Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

This appeal involved a title to a house and lot in a residential subdivision in Forsyth County. The trial court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and defendants appealed. The court held that the trial court properly rejected defendants' claim of bona fide purchaser status; defendants' argument that the trial court erred in holding that the children acquired a collective two-thirds interest in the property by virtue of the 1998 quitclaim deed from their father was without merit; the trial court properly dismissed defendants' claim for equitable subrogation; the trial court did not err in dismissing defendants' counterclaim for unjust enrichment; and the trial court did not err in dismissing defendants' laches defense. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Amber Williams and Frederick Ormsby, who were not married, lived together in a house Amber received through her divorce settlement. Frederick eventually paid the remaining mortgage balance, and Amber gave him title to the property by executing a quitclaim deed. As a result of a later separation, Amber and Frederick signed a document in March 2005 to sell the house and allocate the proceeds. The couple subsequently tried to reconcile and, in June 2005, they signed a second document, purportedly making themselves equal partners in the house and providing for property disposition in the event that their relationship ended. After their relationship ended, the parties filed suit against each other. The trial court determined that the March 2005 agreement was supported by consideration but that the June 2005 agreement was not and held that title to the property was vested in Frederick exclusively. The federal court of appeals reversed, concluding that moving into home with another and resuming a relationship can constitute consideration sufficient to support a contract. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that merely moving into a home with another while engaging in a romantic relationship is not consideration for the formation of a contract.

Plaintiff divorced his wife (Wife) after discovering she had had an extramarital affair with Defendant and had conceived a child (Child) with him. After Plaintiff and Wife divorced, Plaintiff brought an action against Defendant, seeking damages on claims of nondisclosure, misrepresentation, and unjust enrichment. Specifically, Plaintiff sought reimbursement from Defendant for the costs he had expended in raising Child from her birth until his divorce from Wife, when Child was almost fifteen years old. The trial court concluded that although Defendant was Child's biological father, the doctrine of equitable estoppel and public policy concerns precluded Plaintiff from pursuing his claims for reimbursement and denying his paternity. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the court improperly found that Plaintiff was equitably estopped from pursuing his claims because there was insufficient evidence of financial harm to Child, which is required to establish the element of detrimental reliance in a case involving a denial of paternity.

This appeal involved six siblings and their mother. The parties participated in mediation that resulted in an agreement, which, among other things, divided Mother's real property. After disputes arose over the agreement, the probate court ordered arbitration pursuant to the agreement's arbitration clause. The arbitrator concluded that the agreement was enforceable and ordered the transfer of land necessary to effectuate it. Four of the sisters (Appellants) and the remaining siblings and mother (Appellees) then filed a series of motions. The superior court confirmed the arbitration award, denied a motion to vacate the award, denied a motion for judgment on the pleadings, and granted a motion to dismiss a complaint for declaratory judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the superior court did not err in affirming the arbitrator's award and in concluding that the arbitrator and that the settlement agreement gave the arbitrator the authority to determine whether the agreement was valid and enforceable.

Wife appealed the trial court's final divorce decree, contending that the district court erred in enforcing a postnuptial agreement and in determining that child custody was governed by the postnuptial agreement. The court held that the trial court's authority to find full and fair disclosure from wife's extensive familiarity with husband's business dealings and personal financial condition was not altered, but was further supported, by the affirmation in the agreement that each party had "knowingly and voluntarily chosen to forego" formal discovery, investigation, and analysis of the other party's financial condition "and accept the provisions of this agreement on [the] basis of information acquired prior to this date without further such discovery." The court also held that the trial court did not base its custody decision solely on the postnuptial agreement, but expressly and properly based that decision on its alternative application of the "best interests" standard pursuant to OCGA 19-9-3. Therefore, pretermitting the postnuptial agreement's relevance and the applicability of OCGA 19-9-5, the court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's custody award.

Husband and wife were divorced in 2008 and husband subsequently filed a petition for downward modification of his child support obligation. The trial court read a divorce settlement to forbid changes to child support payments below a floor amount, even though the settlement agreement lacked a "clear and express waiver" of the modification right to any degree. The court reversed in light of Varn v. Varn and held that the trial court erred in refusing to allow husband to seek a modification of child support as provided by OCGA 19-6-15(j).

Mother consented to the adoption of her two biological children, after which the children were placed in the legal care of Guardians. Guardians later arranged for the adoption of the children by Adoptive Parents and relinquished the children. After six months of living with Adoptive Parents, Guardians moved to have their relinquishment and consent to adoption set aside, claiming their consent was fraudulently obtained by their reliance on a deficient pre-placement evaluation provided to them by Adoptive Parents. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Guardians failed to establish the existence of actual or constructive fraud by clear and convincing evidence, there was no statutory basis to set aside the relinquishments and consents given by Guardians.

After two decades of marriage, William and Teresa Underwood divorced. The district court entered a consent order requiring William to make monthly alimony payments to Teresa. Ten years later, William asked the trial court to terminate his alimony obligation because Teresa was cohabitating with another man. The trial court terminated the alimony payments. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the trial court lacked the authority to terminate or modify the alimony payments because a reciprocal consideration provision in the consent order demonstrated that the parties unambiguously intended the order to be unmodifiable. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court did not err because (1) N.C. Gen. Stat. 50-16.9(b) requires the termination of alimony payments to a dependent spouse who engages in cohabitation, and (2) the reciprocal consideration provision was unenforceable. Remanded.

After Michele Hobbs and Kelly Mullen decided to have a child together, Mullen became pregnant through in vitro fertilization procedure with donated sperm. Mullen executed a will in which she nominated Hobbs as the guardian of her child and a health-care power of attorney and durable power of attorney in which she gave Hobbs the authority to make decisions regarding the child. Hobbs and Mullen co-parented for two years, after which the women's relationship deteriorated. Hobbs then filed a complaint for shared custody in the juvenile court, alleging that Mullen had created a contract through her conduct with Hobbs to permanently share legal custody of the child. The juvenile court dismissed Hobbs's complaint for shared legal custody, concluding that a preponderance of the evidence did not conclusively demonstrate that Mullen's conduct created a contract that permanently gave partial custodial rights of the child to Hobbs. The court of appeals affirmed. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that competent, credible evidence supported the juvenile court's conclusion that Mullen, by her conduct, did not enter into an agreement with Hobbs through which Mullen permanently relinquished sole custody of her child in favor of shared custody with Hobbs.

Bromberg Rosenthal filed a complaint against Coralie Kurstin in district court, seeking a judgment for the balance of fees owed by Kurstin under an employment agreement in which Kurstin hired Bromberg to represent her in her divorce. During pretrial skirmishing, Bromberg issued a deposition subpoena to Kurstin's present counsel. Kurstin's counsel filed a motion to quash the subpoena, asserting the attorney-client privilege, and also filed a motion for a protective order. The district court denied both motions and ruled that the attorney-client privilege had been waived. Kurstin appealed. The court of special appeals dismissed the appeal as premature, concluding that collateral order doctrine precluded the appeal. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding the intermediate appellate court correctly concluded that the circuit court's denial of the motion to quash was not immediately appealable because the issue (1) was inextricably intertwined with the merits of the action, and (2) will be reviewable on appeal from a final judgment.