Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs sued the former spouse of Stephen Walsh, who was a defendant in related actions brought by plaintiffs, alleging that the property derived from Walsh's illegal securities activities went into the former spouse's possession under the parties' separation agreement and divorce decree. At issue, in certified questions to the court, was whether the former spouse had a legitimate claim to those funds, which would prevent plaintiffs from obtaining disgorgement from her. The court held that an innocent spouse who received possession of tainted property in good faith and gave fair consideration for it should prevail over the claims of the original owner or owners consistent with the state's strong public policy of ensuring finality in divorce proceedings.

Appellant Essie Simmons and Respondent Rubin Simmons divorced in 1990. The parties entered into a settlement agreement that was approved by the family court. Central to the agreement was the requirement that Mr. Simmons give Ms. Simmons a half or third of his Social Security benefits, depending on his age when he retired. When he retired, Mr. Simmons did not pay his ex-wife. She sued, but the family court declined to hear the complaint, finding that it could not hear a case that primarily dealt with Social Security benefits. Mr. Simmons appealed the dismissal, and the appellate court reversed. The court voided the division of Mr. Simmons' benefits, holding that the Social Security Act specifically precluded parties from dividing benefits under the settlement agreement. Because the agreement was partly voided by the court, Ms. Simmons sought to reopen the matter entirely. The family court dismissed again, holding that it lacked jurisdiction to revisit the agreement. On appeal, the Supreme Court was presented with the question of whether the family court could revisit the now partially voided agreement. Upon careful review of the arguments and applicable legal authority, the Court held that "basic principles of equity suggest[ed] that all issues should be revisited by the family court." The Court recognized the practical difficulties confronting the family court, but the Court noted, "that challenge pales in comparison to [Mr. Simmons'] suggestion that we simply end this matter with the remnant of the agreement remaining valid." The Court reversed the decision of the lower court and remanded the case to the family court for further proceedings.

Husband and wife executed a will in 1980, which was expressly identified as being "joint and mutual," bequeathing all of their property to each other as the survivor in fee simple and at the death of the survivor, the residue of the estate was to be divided equally among husband's two children, David and Darrell, and wife's two children, Deana and Diane. After husband died in 2005, wife probated the 1980 will, became the executor, and conveyed husband's estate to herself. In November 2005, wife executed another will which could, at her death, leave 20% of the estate to appellant, Deana, and the residue to the children of Deana and Diane. Deana then obtained wife's power of attorney and conveyed all of her mother's real estate to her two children and to appellee, Diane's child. When wife died in 2008, Deana offered the 2005 will for probate and Diane filed a caveat and also sought to petition the 1980 will as the last will and testament. The court held that the trial court did not err when it applied the law in place before the 1998 probate code was adopted to determine whether husband and wife had a contract not to revoke the 1980 will; when it concluded that the 1980 will was joint and mutual and that husband and wife had an enforceable contract not to revoke the 1980 will; when it did not in fact find that the fee simple conveyance to wife was a marital trust; when it made no rulings as to whether wife's 2005 will was a contract, and as such, that issue could not be raised on appeal; and when the 1980 will specifically provided that the residue of the survivor's estate was to be divided equally among the four children. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's order that the 1980 will would be specifically enforced by equity.

Dr. Daniel Dare appealed a ruling of the Chancery Court that denied him the ability to intervene in the modification of a marital property agreement entered into by Paul and Sharon Stokes. Mr. and Mrs. Stokes were married in 1985. In 2007, Mrs. Stokes had an affair with Dr. Dare. Shortly after the affair began, Mr. Stokes filed for divorce. With the entry of a divorce decree, the Chancery Court incorporated a child-custody and property-settlement agreement that was "executed" by Mr. and Mrs. Stokes. Pertinent to the Supreme Court's review of this matter was a "covenant not to sue" included in the property agreement. Mr. Stokes filed a petition to modify the property agreement and sought to delete that part of the provision that barred him from bringing suit against "any other person for alienation or affection." Mrs. Stokes did not contest Mr. Stokes' petition, and the court deleted the term "any other person." Mr. Stokes then sued Dr. Dare for "alienation of affection." Dr. Dare sought to intervene in Mr. Stokes' modification matter. The court held that Dr. Dare was not a party to the divorce or the property agreement, and as such, had no legally cognizable interest in the divorce. Dr. Dare argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the modified "covenant not to sue" implicitly targeted Dr. Dare as a party, and that he should be allowed to intervene in the modification proceedings. The Supreme Court agreed with the Chancery Court that Dr. Dare had no legally protected interest in the Stokes' divorce and affirmed the lower court's decision.

Bruce Bedrick appeals the trial courtâs decision in favor of his wife Deborah Bedrick. Deborah filed suit seeking dissolution of her marriage in August, 2007. She sought permanent alimony, an equitable distribution of the partiesâ real and personal property, and other relief. Bruce filed a cross-complaint seeking to enforce a postnuptial agreement that the parties executed in December, 1977 but most recently modified in 1989. The agreement provided that in the event of dissolution, neither party would pay alimony. Instead, Deborah would receive a cash settlement. The 1989 amendment listed the cash settlement to be $75,000. The agreement further provided that Deborah would waive her interests in Bruceâs businesses, and not be liable for Bruceâs personal and business loans. The trial court concluded that because there was not much case law addressing the validity of postnuptial agreements in Connecticut to use as a guide, it may not enforce an agreement that was not fair and equitable. The court concluded that the postnuptial agreement was not fair and equitable, and declined to enforce it. Bruce appealed the decision and lost. The Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that postnuptial agreements are valid and enforceable, and generally must comply with contract principles. The Court also concluded that the terms of such agreements should be both fair and equitable at the time of execution, and not unconscionable at the time of dissolution. The Court found that the terms of the Bedricksâ agreement were unconscionable, and it affirmed the lower courtâs decision.