Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Before Peter and Debra Last were married in June 2002, they entered into a premarital agreement which included a provision by which Debra purported to waive any right to receive spousal support in the event the marriage ended in dissolution. When the marriage did end in dissolution, Debra sought, and the trial court awarded her, temporary spousal support. The court did not adjudicate the issue whether the premarital agreement was enforceable but granted Peter’s request to bifurcate that issue. Peter argued the trial court erred by awarding Debra temporary spousal support because the premarital agreement was presumed to be valid and, absent a determination the agreement was unenforceable, it barred an award of temporary spousal support. While the Court of Appeal agreed that premarital agreements were no longer disfavored and are not per se unenforceable, the Court found Peter was incorrect in asserting the premarital agreement was presumed valid simply because it facially appeared to satisfy the requirements of Family Code section 1615(c)(1) and (2). "To the contrary, a premarital agreement is presumed to have not been executed voluntarily, and is therefore unenforceable, unless the trial court finds in writing or on the record that the agreement satisfies the requirements of section 1615(c)(1) and (2)." When the court ordered temporary spousal support, the premarital agreement was deemed not to have been voluntarily executed, and, therefore, the spousal support waiver did not prevent the court from awarding Debra temporary spousal support. The appeals court also concluded the trial court had the ability to modify the support order retroactively to the first support payment if it ultimately determined the premarital agreement was enforceable. Although the appeals court believed this reservation of jurisdiction did not make the temporary spousal support order nonappealable, it resolved any doubts about appellate jurisdiction by treating the appeal as a petition for writ of mandate, which was thus denied. View "Last v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the county court in favor of the decedent's brother in this estate case, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, the county court erred.Jordon R. Wiggins died, leaving two minor children and an ex-wife. In response to a claim against the estate regarding life insurance coverage that Wiggins was required under the divorce decree to maintain for the children's benefit, Wiggins's ex-wife, as guardian and next friend of the minor children, his brother, and his father, as personal representative of Wiggins's estate, entered into a settlement agreement. Thereafter, the parties jointly filed a petition for a declaration of their rights and obligations under the agreement. The county court ruled in favor of the brother, and the ex-wife appealed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the cause with directions for the county court to rescind the agreement and conduct further proceedings, holding that a mutual mistake as to the existence of a fact that was a material inducement to the contract is not ground for reformation, although it may be ground for rescission. View "In re Estate of Wiggins" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court granting petitions made by Lorri Williams to formally probate the estate of Gerry Williams, her ex-husband, and to remove Vicki Hofedlt as personal representative of Gerry's estate, holding that the district court did not err or abuse its discretion.Gerry and Lorri had two daughters, Brittany Williams and Vicki, during their marriage and later divorced. After Gerry died, Lorri paid for his funeral expenses. Vicki then filed an application for informal probate. Lorri filed a creditor's claim claiming funeral expenses and then filed a petition for formal probate asserting that the divorce decree was a testamentary instrument that needed to be probated along with Gerry's will. Lorri also filed a petition to remove Vicki as personal representative of Gerry's estate. The district court granted both petitions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Vicki was not entitled to relief on her claims of error. View "In re Estate of Williams" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the district court concluding that the parties' signed voluntary declaration of paternity (VDP) should be set aside because of the parties' fraud and a mutual mistake but that Taylor Scott should nevertheless be adjudicated the child's father, holding that there was no error.Sarah Benson and Taylor Scott, an unmarried couple, signed a VDP representing that Scott was the father of Benson's child when both parties know that Scott was not the child's biological father. When Benson later cut off contact between Scott and the child Scott filed a complaint seeking joint legal and physical custody. In response, Benson challenged the VDP. The district court set aside the VDP but concluded that, under the Utah Uniform Parentage Act, Scott should be adjudicated to be the child's father. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in looking to the factors set forth in Utah Code 78B-16-608 to disregard the genetic test results that would have excluded Scott as the child's father. View "Scott v. Benson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial justice awarding attorneys' fees to Plaintiff in this divorce action, holding that there was no error.Plaintiff filed a complaint for divorce, and Defendant filed a counterclaim for divorce. As to attorneys' fees, the trial justice found that Plaintiff was entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to the parties' postnuptial agreement's fee-shifting provision, as well as R.I. Gen. Laws 15-5-16. Defendant appealed, challenging the award of attorneys' fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice had both a statutory and contractual basis to award Plaintiff attorneys' fees and costs and did not abuse his discretion in making the award. View "McCollum v. McCollum" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals determining that Karen Michael held an equitable lien on David Miller's Ram Sensors, Inc. stock shares securing David's current obligation to pay monthly spousal support to Karen, holding that an equitable lien did not exist on the stock to secure the current obligation.When Karen and David divorced, the separation agreement incorporated into their final judgment entry of divorce provided that David would pay Karen $15,000 per month in spousal support for twenty years. Karen agreed to relinquish all rights she may have had in Ram Sensors, and David agreed to secure his spousal support obligations. Later, Karen filed a postdecree pleading against David and Cody seeking a declaration that David's ownership of the Ram Sensors stock secured his obligations under the divorce decree and requesting that the court order Cody Miller, the parties' son, to transfer David's stock to her. The court granted partial summary judgment to Karen, concluding that she held a perfected lien in the Ram Sensors stock and an equitable lien on the stock. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals misconstrued the separation agreement and erred when it recognized an equitable lien securing David's current support obligation. View "Michael v. Miller" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court conditionally granted mandamus relief in this case concerning a premarital agreement to resolve disputes by binding arbitration under religious law, holding that the trial court was statutorily required to hear and determine Wife's challenges to the agreement's validity and enforceability before referring the parties' disputes to arbitration.When the parties in this case married they signed an "Islamic Pre-Nuptial Agreement" providing that "[a]ny conflict which may arise between the husband and the wife will be resolved according to the Qur'an, Sunnah, and Islamic Law in a Muslim court, or in [its] absence by a Fiqh Panel." When Wife sued for divorce, Husband moved to enforce the agreement. After a hearing on whether the reference to Islamic law was sufficiently ambiguous to render the agreement unenforceable the trial court ordered the parties to arbitrate under the agreement. Wife moved for mandamus relief. The Supreme Court conditionally granted relief, holding that the trial court erred in compelling the parties to arbitrate. View "In re Mariam Ayad" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's complaint seeking an order prohibiting the general division judge from exercising further authority over some of the claims in the underlying case, holding that the court of appeals properly dismissed the complaint.Appellant brought an action against the estate of his ex-wife in the general division of the court of common pleas seeking to recover funds to which Appellant claimed he was entitled under the former spouses' separation agreement. The state filed a counterclaim against Appellant. The trial court ruled (1) Appellant was entitled to $15,353, but there were genuine issues that precluded summary judgment on his remaining claims; and (2) the estate was entitled to partial summary judgment on its counterclaims. Appellant then filed a complaint for a writ of prohibition seeking to prevent the judge from taking further action on the estate's counterclaim. The court of appeals dismissed the complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the general division did not patently or unambiguously lack subject-matter jurisdiction, and Appellant had an adequate legal remedy by way of direct appeal. View "State ex rel. Gray v. Kimbler" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the circuit court in this action brought by Plaintiff to determine custody, child support, and shared parenting of the parties' child and on Defendant's counterclaim for breach of an implied contract and unjust enrichment, holding that the circuit court erred in part.In his counterclaim, Defendant argued that the parties had impliedly agreed that they would jointly own the marital home and that he would receive equity in the home acquired through his financial contributions toward the home mortgage. In response, Plaintiff claimed that she owned the home and that Defendant simply paid her rent while living there. The circuit court denied Defendant's claims, concluded that the parties' relationship was that of a landlord and tenant and awarded back rent, and determined shared child support and parenting issues. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the circuit court (1) erred when it awarded Plaintiff back rent; (2) erred in determining the amount of back child support due; and (3) did not otherwise err or abuse its discretion. View "Murphey v. Pearson" on Justia Law

Brandon and Brandi Kelly married on April 20, 2015, and had a child on June 9, 2015. Brandon filed for divorce on May 30, 2017. This appeal primarily concerned their disputes regarding the division of property and attorney fees. Prior to marriage, Brandon and Brandi entered into a prenuptial agreement (“the PNA”) seeking to establish their rights to various items of property. Brandi and Brandon were represented by separate counsel during the negotiation and execution of the PNA. Before signing the PNA, Brandi reviewed Brandon’s 2014 tax return. Brandi’s attorney requested changes to the PNA’s definitions of separate and community property, which were made. Brandi expressly waived her right to review other financial documentation concerning Brandon’s assets and signed the PNA. During the pendency of the divorce action, and relevant to this appeal, Brandon filed four motions for partial summary judgment and Brandi filed two motions for partial summary judgment, each of which required interpretation of various provisions of the PNA. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed in part, and reversed in part, certain district court decisions with respect to the parties' PNA. The Supreme Court found the district court erred (1) in affirming the magistrate court’s decision that the PNA barred Brandi from requesting attorney fees for child custody, visitation and support matters; (2) in affirming the magistrate court’s summary judgment decision concluding that Brandon’s payments from EIRMC were his separate property; and (3) when it failed to vacate the award of attorney fees to Brandon for his contempt motions, but did not err when it affirmed the magistrate court’s other deductions from Brandi’s separate property award. View "Kelly v. Kelly" on Justia Law