Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

During their marriage, Brian Shabino and Sandra Wichman borrowed money from Sandra’s mother, Mary Ann Wichman, to use as a down payment on the purchase of their home. When Sandra and Brian divorced in 2003, the divorce decree apportioned to Brian the marital home as well as the remaining debt to Mary Ann. Brian failed to repay Mary Ann, In 2012, Mary Ann brought suit for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and enforcement of the divorce decree. The circuit court concluded that a portion of Mary Ann’s breach of contract claim was barred by the statute of limitations and that Mary Ann could not enforce the terms of the divorce decree. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in determining that Mary Ann could not enforce the divorce decree; and (2) the circuit court did not err in ruling that Mary Ann could not recover the entirety of the debt under the statute of limitations. View "Wichman v. Shabino" on Justia Law

Upon the dissolution of their marriage, Husband and Wife entered into a dissolution settlement agreement that provided that Wife was entitled to half of Husband’s federal retirement benefits entered during the parties’ marriage. Wife later sought an order to show cause alleging that Husband violated the agreement by not naming her as the beneficiary of his Survivorship Benefit Plan. The district court granted Wife’s motion, concluding that the agreement awarded Wife a portion of Husband’s Survivorship Annuity. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the plain language of the agreement reflected the parties’ intent that Husband was to retain ownership of the Survivorship Annuity after the dissolution. View "In re Marriage of Bushnell" on Justia Law

In 2011, the district court filed a decree dissolving the marriage of Brenda Rice and Dale Rice that incorporated a property settlement agreement (“agreement”) previously entered into by the parties. Dale died one week later. At the time of his death, Dale owned two life insurance policies, both of which listed Brenda as the primary beneficiary. Brenda subsequently filed claims for the proceeds of the policies. The personal representative of Dale’s estate moved to enforce the dissolution decree, claiming that under the agreement, Brenda relinquished her beneficiary interests in the life insurance policies. The district court ordered Brenda to withdraw her claims under the policies and to renounce her rights to any property or interest in Dale’s estate and proceeds from any insurance policies on Dale’s life. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) as a matter of law, Brenda relinquished all rights to Dale’s life insurance policies in the agreement, which was incorporated into the divorce decree; and (2) therefore, the district court did not err when it enforced the dissolution decree and ordered Brenda to withdraw claims to Dale’s life insurance policies. View "Rice v. Web" on Justia Law

Wife and Husband married in 2003. In 2005 and 2008, Wife and Husband executed marital settlement agreements. In 2009, Husband filed a complaint for divorce, alleging that the separation agreements were voidable at his demand. In support of his demand, Husband argued that the attorney, who earlier assisted the Wife in obtaining permanent resident status and in the United States and largely served as scrivener to the settlement agreements, violated the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct by failing to obtain Husband’s informed consent to her representation of Wife in connection with the two settlement agreements. The circuit court held that the separation agreements were not voidable and entered a judgment of absolute divorce in which the separation agreements were incorporated. The intermediate appellate court affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that sufficient grounds to render the agreements voidable were not present in this case. View "Li v. Lee" on Justia Law

After John and Anne had been married almost twenty years, John filed a complaint for divorce. Three years later, the parties indicated that they had reached a settlement, which obligated John to provide health insurance for Anne until she reached sixty-five years of age, with a Medicare supplement thereafter. The parties' agreement was read into the record and approved by the trial justice, who ordered it incorporated but not merged into the final divorce decree. However, the parties never executed a written agreement. John later challenged the validity of the marital settlement agreement after Anne moved to enforce the provisions of the agreement respecting John's obligation to pay for health insurance. The family court found that the parties clearly agreed that John was to cover Anne with her health insurance and ordered John to obtain and maintain the health insurance pursuant to the agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the agreement was sufficient to form a nonmodifiable marital settlement agreement, and therefore, John was bound by its terms. View "O'Donnell v. O'Donnell" on Justia Law

Pam, Allan, and Charles and Mary Lou Dees (the Dees) started a business, Great Falls Portables, Inc. (GFP), with Allan acting as sole manager of the business. Pam subsequently took over management. The Dees later filed a complaint against Pam, GFP, and others. A month later, Pam and Allan, who were married but separated, entered into a settlement agreement that provided that Pam would be responsible to the Dees for any obligation owed them in connection with their interest in GFP. In litigation with the Dees, Pam filed a third-party complaint against Allan, alleging (1) the Dees' complaint arose out of Allan's fraudulent activity (Count I), (2) Allan had fraudulently induced Pam to enter the agreement assigning responsibility for the Dees' interest (Count II), and (3) Allan must indemnify her from liability to the Dees (Count III). The district court granted summary judgment to Allan on all three counts. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly determined that (1) Pam failed to plead fraud with sufficient particularity; (2) Pam failed to show reliance on Allan's representations; and (3) Count III of Pam's complaint was dependent on and related back to Counts I and II. View "Fossen v. Fossen" on Justia Law

Sha'Kayla St. Mary and Veronica Damon became romantically involved and decided to have a child together. The couple subsequently drafted a co-parenting agreement. Using Damon's egg and an anonymous donor's sperm, St. Mary gave birth to a child through in vitro fertilization. After their relationship ended, the parties disputed who had custodial rights over the child. The district court (1) concluded that St. Mary was a mere surrogate and therefore not a parent entitled to any custodial rights; and (2) refused to uphold the parties' co-parenting agreement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court erred in determining that St. Mary was a surrogate lacking any legal rights to parent the child without holding an evidentiary hearing on that issue; and (2) the parties' co-parenting agreement was not void as unlawful or against public policy, and therefore, the district court abused its discretion in deeming the agreement unenforceable. View " St. Mary v. Damon" on Justia Law

Mother and Father were married in 1992 and had two children. The parties later divorced. In 2009, Mother and Father agreed to recalculate their support obligation annually using the Child Support Rules and Guidelines. However, the agreement's terms were silent about which version of the Guidelines applied. Importantly, the Guidelines were amended in 2010, and the changes significantly increased support obligations for high-income parents like Father. Father used the 2009 Guidelines when calculating his 2010 distribution clause payment, and Mother objected. The trial court interpreted the agreement as incorporating the version of the Guidelines that applied to a particular's income, and therefore, concluded that Father should have used the 2010 Guidelines for the 2010 calculation, though he correctly applied the 2009 Guidelines to his 2009 income. Both parties appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court, concluding that the agreement incorporated each year's version of the Guidelines as to that year's income. View "Schwartz v. Heeter" on Justia Law

Allen suffered a fatal heart attack in 2009, leaving a wife of three years, Arlene, and three adult children from a previous marriage. At the time of Allen’s death, his daughter and her children lived with Allen and Arlene. Allen had a will bequeathing $100,000, but his assets passed outside of probate, leaving his estate with insufficient funds for the bequest. Allen had designated his children as beneficiaries of assets, including a home, life insurance policies, retirement accounts, and other savings accounts. Allen had one life insurance policy as part of his compensation package as a pharmacist, which provided $74,000 in basic coverage and $341,000 in supplemental coverage. If the policyholder failed to designate a beneficiary by his date of death, the proceeds would pass to the policyholder’s spouse by default. The insurer never received any indication that Allen wished to designate a beneficiary. In the days following Allen’s death, however, the children found a change-of-beneficiary form, allegedly completed by their father more than a year before his death, but never submitted. The district court ruled in Arlene’s favor, finding that even if Allen had filled out a change-of-beneficiary form he had not substantially complied with policy requirements for changing beneficiaries. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Kagan v. Kagan" on Justia Law

After Plaintiff's former husband filed for dissolution, the parties reconciled and entered into two postmarital agreements specifying how their property would be divided in the event of a future dissolution. The district court approved the agreements and dismissed the dissolution proceeding. Plaintiff subsequently filed a second dissolution proceeding. On the advice of Defendants, certain attorneys and law firms, Plaintiff accepted a settlement proposal from her former husband based upon the postmarital agreements approved in the first dissolution action. The marriage was then dissolved. Thereafter, Plaintiff brought this action alleging that Defendants were negligent in advising her to accept the settlement proposal. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding that the actions of Defendants were not the proximate cause of any damage to Plaintiff, and even if Defendants breached the standard of care, Plaintiff could not have received a more favorable settlement in the second dissolution proceeding because the court was bound to enforce the order in the first dissolution proceeding under the doctrines of res judicata and judicial estoppel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the judgment in the first proceeding had preclusive effect under the doctrine of res judicata. View "Young v. Govier & Milone, LLP" on Justia Law