Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Pro se Defendant Mary Y. Seguin challenged a Superior Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiff Jessup & Conroy, P.C. (the law firm), on her counterclaim in this collection action. In late 2001, Seguin retained the law firm to represent her in two Rhode Island Family Court matters, a divorce action involving her former husband, Marc Seguin, and a paternity action involving her former boss at a prior place of employment. The law firm entered its appearance in both cases. Soon thereafter, Defendant received a large cash settlement from her former employer. Mr. Seguin successfully entreated a Family Court justice to impound the settlement as a marital asset and to place the funds in an escrow account with the children's guardian ad litem. Over the next year, litigation ensued in both Family Court matters; ultimately, the law firm withdrew as counsel for Defendant in the two cases, citing Defendant's repeated requests that the law firm file baseless motions, as well as her refusal to pay over $30,000 in legal fees for services rendered. Defendant and her former husband signed an addendum to their property-settlement agreement, which stipulated that any funds held in escrow were to be deposited in equal shares into irrevocable trusts established for the benefit of the minor daughter fathered by Mr. Seguin. That August, both Seguin and Mr. Seguin requested, via correspondence to the law firm, that the law firm release all escrowed funds to them personally. However, the law firm declined to honor that request based on the addendum's provision that the escrow funds be deposited into irrevocable trusts. After a repeated request from Defendant and her former husband coupled with the imposition of a Family Court sanction upon Defendant in the paternity action, the law firm filed a motion for instructions in the divorce action, seeking guidance from the Family Court in regard to distribution of the escrow funds at issue. A Family Court justice ordered the law firm to provide an accounting of the funds and to deposit them into irrevocable trusts as set forth in the addendum. The law firm complied by providing an accounting of the funds and deposited the money into two trust accounts. Subsequently, the law firm filed a complaint against Defendant seeking to recover unpaid legal fees. In response, Defendant filed an answer, as well as a counterclaim, setting forth fifteen counts against the law firm, including: (1) false advertising; (2) deceptive trade practices; (3) fraud; (4) wire fraud; (5) mail fraud; (6) RICO violations; (7) breach of fiduciary duty; (8) breach of fiduciary duty by trustee; (9) breach of trust; (10) grand theft; (11) tampering with/altering legal records; (12) legal malpractice; (13) negligence; (14) breach of contract; and (15) breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. After hearing from both parties, the motion justice concluded that Defendant had failed to meet her burden in opposing Plaintiff's motion. Defendant appealed. After its review, the Supreme Court affirmed, finding Defendant indeed failed to meet her burden to defeat Plaintiff's motion.

The parties to this appeal were former spouses, and the issue before the Supreme Court involved the marital settlement agreement they entered into in connection with their divorce. The dispute centered around the appraisal of certain real estate of the former husband, Robert Hazard, which real estate he acquired before his marriage to Connie Hazard. Upon Connie's motion to enforce the agreement, an appraiser valued the property at significantly less than the parties' alleged understanding of the property's value at the time of the agreement. The family court granted Connie's motion and ordered Robert to pay Connie $192,500. Robert appealed, arguing that based upon a mutual mistake of fact, Connie received an unconscionable windfall and that the agreement should be vacated. The Supreme Court affirmed, agreeing with the hearing justice that a mutual mistake of material fact was not established in this case by clear and convincing evidence.

Petitioner Edeltraud Elter-Nodvin appealed a superior court order that dismissed her claims against Respondents (her daughters) Leah and Madeline Nodvin. The claims sought to impose a constructive trust on insurance and retirement account proceeds that would otherwise pass to her daughters. Petitioner was married to Stephen Nodvin in 1986, and had Respondents. In 2009, Stephen filed for divorce, the couple separated, and Petitioner moved abroad. In October of that year, the family division issued an anti-hypothecation order instructing the parties to refrain from, among other things, disposing of marital property while proceedings were pending. Sometime thereafter, Stephen changed the beneficiaries of certain life insurance policies and retirement accounts from Petitioner to the couple’s daughters. After changing the beneficiaries, Stephen died. In 2011, Petitioner sued her daughters for the insurance and retirement account proceeds. She argued that the circumstances under which her husband changed his beneficiaries justified the imposition of a constructive trust. The daughters, one of whom was still a minor and represented by guardians, moved to dismiss the petition. They argued that Stephen’s change of beneficiaries did not violate the anti-hypothecation order, and, therefore, their status as the named beneficiaries entitled them to the proceeds of their father’s insurance policies and retirement accounts. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Stephen's action did not violate the plain language of the anti-hypothecation order. Further, the Court held that the superior court properly dismissed Petitioner's breach of contract and constructive trust claim because she failed to allege facts to establish a contract or a confidential relationship at the time Stephen changed beneficiaries: "while the divorce action was pending, Petitioner could not rely upon Stephen to provide for her based on a spousal obligation. Rather, if she wished to remain beneficiary of the insurance policies, she should have asked the court to order Stephen not to alter them."

This case presented the question of whether an individual who made voluntary expenditures based on a mother's fraudulent representation that the individual had fathered her child has a cause of action against the mother for recovery of those payments. The district court granted the mother's motion to dismiss the action. The Supreme Court reversed the district court, holding that such a cause of action may be pursued because it is consistent with traditional concepts of common law fraud, there is no prevailing public policy reason against recognizing such a cause of action, and Iowa's statutes do not speak to the issue. Remanded.

Appellee, as executrix of the estate of her father, and her sister, brought a breach of contract action in which they asserted that their father's second wife, appellant, contractually waived her right to retain the proceeds of their deceased father's employer-provided 401K plan and life insurance policy by entering a settlement agreement incorporated into an order of separate maintenance executed approximately a year prior to the father's death. At issue was whether the court of appeals erred in finding that decedent's children could maintain a state law action against the decedent's surviving spouse to recover proceeds distributed to the spouse as the beneficiary of the decedent's ERISA-governed benefits plans, 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., where the state law claims were based on a contention that the spouse waived her rights to such proceeds. The court answered in the negative, concluding that, in this case, since the proceeds of the ERISA-covered plans were paid out to appellant and were no longer in the control of the plan administrator, the trial court erred when it dismissed appellees' breach of contract claim against appellant.

Defendant Roberta Shore retained attorney third-party Defendant Nicholas Bokides to represent her in her divorce from William Shore. Pursuant to the divorce decree, William took all interest in the couple's business, Bear River Equipment, Inc., a farm equipment dealership. Roberta had instructed Bokides to provide notice to McCormick International USA, Inc, a Bear River creditor, that she would no longer personally guarantee its advances. Bokides never provided the notice, and McCormick sued Roberta to enforce the guarantee. Roberta brought a third party complaint against Bokides for malpractice. Bokides did not deny the malpractice claim, but alleged that Roberta failed to mitigate her damages because she did not seek to enforce the divorce decree’s mandate that William hold her harmless from all Bear River debts. Bokides appealed the trial court's judgment in Roberta's favor. Roberta cross-appealed the district court's determination that her damages were limited to advances made after entry of the divorce decree. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed: "substantial and competent evidence in the record supports the district court's finding that Roberta reasonably concluded that William was judgment proof and that it would therefore be futile to enforce the divorce decree against him. An implicit corollary of that finding is the finding that McCormick could not successfully seek compensation from William. Thus substantial, competent evidence supports the district court’s determination of the extent of Roberta's damages."

The county district court entered a decree of dissolution of the marriage of Kevin and Valara Mamot. The court determined that the premarital agreement entered into by the parties, although unconscionable, was valid and enforceable. The court then divided the assets and entered an order regarding child support. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court finding that the premarital agreement was enforceable, holding that because Valara did not sign the agreement voluntarily, the agreement was unenforceable under the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act adopted by Nebraska, and therefore, the Court did not need to further address whether the agreement was unconscionable.

This case involved a mediated settlement agreement (MSA) from a divorce. At issue was whether the court of appeals erred in setting aside the underlying MSA, which the trial court purported to follow in its divorce decree. The court did not agree with the court of appeals that the MSA unambiguously required wife's substitution as a limited partner nor did it agree that the MSA should be set aside merely because the parties interpret their agreement differently. The court agreed with the decision to remand, however, because the MSA's ambiguity must be resolved before an agreed judgment could be rendered. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Husband and Wife divorced in 1989 pursuant to a divorce judgment that incorporated an agreement dividing the parties' property. Husband retired from the Air National Guard in 2002 and began collecting his retirement benefits in 2006. In 2010, Wife filed a motion to modify the divorce judgment, requesting that the district court specify the amount of Husband's military pension to which she was entitled. The court granted the motion and awarded a portion of Husband's benefits to Wife after concluding that the provision of the divorce judgment regarding Husband's military pension was ambiguous. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the district court, holding that the provision awarding Husband his military pension was unambiguous and that Wife's motion to modify was improperly granted. Remanded.

This appeal involved a title to a house and lot in a residential subdivision in Forsyth County. The trial court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and defendants appealed. The court held that the trial court properly rejected defendants' claim of bona fide purchaser status; defendants' argument that the trial court erred in holding that the children acquired a collective two-thirds interest in the property by virtue of the 1998 quitclaim deed from their father was without merit; the trial court properly dismissed defendants' claim for equitable subrogation; the trial court did not err in dismissing defendants' counterclaim for unjust enrichment; and the trial court did not err in dismissing defendants' laches defense. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.