of the City of Gadsden ("the Board") and various carpet and chemical manufacturers. Zackery requested these agreements under the Open Records Act. The Board had sued the manufacturers, alleging they contaminated the Board's raw water intake. The Board settled with all the manufacturers and planned to use the settlement funds to build and maintain a new water-treatment facility.Zackery, a citizen of Gadsden and a local radio station manager, intervened in the lawsuit specifically to request disclosure of the settlement agreements. The trial court granted his intervention but ruled that the Board didn't have to disclose the agreements until it had accepted a bid for the construction of the water-treatment facility. This decision was grounded in Alabama's Competitive Bid Law, which is designed to guard against corruption and favoritism in awarding contracts for public projects.The Supreme Court of Alabama upheld the trial court's decision, affirming that the immediate disclosure of the settlements could interfere with the competitive bid process, potentially driving bids upwards and leaving fewer funds for the long-term operation and maintenance of the new facility. This situation, the court reasoned, could cause rate hikes for the Board's customers. Therefore, the court concluded that an exception to the Open Records Act justified nondisclosure of the settlement agreements until the competitive-bid process was complete. View "Zackery v. Water Works and Sewer Board of the City of Gadsden" on Justia Law

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In a dispute arising from a contract for refurbishing an elementary school, the Supreme Court of Louisiana ruled that no unfair trade practices claim could be stated against the State of Louisiana, Department of Education, Recovery School District (the “State”). The plaintiff, Advanced Environmental Consulting, Inc. (“AEC”), had subcontracted to perform asbestos abatement services for Law Industries, LLC, the general contractor. When the State terminated the contract due to unsatisfactory asbestos remediation progress, AEC amended its answer to Law Industries' breach of contract suit to include a claim of unfair trade practices under the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act (“LUTPA”). The State had objected to this claim, arguing that AEC had no cause of action and that the claim was perempted (time-barred). The Supreme Court of Louisiana held that AEC had failed to state a valid LUTPA cause of action against the State. It concluded that the State's actions were in furtherance of its governmental function of providing safe educational facilities for schoolchildren. The State, in this case, was a consumer of construction services, not a participant in "trade or commerce" as defined in the LUTPA, and was therefore not subject to a LUTPA claim. The court remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with its ruling. View "LAW INDUSTRIES, LLC VS. STATE" on Justia Law

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This case involves a dispute between American Precision Ammunition, L.L.C. (APA) and the City of Mineral Wells in Texas. APA and the City entered into a Tax Abatement Agreement ("Agreement") where the City promised to gift APA $150,000 and provide APA ten years of tax abatements. However, the City terminated the Agreement, claiming that the $150,000 gift was illegal under the Texas Constitution. APA sued the City for breach of contract, violation of the Texas Open Meetings Act (TOMA), and denial of federal due process and due course of law under the Texas Constitution. The district court dismissed all claims, and APA appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. It held that the Agreement was illegal and unenforceable under Texas law because the City's contractual obligation to "gift" APA $150,000 constitutes a gratuitous payment of public money. The court also dismissed APA's TOMA claim as moot because there was no "agreement" to reinstate given that the Agreement was unenforceable. Furthermore, the court found that APA's due process claims failed because the promise for the $150,000 gift was void and did not constitute a contract, and therefore, APA had no protected property interest in the gift. Even assuming that APA had a property interest in the tax abatements, the court held that APA's due process and due course of law claims still fail because Texas law affords APA sufficient opportunity to pursue that claim in state court. View "American Precision v. Mineral Wells" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho ruled on a dispute between TCR, LLC, a developer, and Teton County. The developer had sought to record a condominium plat for a planned unit development, but the County refused to do so, arguing that the developer had not submitted final site plans, architectural designs, or landscape drawings for review. The developer filed suit, alleging breach of contract and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to compel the County to record the condominium plat. The district court granted the developer's motion for summary judgment on its declaratory and injunctive relief claim and denied the County's motion for summary judgment on the same claim. The court also denied all motions to reconsider. The Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed the district court's decision in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that the County's refusal to record the condominium plat violated the Idaho Condominium Property Act and that the County did not have a valid reason for its refusal. The court also found that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the County on the developer's breach of contract claim, concluding that genuine issues of material fact remained. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "TCR, LLC v. Teton County" on Justia Law

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Austin McGee was involved in a car accident on a stretch of Highway 45 in South Dakota that was undergoing resurfacing. He claimed that the accident was caused by a negligent failure by the South Dakota Department of Transportation (DOT) and several of its employees to ensure that the contractor responsible for the resurfacing complied with DOT standards and industry practices. The DOT argued that sovereign immunity protected it from the lawsuit. The Supreme Court of South Dakota affirmed the lower court's decision that McGee could sue the DOT and its employees, rejecting the DOT's arguments that McGee lacked standing as a third-party beneficiary of the contract between the DOT and the contractor, and that McGee failed to establish an actionable duty. The court found that the DOT had a ministerial duty under its own Standard Specifications not to exceed the estimated amount of tack coating to be applied each day, but found no ministerial duties relating to the use of precautionary measures. Thus, the Supreme Court of South Dakota affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Mcgee V. Spencer Quarries" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the decision of the superior court judge dismissing the underlying declaratory judgment complaint in this declaratory judgment action regarding the scope of the Department of Housing and Community Development's (DHCD) authority under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 121B, 7A, holding that dismissal was warranted.Plaintiffs - location housing authorities (LHAs) of various cities and towns, current and former executive directors of LHAs and others - sought a judgment declaring that DHCD exceeded its authority under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 121B, 7A by promulgating guidelines that govern contracts between an LHA and its executive director and making compliance with the guidelines a requirement to obtain contractual approval from DHCD. A superior court judge allowed DHCD's motion to dismiss. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that LHAs have authority to hire executive directors and "determine their qualifications, duties, and compensation, under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 121B, 7. View "Fairhaven Housing Authority v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

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Stronghold and the city entered into a 2015 contract to renovate the Monterey Conference Center. Before filing a lawsuit asserting a claim for money or damages against a public entity, the Government Claims Act (Gov. Code 810) requires that a claim be presented to the entity. Without first presenting a claim to the city, Stronghold filed suit seeking declaratory relief regarding the interpretation of the contract, and asserting that the Act was inapplicable.Stronghold presented three claims to the city in 2017-2019, based on its refusal to approve change orders necessitated by purportedly excusable delays. Stronghold filed a fourth amended complaint, alleging breach of contract. The court granted the city summary judgment, reasoning that the declaratory relief cause of action in the initial complaint was, in essence, a claim for money or damages and that all claims in the operative complaint “lack merit” because Stronghold failed to timely present a claim to the city before filing suit.The court of appeal reversed. The notice requirement does not apply to an action seeking purely declaratory relief. A declaratory relief action seeking interpretation of a contract is not a claim for money or damages, even if the judicial interpretation sought may later be the basis for a separate claim for money or damages which would trigger the claim presentation requirement. View "Stronghold Engineering, Inc. v. City of Monterey" on Justia Law