Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

3M Company operates a manufacturing facility in Cordova, Illinois, producing chemical products containing PFAS. The State of Illinois sued 3M, alleging that PFAS from the Cordova Facility contaminated the Mississippi River, violating state environmental laws. The State's complaint specifically excluded PFAS contamination from any other source, including AFFF used by the U.S. military at the nearby Rock Island Arsenal.The case was initially filed in Illinois state court. 3M removed it to the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois, citing the federal officer removal statute, arguing that some contamination might have come from AFFF provided to the military, thus invoking a federal government contractor defense. The State moved to remand the case back to state court. The district court granted the motion, finding that the State's complaint excluded AFFF-related contamination, focusing solely on PFAS from the Cordova Facility.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that 3M could not satisfy the fourth element required for removal under the federal officer removal statute, which necessitates a colorable federal defense. The court noted that the State had unequivocally conceded that it would not seek relief for mixed PFAS contamination and that any recovery would be barred if contamination was not solely from the Cordova Facility. Consequently, 3M's government contractor defense was deemed irrelevant under the State's theory of recovery. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to remand the case to state court. View "Raoul v. 3M Company" on Justia Law

This case involves a contractual dispute between Alabama Plating Technology, LLC (APT) and Georgia Plating Technology, LLC (GPT), DVEST, LLC, and Jin Kim. The dispute arose from an asset-purchase agreement for a brake-plating plant. After the purchase, APT claimed indemnity from the sellers for environmental issues, unpaid accounts payable, and certain inoperable assets, alleging these were retained liabilities or breaches of warranties by the sellers. The sellers sued APT for breach of contract due to setoff of losses against annual installment payments.The trial court found in favor of APT regarding the environmental issues and unpaid accounts payable, but sided with the sellers on the inoperable-assets claim. It also rejected APT's claim for attorneys' fees and legal expenses. Both parties appealed.The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the trial court's judgment denying APT relief on its inoperable-assets claim and its claim for attorneys' fees and legal expenses. It affirmed the trial court's judgment granting APT relief on its environmental-issues and unpaid-accounts-payable claims, and the denial of the sellers' request to accelerate the remaining installment payments owed to them by APT. View "Alabama Plating Technology, LLC v. Georgia Plating Technology, LLC" on Justia Law

The case in question involved a dispute between Epochal Enterprises, Inc., doing business as Divine Orchids, and LF Encinitas Properties, LLC and Leichtag Foundation, over a commercial lease agreement for a property containing dilapidated commercial greenhouses known to contain asbestos and lead paint. Epochal Enterprises claimed that the defendants failed to disclose the presence of these hazardous substances, which resulted in economic damage when the County of San Diego quarantined the leased premises. A jury found the defendants liable for premises liability and negligence, and awarded Epochal Enterprises damages for lost profits and other past economic loss.However, the trial court granted the defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), based on a limitation of liability clause in the lease agreement that purported to prevent Epochal Enterprises from recovering the economic damages awarded by the jury.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One State of California, reversed the trial court's judgment. It found that the jury necessarily concluded that the defendants had violated the Health and Safety Code by failing to disclose the existence of asbestos, and that this violation of law rendered the limitation of liability clause invalid under Civil Code section 1668. The court concluded that the limitation of liability clause could not bar Epochal Enterprises from recovering damages for the defendants' statutory violations.The court also affirmed the trial court's denial of the defendants' motion for partial JNOV on the issue of damages, finding that the jury had a reasonable basis for calculating the amount of lost profits. The court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Epochal Enterprises, Inc. v. LF Encinitas Properties, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals in this dispute arising out of environmental-cleanup and remediation work at two Superfund sites in Bronson, Michigan, holding that Restatement (Second) 193 does not govern the choice-of-law analysis for bad faith claims.Scott Fetzer Company filed this action asserting a breach of contract claim against certain insurance companies, including Travelers Casualty and Surety Company, alleging breaches of certain insurance contracts. Fetzer also asserted a tort claim against each company, arguing that they had acted in bad faith when handling his claims. As to Travelers, an administrative judge concluded that Ohio law applied to a discovery dispute concerning Scott Fetzer's bad faith claim. The court of appeals affirmed, determining that Ohio law governed the bad-faith discovery dispute because the cause of action was a tort. In affirming, the court applied the choice-of-law rules set forth in section 145 of the Restatement. Travelers appealed, arguing that section 193 governs the choice-of-law analysis for bad faith claims because they arise out of insurance contracts. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals correctly ruled that the choice-of-law analysis applicable to a bad-faith claim as provided by section 145. View "Scott Fetzer Co. v. American Home Assurance Co." on Justia Law

Gold Coast Commodities, Inc. makes animal feed using saponified poultry and plant fats at its Rankin County, Mississippi facility. Because its production process involves, among other things, old restaurant grease and sulfuric acid, Gold Coast is left with about 6,000 gallons of oily, “highly acidic,” and “extremely hot” wastewater each week. The City of Brandon, Mississippi, told a state agency that it believed Gold Coast was “discharging” that “oily, low-pH wastewater” into the public sewers. As a result, the Mississippi Department of Environmental Quality launched an investigation. Two months before the Department’s investigation, Gold Coast purchased a pollution liability policy from Crum & Forster Specialty Insurance Company. After the City filed suit, Gold Coast—seeking coverage under the provisions of its Policy—notified the insurer of its potential liability. But Crum & Forster refused to defend Gold Coast. The insurer insisted that because the Policy only covers accidents. The district court agreed with Crum & Forster—that the City wasn’t alleging an accident.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that here, the Policy is governed by Mississippi law. In Mississippi, whether an insurer has a duty to defend against a third-party lawsuit “depends upon the policy's language.” The district court found that the “overarching” theme of the City’s complaint, regardless of the accompanying “legal labels,” is that Gold Coast deliberately dumped wastewater into the public sewers. The court agreed with the district court and held that Gold Coast isn’t entitled to a defense from Crum & Forster. View "Gold Coast v. Crum & Forster Spclt" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was a breach-of-contract dispute involving a stock purchase agreement for the sale of all the shares of stock of International Specialty Products Inc. (“International Specialty”). The selling shareholders were nine trusts and RFH Investment Holdings LLC (the “Heyman Parties”). The purchaser was Appellee Ashland Inc., a leading global specialty chemical company. International Specialty had two wholly owned subsidiaries that went with the sale, Appellee ISP Environmental Services Inc. and Appellee Chemco LLC (“Chemco”). ISP Environmental owned a property known as the Linden property, which for years had been home to chemical manufacturing operations and had an extensive environmental history. As part of the transaction, the parties agreed that the Heyman Parties would keep the Linden property. At the time of closing on the Stock Purchase Agreement, ISP Environmental caused the Linden property to be transferred to Appellant Linden Property Holdings LLC, the Heyman Parties’ designated entity for that purpose. A dispute arose between the parties as to who was responsible for the Linden property’s pre-closing, environmental liabilities. The parties agreed the Heyman Parties assumed responsibility in the agreement for the environmental contamination on the property itself. They disagreed as to who was responsible for environmental contamination to areas that were not part of the Linden property but were contaminated because of the activities on the Linden property. Ashland claimed that under the agreement, the Heyman Parties were responsible for all of the liabilities. The Heyman Parties claimed they never assumed any liability in the agreement for the off-site liabilities. The Superior Court agreed with Ashland and found that the Heyman Parties assumed responsibility in the agreement for the Linden property’s off-site environmental liabilities. The Delaware Supreme Court concluded, however, that under the unambiguous language of the agreement, the Heyman Parties assumed liability only for the Linden property’s on-site environmental liabilities, and assumed no liability for the property’s off-site liabilities. View "The Samuel J. Heyman 1981 Continuing Trust for Lazarus S. Heyman v. Ashland LLC" on Justia Law

BP retained the Responders (O’Brien’s and NRC) for nearly $2 billion to assist with the cleanup of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. Thousands of the Responders' workers filed personal injury lawsuits against BP, which were consolidated and organized into “pleading bundles.” The B3 bundle included “all claims for personal injury and/or medical monitoring for exposure or other injury occurring after the explosion and fire of April 20, 2010.” In 2012, BP entered the “Medical Settlement” on the B3 claims with a defined settlement class. The opt-out deadline closed in October 2012. The Medical Settlement created a new type of claim for latent injuries, BackEnd Litigation Option (BELO) claims. After the settlement, plaintiffs could bring opt-out B3 claims if they did not participate in the settlement, and BELO claims if they were class members who alleged latent injuries and followed the approved process. Responders were aware of the settlement before the district court approved it but neither Responder had control over the negotiations, nor did either approve the settlement.In 2017, BP sought indemnification for 2,000 BELO claims by employees of the Responders. The Fifth Circuit held that BP was an additional insured up to the minimum amount required by its contract with O’Brien’s; the insurance policies maintained by O’Brien’s cannot be combined to satisfy the minimum amount. O’Brien’s is not required to indemnify BP because BP materially breached its indemnification provision with respect to the BELO claims. View "O'Brien's Response Management, L.L.C. v. BP Exploration & Production, Inc." on Justia Law

In 1987, Central purchased certain Soo assets, including LST rail lines. Soo agreed to retain liability and indemnify Central for “all claims for environmental matters relating to ownership of the Assets or the operation of LST that are asserted” within 10 years of closing, after which Central would assume all liability and indemnify Soo. Years later, contamination was discovered in a former Ashland industrial area, now Kreher Park, which contains a railroad right-of-way purchased by Central under the Agreement. The Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (WDNR) identified an old factory as the likely source; its owner, Northern, named as a potentially responsible party (PRP), undertook to shift responsibility to the railroads. Central kept Soo apprised of the situation. Central sent notification to Soo in 1997 that it was seeking indemnification for environmental matters, including at Kreher Park. Soo did not agree to indemnify or defend.In 2002, the EPA designated the area as a Superfund site (CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. 9601). In 2011, the EPA issued PRP notices to Central, Soo, Northern, and others. Northern sued Central, Soo, and the city for its cleanup expenses. The EPA cited evidence that the railroads engaged in activities contributing to the contamination. The railroads settled the EPA and Northern claims for $10.5 million.In breach of contract litigation between the railroads, the district court granted Soo summary judgment, finding that no claim had been asserted during the claim period. Central then argued that it should not be responsible for the portion of the environmental claims attributable to operations and land not purchased by Central. The court rejected the argument and awarded Soo $10,799,427, prejudgment interest, and $1,776,764 for attorneys’ fees. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. No “claim” was asserted against the railroads during the Agreement’s claim period; Northern never threatened litigation and the WDNR did not take any action that imposed any legal duties or impending legal peril on either railroad. The operation of the railroad business, not just the ownership of the assets, was identified by the EPA as contributing to the contamination; the claims are within the scope of the indemnification clause. View "Wisconsin Central LTD v. Soo Line Railroad Co." on Justia Law

In 2007, GM sold a power plant to DTEPN, which leased the land under the plant for 10 years. DTEPN agreed to sell utilities produced at the plant to GM, to maintain the plant according to specific criteria, and to address any environmental issues. DTEPN’s parent company, Energy, guaranteed DTEPN’s utility, environmental, and maintenance obligations. Two years later, GM filed for bankruptcy. GM and DTEPN agreed to GM’s rejection of the contracts. DTEPN exercised its right to continue occupying the property. An environmental trust (RACER) assumed ownership of some GM industrial property, including the DTEPN land. DTEPN remained in possession until the lease expired. RACER then discovered that DTEPN had allowed the power plant to fall into disrepair and contaminate the property.The district court dismissed the claims against Energy, reasoning that RACER’s allegations did not support piercing the corporate veil and Energy’s guaranty terminated after GM rejected the contracts in bankruptcy.The Sixth Circuit reversed. Michigan courts have held that a breach of contract can justify piercing a corporate veil if the corporate form has been abused. By allegedly directing its wholly-owned subsidiary to stop maintaining the property, Energy exercised control over DTEPN in a way that wronged RACER. DTEPN is now judgment-proof because it was not adequately capitalized by Energy. RACER would suffer an unjust loss if the corporate veil is not pierced. Rejection in bankruptcy does not terminate the contract; the contract is considered breached, 11 U.S.C. 365(g). The utility services agreement and the lease are not severable from each other. Energy guaranteed DTEPN’s obligations under the utility agreement concerning maintenance, environmental costs, and remediation, so Energy’s guaranty is joined to DTEPN’s section 365(h) election. View "EPLET, LLC v. DTE Pontiac North, LLC" on Justia Law

Taylor's leases for the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS), set to expire in 2007, incorporated Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), 43 U.S.C. 1301, regulations. They required Taylor to leave the leased area “in a manner satisfactory to the [Regional] Director.” Taylor drilled 28 wells, each connected to an oil platform. In 2004, Hurricane Ivan toppled Taylor’s platform, rendering the wells inoperable. Taylor discovered leaking oil but took no action. In 2007, Taylor was ordered to decommission the wells within one year. Taylor sought extensions. The government required Taylor to set aside funds for its decommissioning obligations. For Taylor to receive reimbursement, the government must confirm the work was conducted “in material compliance with all applicable federal laws and . . . regulations" and with the Leases. The resulting Trust Agreement states that it “shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of" Louisiana. Taylor attempted to fulfill its obligations. The government approved a departure from certain standards but ultimately refused to relieve Taylor of its responsibilities.Taylor filed claims involving Louisiana state law: breach of the Trust Agreement; request for dissolution of the trust account based on impossibility of performance; request for reformation for mutual error; and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. The Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. OCSLA makes federal law exclusive in its regulation of the OCS. To the extent federal law applies to a particular issue, state law is inapplicable. OCSLA regulations address the arguments underlying Taylor’s contract claims, so Louisiana state law cannot be adopted as surrogate law. View "Taylor Energy Co. LLC v. United States" on Justia Law