Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

In open court, Appellant Vanessa Condon and Respondent Fely Condon entered into a stipulated settlement and dismissal with prejudice of Vanessa's claims against Fely, stemming from an automobile accident. Before payment, Fely requested that Vanessa sign a release agreement, which the parties had not discussed nor placed on the record. Vanessa refused to sign, and Fely made a motion to enforce the settlement and release. The trial court deemed the release signed, and Vanessa appealed the trial court's order. On appeal, she argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enforce release terms that were not a part of the original agreement. Fely argued that Vanessa waived her right to appeal by accepting the settlement check. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that Vanessa did not waive her right to appeal, and that the trial court improperly added implied terms to the agreement. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Condon v. Condon" on Justia Law

Michael and Kelly Goodell divorced in 2006 by a Final Judgment and Decree which incorporated a settlement agreement. Pursuant to the agreement, Michael was required to pay Kelly alimony until she remarried. Michael also voluntarily agreed to make payments for the benefit of Kelly's two children from a previous marriage, after she remarried. Kelly remarried in 2008, and Michael began making payments to her children. Kelly died one year later, and Michael stopped making payments to her children. The administrator of Kelly's estate filed a contempt action against Michael for non-payment, contending that the payments were part of the property division in the divorce, and as such, survived Kelly's death. The trial court agreed with Kelly's estate; Michael thereafter appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the payments were a voluntary contractual obligation to be construed in the same manner and with the same rules of construction as other contractual agreements. The payments remained Michael's responsibility, and accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Goodell v. Oliver" on Justia Law

Brent Anderson purchased life insurance from Insurer and named three beneficiaries under the policy: (1) his then-wife, Lucia, (2) his parents, and (3) his sister. Brent and Lucia subsequently divorced. Later that year, Mont. Code Ann. 72-2-814 became effective. The statute provides that a divorce revokes "any revocable disposition or appointment of property made by a divorced individual to the individual's former spouse in a governing instrument." Brent died several years later without having changed his designation of Lucia as primary beneficiary under the life insurance policy. Insurer filed an interpleader action to determine the rightful beneficiary under Brent's policy. The district court ruled in favor of Lucia based in part on the fact that section 72-2-814 became effective after Brent and Lucia's divorce. The Supreme Court accepted a certified question from the U.S. court of appeals and answered that section 72-2-814 applies to a divorce that pre-dates the statute's enactment. View "Thrivent Fin. for Lutherans v. Andronescu" on Justia Law

Defendant Donna Mae Peck appealed a superior court judgment that granted plaintiff Victor Shattuck a writ of possession for the parties' former residence in Cavendish and that denied her counterclaim for an equitable interest in the Cavendish property and another former residence in Springfield. Between December 1997 and June 1999, plaintiff purchased two adjoining parcels of land in Cavendish. He made most of the payments for the first parcel, but defendant made a significant financial contribution toward payment of the second parcel. In 2001, plaintiff conveyed the Cavendish properties to himself and defendant as joint tenants with rights of survivorship, and defendant conveyed the Springfield property to herself and plaintiff as joint tenants with rights of survivorship. The parties lived together in Cavendish until June 2010, when plaintiff decided to end their relationship. Following an angry confrontation, defendant obtained a relief-from-abuse order against plaintiff and was awarded sole possession of the Cavendish property. Plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint in superior court seeking to evict defendant from the Cavendish property. Defendant answered and counterclaimed, alleging that the Cavendish and Springfield properties were the subject of a partnership agreement between the parties. Alleging that she had been induced to convey the Springfield properties by plaintiff's fraudulent misrepresentations, she also sought equitable relief through imposition of a resulting or constructive trust. She later claimed that the Cavendish property was also held in a constructive trust for her benefit. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court: "pursuant to the principles of equity, not every unmarried cohabitant who confers an economic benefit on his or her partner is entitled to payback if the relationship ends. In this case, defendant may or may not ultimately be entitled to restitution, whether in the form of a constructive trust or a money judgment, for her substantial investments in the Cavendish and Springfield properties, and any such judgment could well be subject to offsets for benefits received." View "Shattuck v. Peck" on Justia Law

Wendell Lund appealed a district court order dismissing his action against his mother Betty Lund for lack of personal jurisdiction. Wendell is the son of Orville and Betty Lund. Orville and Betty Lund owned real property in Bottineau County. Wendell claimed that in 1985 he entered into an implied contract with his parents whereby he agreed to provide certain labor and supplies to maintain the real property and to pay half of the real estate taxes, and that in exchange his parents agreed to convey the property to him. In 1991, Orville and Betty signed a deed purporting to convey their interest in the property to Orville and Wendell. When Orville and Betty divorced in 2010, the trial court found the 1991 deed was not a legitimate transaction, but rather had been an attempt to deprive Betty of her interest in the property and her homestead rights. The court included the entire value of the real property in the marital estate and awarded it to Orville. Betty received other offsetting property, and each party ultimately received approximately one-half of the marital estate. Betty Lund moved to Arizona in 2010. Since then, she held an Arizona driver's license, registered her vehicle in Arizona and where she registered to vote. In 2011, Wendell brought this action against his parents alleging they failed to comply with the 1985 implied contract. He sought damages and transfer of the real property to him. Wendell claimed that Betty could not be located for service of process, so service was made by publication. Betty entered a special appearance through her attorney and moved to dismiss the action against her, arguing she was a permanent resident of Arizona and the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over her. The district court concluded it lacked personal jurisdiction over Betty and subsequently dismissed Wendell's claims against both of his parents, to which Wendell appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded Betty Lund resided in North Dakota, owned real property, and allegedly entered into a contract regarding her property in North Dakota. Those contacts were sufficient under Rule 4(b)(2) to assert personal jurisdiction over her for the transactions related to those activities, and she was not immune from suit because she left. The Court concluded the district court erred in concluding it lacked personal jurisdiction over Betty Lund. View "Lund v. Lund" on Justia Law

In this divorce action, Appellant Michael Grisham and Respondent Susie Grisham negotiated based on a draft property settlement agreement (PSA). At the end of an uncontested divorce prove-up hearing, the district court orally accepted the settlement. Michael, however, refused to sign the PSA. After several months, Susie moved for entry of a divorce decree based on the PSA. The district court entered a final written decree incorporating the PSA and denied Michael's motion for mistrial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court's procedure complied with applicable district court rules, which obviated any issue as to the statute of frauds, and the PSA otherwise met the requirements for an enforceable contract. View "Grisham v. Grisham" on Justia Law

This appeal raised the issue of whether a district court can order a child support obligor to cooperate with a child support obligee in the obligee's efforts to obtain insurance on the obligor's life if the obligor objects to the issuance of the life insurance policy. Here, despite the obligor's objection, the district court ordered the obligor to cooperate with the obligee's attempts to obtain insurance on the obligor's life at the obligee's own expense. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a district court cannot issue such an order because the order would be contrary to public policy as expressed by the Kansas Legislature in Kan. Stat. Ann. 40-453(a), which provides that an insurable interest does not exist if a person whose life is insured makes a written request for the termination or nonrenewal of the policy. View "In re Marriage of Hall" on Justia Law

Appellant James Newman (husband) and appellee Judy Newman (wife) were married in May 2007. Just before their wedding, they executed a 20-page type-written prenuptial agreement to which they added a handwritten provision acknowledging "that there [were] certain ambiguities contained [within] the body of this document which each party agrees to clarify and re-write within 30 days of the date of execution hereof." Wife filed for divorce in 2011. After a hearing, the trial court granted wife's motion to enforce the prenuptial agreement and entered a judgment of divorce incorporating its terms. The Supreme Court granted husband's application for discretionary appeal and affirmed the trial court's judgment: "[i]n essence, husband argue[d] that any agreement the parties may have had was voided by the addition of the language indicating their belief that the agreement contained ambiguities and their intent to clarify such ambiguities. Because the language of the prenuptial agreement demonstrate[d] the parties reached a complete agreement regarding the disposition of property in the event their marriage ended in divorce, we conclude the trial court did not err by granting wife's motion to enforce the agreement and incorporating the agreement into the final divorce decree." View "Newman v. Newman" on Justia Law

When Sean and Dee Anna Ryan divorced, they agreed to sell two properties they owned and divide the proceeds, subject to a proviso that neither party was required to accept a sale yielding net proceeds below specified minimums. When the properties could not be sold at or above the specified minimums, Dee Anna refused to waive the proviso. Sean filed a motion for relief from judgment, seeking a court order that the properties be sold at prevailing fair market value and the private agreement be declared of no further force and effect. The trial court denied Sean's request. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) general rules applicable to contract construction dictated that Dee Anna was not required to agree to sell the properties for net proceeds less than the amounts set forth in the parties' agreement; and (2) Sean was not entitled to relief under Trial Rule 60(B), under which a court may relieve a party from a judgment. View "Ryan v. Ryan" on Justia Law

Defendant Helen Cupido appealed a trial court's summary judgment entered in favor of Recovery Resources, LLC. Helen and David Cupido married in January 1993. In March 2010, David Cupido incurred medical expenses at St. Alexius Medical Center. The parties divorced in April 2011. Under the divorce judgment, the trial court ordered David Cupido responsible for payment of the debt owed to St. Alexius Medical Center. The divorce judgment also required Helen and David to indemnify one another from any and all collection activities, which may arise regarding debts awarded to a party. Recovery Resources, LLC, a collection company, sued Helen and David for $9,494.61 owed to St. Alexius Medical Center for medical care provided to David while he and Helen were married and living together. David did not answer Recovery Resources' claim and a default judgment was entered against him. Helen answered denying liability and cross-claimed for indemnity against David. Helen then moved for summary judgment arguing she was entitled to judgment, as a matter of law, because the divorce judgment allocated the debt to David. Recovery Resources resisted and moved for summary judgment arguing it was entitled to judgment, as a matter of law, because Helen was liable for the debt. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Recovery Resources. On appeal, Helen contended the trial court erred: (1) by concluding she is jointly and severally liable for the debt David incurred, and (2) by failing to dismiss her from the lawsuit based on the indemnification language in the divorce judgment. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the indemnification language in the divorce judgment between Helen and David Cupido did not affect Recovery Resources' statutory right to recover the debt. Accordingly the trial court did not err in failing to dismiss Helen from the collection action.