Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Family Law
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Upon their divorce, Wife and Husband entered into a marital dissolution agreement (MDA) that contained a provision entitling the prevailing party to an award of appellate attorney’s fees in subsequent legal proceedings. The MDA was incorporated into the parties’ final divorce decree. Wife later filed a relocation motion seeking to modify the parties’ parenting plan. Wife then filed a motion for judgment against Husband for reimbursement of uncovered medical expenses. After a hearing, the trial court granted both motions filed by Wife and awarded Wife attorney’s fees based on the MDA. The court of appeals affirmed but declined Wife’s request for an award of fees and costs on appeal. Wife appealed, arguing that she was entitled to appellate attorney’s fees. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Wife was entitled to an award of appellate attorney’s fees incurred before the court of appeals under the parties’ MDA. View "Eberbach v. Eberbach" on Justia Law

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Prior to their marriage in 1993, Wife and Husband entered into a pre-marriage agreement (PMA) listing their assets and liabilities. In 2012, Husband sued Wife for divorce in Minnesota. The Minnesota court determined that Butte County, South Dakota, was the proper venue to determine the issues regarding the validity and enforceability of the parties’ PMA. Wife filed a declaratory judgment action against Donald in Butte County requesting a judgment declaring the PMA valid and enforceable and asking the court to construe the rights and interests of the parties under the PMA. The circuit court declared the PMA valid and enforceable and interpreted the PMA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err when it interpreted the PMA to permit tracing of earnings or property through the joint marital account and applied the marital loan concept; (2) the circuit court did not err when it adopted Wife’s expert’s report; and (3) Wife was not entitled to appellate attorney’s fees. View "Charlson v. Charlson" on Justia Law

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M.C., a gestational carrier, challenges the trial court's declaration that Father is the sole legal parent of triplet children and finding that M.C. has no parental rights. M.C. entered into the surrogacy arrangement with Father, pursuant to a written “In Vitro Fertilization Surrogacy Agreement.” As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that M.C. is not estopped from challenging the legal effect or validity of the Agreement. On the merits, the court concluded that Father complied with the requirements for establishing a parent-child relationship and for terminating M.C.’s claimed parental rights pursuant to Family Code section 7962. The court also concluded that the trial court's application of section 7962 is consistent with the constitutional rights of M.C. and the children. In this case, M.C.'s various substantive and procedural challenges are foreclosed by specific legislative provisions and by a prior decision by the California Supreme Court. Because the court found no error in the trial court's ruling, the court affirmed the judgment. View "C.M. v. M.C." on Justia Law

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Mother and Father shared joint legal and physical custody of their two minor children as stated in a stipulated order. One provision of the order provided for “teenage discretion” in determining time spent with either parent when a child reaches the age of fourteen, and another provision conferred authority to resolve disputes to a “parenting coordinator” and authorized the district court to issue an order that defines the coordinator’s role. Father later filed a motion to modify the original stipulated child custody order, arguing that the two provisions at issue should be rendered void because they were against public policy. The district court denied modification. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that neither contractual provision was against the best interest of the children, which is the paramount public policy concern in child custody matters, and the parenting coordinator provision did not improperly delegate decision-making authority. View "Harrison v. Harrison" on Justia Law

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Linda Davis and Matthew Davis executed a property settlement agreement prior to their divorce providing that Matthew maintain his life insurance policy and keep Linda as the beneficiary. The decree of dissolution entered by the circuit court failed to incorporate the agreement. The omission went unnoticed until after Matthew died. Prior to his death, Matthew changed the beneficiary on his life insurance policy to Karen Davis, his then-wife. Linda, upon learning of Matthew’s death, filed a proof of claim against his estate, alleging breach of the agreement. Karen, as executrix of Matthew’s estate, denied the claim. Karen then filed this action seeking the policy proceeds. Linda intervened as a third party plaintiff. The circuit court ruled against Linda. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that Ky. Rev. Stat. 403.180(4) essentially voided the agreement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a settlement agreement involving property division that was not incorporated or referenced in the final decree of dissolution may be enforced through an independent contract action. View "Davis v. Davis" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court granted an application of interlocutory appeal to determine whether the trial court erred when it denied enforcement of a prenuptial agreement. After a hearing, the trial court analyzed the agreement under the standard set forth in "Scherer v. Scherer;" the wife argued that the husband failed to establish eh made a full and fair disclosure of his financial condition. The trial court indeed found that though the agreement satisfied most of the Scherer test, the agreement was unenforceable due to the nondisclosure of certain material facts. Finding no error with this analysis, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's findings. View "Dodson v. Dodson" on Justia Law

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Martha and Mario Madrigal sued the City of Mesa. After the case was settled by the Madrigals’ second attorney, Raymond Slomski, the Madrigals’ first attorney, Edward Fitzhugh, assigned his rights under the parties’ contingent fee agreement to Al Carranza. Carranza later sued the Madrigals (“the fee-collection action”). The Madrigals subsequently divorced pursuant to a decree that allocated the remaining funds from the as-yet-unresolved fee-collection action. Mario and Carranza then entered into a settlement agreement that called for a portion of the disputed funds to be released to Mario and Carranza. The superior court approved the agreement. Slomski filed an interpleader action contesting the settlement. Thereafter, Martha successfully moved to set aside the order approving the settlement. Carranza then moved to substitute Fitzhugh as the real party in interest in both the fee-collection action and the interpleader action. The superior court denied the substitution request and court granted summary judgment in favor of Martha in the fee-collection action. The court of appeals affirmed summary judgment but reversed the denial of Carranza’s motion to substitute in the fee-collection action. The Supreme Court vacated in part, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motions to substitute. View "Carranza v. Madrigal" on Justia Law

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At issue in this case was the scope of attorneys’ immunity from civil liability to non-clients. Philip Byrd and Nancy Simenstad commenced divorce proceedings. Simenstad was represented in the proceedings by Cantey Hanger, LLP. The parties eventually settled. The decree awarded Simenstad three aircraft as her separate property, including a Piper Seminole that had been owned by Lucy Leasing, Co., LLC. Byrd and two of the companies awarded to Byrd in the decree later sued Simenstad and Cantey Hanger alleging that after the decree was entered, Defendants falsified a bill of sale transferring the Piper Seminole from Lucy Leasing to a third party in order to shift tax liability for the aircraft to Byrd in contravention of the divorce decree. The trial court granted summary judgment to Cantey Hanger on attorney-immunity grounds. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the firm’s alleged misconduct was unrelated to the divorce litigation and that the firm had not conclusively established its entitlement to immunity. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the trial court’s judgment, holding that Canter Hanger conclusively established that it is immune from civil liability to Plaintiffs, and therefore, the trial court’s grant of summary judgment was proper. View "Cantey Hanger, LLP v. Byrd" on Justia Law

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The Avakians purchased a house with a loan secured by a properly executed deed of trust. The property was their homestead, where they lived together. Citibank refinanced the loan. Unlike the original loan, the refinancing note only listed Norair as the debtor. Citibank required that the Avakians execute another deed of trust. Norair signed the Citibank deed of trust. The next day, Burnette signed an identical deed of trust. The deeds of trust did not mention each other, and did not refer to signature of counterpart documents. Citibank recorded them as separate instruments. The Avakians received a loan modification. Around the time of Norair’s death, Burnette received notice that Citibank was taking steps to foreclose. After Norair’s death, Burnette sought a declaratory judgment. The district court granted summary judgment to Burnette, finding that, because the two were living together when they signed the Citibank deeds of trust, the instruments were invalid. The Fifth Circuit reversed. Under Mississippi law, a deed of trust on a homestead is void if it is not signed by both spouses, but the Mississippi Supreme Court would likely hold that a valid deed of trust is created when husband and wife contemporaneously sign separate, identical instruments. View "Avakian v. Citibank, N.A." on Justia Law

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In this case, Beverly Maeker and William Ross, although unmarried to each other, lived together and shared a marital-like relationship from 1999 to 2011. In the course of that relationship, Maeker alleged she gave up a career and devoted herself to Ross, who promised to support her in the future. In short, Maeker claimed that the two entered into a palimony agreement. In 2011, their relationship dissolved, and Maeker filed an action to enforce Ross's promise to provide financial support. Ross argued that the alleged agreement was not reduced to writing and could not be enforced under the 2010 Amendment to the Statute of Frauds. The trial court rejected Ross's argument, concluding that the Legislature intended the 2010 Amendment to be prospectively applied. The Appellate Division reversed and dismissed Maeker's complaint, holding that the Legislature intended that any palimony agreement as of 2010 had to be in writing and that oral agreements predating the Amendment were no longer enforceable. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court disagreed with the Appellate Division, finding that the Legislature did not intend the 2010 Amendment to apply retroactively to oral agreements that predated the Amendment. "In amending the Statute of Frauds, the Legislature was aware that historically the Statute has been construed -- absent a legislative expression to the contrary -- not to reach back to rescind preexisting, lawfully enforceable oral agreements. The Legislature has given no indication that it intended to depart from the traditional prospective application of a change to the Statute." Accordingly, the Appellate Division was reversed and Maeker’s complaint reinstated. View "Maeker v. Ross" on Justia Law