Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

The court granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals to consider whether that court erred in determining that the doctrine of res judicata barred plaintiff's "complaint for breach of contract" in this litigation involving the ultimate distribution of plaintiff's father's estate. The court concluded that res judicata was a bar to the present suit where plaintiff's restyling of her complaint in terms of a breach of contract theory of recovery did not revive her cause of action for fraud that was defeated on appeal from a summary judgment ruling. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

Sterling, a limited liability corporation engaged in the business of importing and selling Iraqi currency, hired Grossi, a company that specialized in web-based marketing strategies, in an effort to create an internet-based sales platform. After the parties' dispute over the modification of a compensation scheme by which Grossi was paid, Sterling filed suit against Grossi seeking a temporary restraining order, interlocutory and permanent injunctions, and damages. Grossi subsequently appealed the grant of interlocutory injunction in favor of Sterling, contending that the trial court erred by entering an interlocutory injunction that failed to preserve the status quo. The court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by entering the injunction in light of Grossi's threats to do harm to the website. The court also rejected Grossi's contention that the interlocutory order was, in reality, a mandatory, permanent injunction affecting the rights of the parties. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

This case arose from an automobile collision in which a police officer employed by the City of Newman was driving a City police car when it was struck by a motor vehicle owned and operated by the insured, who had $25,000 of motor vehicle liability coverage. The City had a Member Coverage Agreement (Agreement) with the Georgia Interlocal Risk Management Agency (GIRMA), established under OCGA 36-85-1 et seq. The officer subsequently sued the insured in tort and served a copy of the complaint on GIRMA to notify GIRMA that it might be held responsible as an uninsured motorist carrier pursuant to OCGA 33-7-11. The court subsequently granted a writ of certiorari to the court of appeals to consider whether that court properly determined that a municipality's motor vehicle liability coverage secured through an interlocal risk management agency was not statutorily obligated to satisfy the requirements for uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage that were applied to commercial insurance policies and private self-insurance plans. The court held that the district court reached the correct conclusion when it determined that there was no authority for the conclusion that an interlocal risk management program such as that offered by GIRMA must include uninsured motorist coverage pursuant to OCGA 33-7-11. Therefore, the Agreement was limited to its express terms and did not include the underinsured motorist protection that the police officer sought. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Wife appealed the trial court's final divorce decree, contending that the district court erred in enforcing a postnuptial agreement and in determining that child custody was governed by the postnuptial agreement. The court held that the trial court's authority to find full and fair disclosure from wife's extensive familiarity with husband's business dealings and personal financial condition was not altered, but was further supported, by the affirmation in the agreement that each party had "knowingly and voluntarily chosen to forego" formal discovery, investigation, and analysis of the other party's financial condition "and accept the provisions of this agreement on [the] basis of information acquired prior to this date without further such discovery." The court also held that the trial court did not base its custody decision solely on the postnuptial agreement, but expressly and properly based that decision on its alternative application of the "best interests" standard pursuant to OCGA 19-9-3. Therefore, pretermitting the postnuptial agreement's relevance and the applicability of OCGA 19-9-5, the court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's custody award.

Appellants filed suit against all appellees for compensatory and punitive damages, asserting breach of contract, negligence, fraud, and violations of the Georgia Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), OCGA 16-14-1 et seq. In 2009, the trial court, inter alia, granted summary judgment to all appellees on the contract, negligence, and RICO claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed the grants of summary judgment. The court held that, since the Court of Appeals erred in making reliance an element of mail fraud and in affirming the grant of summary judgment to appellees based on the failure of appellants to establish reliance, the court reversed that portion of the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the grant of summary judgment to appellees on the RICO claim based on mail fraud and remanded for further proceedings. The court also held that there was no evidence in the record that would provide the basis for a fact-finder to calculate damages upon a finding of liability and therefore, the Court of Appeals did not err in holding that summary judgment was authorized due to the failure of appellants to present evidence of damages.

Husband and wife were divorced in 2008 and husband subsequently filed a petition for downward modification of his child support obligation. The trial court read a divorce settlement to forbid changes to child support payments below a floor amount, even though the settlement agreement lacked a "clear and express waiver" of the modification right to any degree. The court reversed in light of Varn v. Varn and held that the trial court erred in refusing to allow husband to seek a modification of child support as provided by OCGA 19-6-15(j).

Appellant sued appellees for breach of contract where the parties entered into a contract for appellant to build a house for appellees. After trial, the jury found that appellees did not breach the contract and awarded no actual damages but $16,552 in attorney fees. Appellant appealed the trial court's denial of its motion to amend the verdict to strike the attorney fee award on the grounds that it was improper under OCGA 13-6-11. The court held that, to the extent the attorney fee award was based on OCGA 13-6-11, the Court of Appeals erred in relying on waiver to affirm the award. The court also held that, because the Court of Appeals did not address appellees' alternative argument that the award was properly based on the parties contract rather than OCGA 13-6-11, the court declined to address the alternative argument. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment and remanded.

Plaintiff, who was employed as the City of McDonough's ("city") chief building inspector, brought suit against the city when the city refused to pay him severance under an employment agreement contract. At issue was whether the contract was binding to a successor municipal council in violation of OCGA 36-30-3(a). The court held that the contract was ultra vires and void because the contract was renewed automatically and the severance package required the city to pay plaintiff his salary and benefits for an entire year after the year in which the contract was terminated.

Husband and wife executed a will in 1980, which was expressly identified as being "joint and mutual," bequeathing all of their property to each other as the survivor in fee simple and at the death of the survivor, the residue of the estate was to be divided equally among husband's two children, David and Darrell, and wife's two children, Deana and Diane. After husband died in 2005, wife probated the 1980 will, became the executor, and conveyed husband's estate to herself. In November 2005, wife executed another will which could, at her death, leave 20% of the estate to appellant, Deana, and the residue to the children of Deana and Diane. Deana then obtained wife's power of attorney and conveyed all of her mother's real estate to her two children and to appellee, Diane's child. When wife died in 2008, Deana offered the 2005 will for probate and Diane filed a caveat and also sought to petition the 1980 will as the last will and testament. The court held that the trial court did not err when it applied the law in place before the 1998 probate code was adopted to determine whether husband and wife had a contract not to revoke the 1980 will; when it concluded that the 1980 will was joint and mutual and that husband and wife had an enforceable contract not to revoke the 1980 will; when it did not in fact find that the fee simple conveyance to wife was a marital trust; when it made no rulings as to whether wife's 2005 will was a contract, and as such, that issue could not be raised on appeal; and when the 1980 will specifically provided that the residue of the survivor's estate was to be divided equally among the four children. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's order that the 1980 will would be specifically enforced by equity.