Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Chesapeake Exploration entered into an agreement to purchase deep rights held by Peak Energy in certain oil and gas leases in the Haynesville Shale formation at a certain price. Peak Energy filed a complaint against Chesapeake Exploration after Chesapeake Exploration refused to honor its commitment when the price of natural gas plummeted several months after the agreement. Chesapeake Exploration argued that the agreement was unenforceable under the Texas statute of frauds, fatally indefinite, and that Peak Energy had failed to tender performance. The court held that the district court did not err in its instructions to its expert, or in holding that the agreement was enforceable under the statute of frauds; in finding that Peak Energy was willing and able to tender performance of the agreement; and in calculating damages. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Coe, et al v. Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C., et al" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a related case currently pending in a United Kingdom Litigation, which arose from contractual disputes related to the exploration, development, and operation of oil blocks in Kurdistan, Iraq. On appeal, plaintiff argued that the district court erred by granting a motion to quash certain discovery subpoenas before plaintiff had an opportunity to respond in opposition and by not providing any reasons on the record for its decision. The court vacated the district court's order and remanded with instructions to allow plaintiff a reasonable period to respond to the motion and, thereafter, to provide written or oral reasons for the basis of its ruling. Otherwise, the district court was fully empowered to resolve these discovery disputes in a manner not inconsistent with this opinion. View "Texas Keystone, Inc. v. Prime Natural Resources, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

This case involved the duties and standard of care of an oil and gas operator under an exculpatory clause in a joint operating agreement (JOA). Based on language in the exculpatory clause in the JOA, the trial court instructed the jury to find that to find a breach of the JOA the operator's conduct must have risen to the level of gross negligence or willful misconduct. The jury found the operator, Petitioner, breached his duties under the JOA to the working interest owners. The court of appeals affirmed, holding (1) the gross negligence and willful misconduct instruction should not have been included in the charge because the case centered around a breach of contract; but (2) there was legally sufficient evidence to support the jury's findings that Petitioner breached his duty as operator when measured against the elements of breach of contract. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the exculpatory clause in the JOA established the standard for the claims against Petitioner; and (2) there was legally insufficient evidence that Petitioner was grossly negligent or acted with willful misconduct. View "Reeder v. Wood County Energy, LLC" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a dispute over the proper calculation of royalty payments on state oil and gas leases. Over the years, the Legislature has enacted several versions of the statutory oil and gas lease, and Lessees have entered into “hundreds” of oil and gas leases with the State. Specifically, the New Mexico Legislature enacted statutory oil and gas leases in 1919, 1925, 1927, 1929, 1931, 1945, 1947 and 1984. This appeal concerned the royalty clauses contained in the 1931 and the 1947 statutory lease forms. Both the 1931 lease and 1947 lease specified that the payment of royalty was to be calculated as a percentage of the “net proceeds” resulting from the sale of gas. During 2005 and 2006 Commissioner audited ConocoPhillips Company and Burlington Resources Oil & Gas Company’s royalty payments. Following the Audit, Commissioner notified Lessees that they had been underpaying their royalty obligations and issued them assessments for the underpayment. The Commissioner claimed that pursuant to the terms of the statutory lease forms Lessees could not deduct the post-production costs necessary to prepare the gas for the commercial market when calculating their royalty payments. Commissioner claimed that the improper deductions for post-production costs resulted in ConocoPhillips underpaying royalties by approximately $18.9 million and Burlington underpaying by approximately $5.6 million. In response to Commissioner’s audit and assessments, Lessees filed a complaint in the district court seeking a declaration that Commissioner’s assessment of additional royalty constituted a deprivation of due process, an unconstitutional impairment of contract, and breach of contract. In addition, Lessees claimed that Commissioner had exceeded his constitutional and statutory powers by issuing the assessments and had effectively usurped legislative power by seeking royalty payments under calculation methods not approved by the Legislature. In response, Commissioner alleged a host of counterclaims for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and breach of the implied covenant to market. This appeal pertained to three orders granting summary judgment on behalf of Lessees and a fourth order denying Commissioner’s motion for reconsideration of the district court’s previous dismissal of his counterclaim for breach of the implied covenant to market. In the first order, the district court granted Lessees’ motion for summary judgment. Upon review of the several orders and claims before the Supreme Court on appeal, the Court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment. View "ConocoPhillips Co. v. Lyons" on Justia Law

Bowers Oil and Gas, Inc. (BOG) entered into a Gas Purchase Contract with Kinder Morgan Operating, L.P. (Kinder Morgan), pursuant to which Kinder Morgan agreed to purchase coal bed methane gas from certain of BOG's wells. Kinder Morgan transferred its interest in the Contract, and Kinder Morgan's successor eventually terminated the Contract pursuant to a provision that allowed either party to terminate if in the terminating party's sole opinion, the sale or purchase of the gas became unprofitable or uneconomical. BOG thereafter filed suit asserting claims for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Following a bench trial, the district court found no contract breach or covenant breach and ruled in favor of Kinder Morgan and its successor. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed. The Court found no breach of contract in the successor's removal of the pipelines connecting BOG to the gas gathering system and that the Gas Purchase Contract was properly terminated for economic cause. Furthermore, the Court found no clear error in the district court's rejection of BOG's claim for breach of the implied covenant and fair dealing. View "Bowers Oil & Gas, Inc. v. DCP Douglas, LLC" on Justia Law

This case arose from an underlying dispute involving three parties related to an alleged breach of an assignment agreement. The three parties disagreed over the appointment of arbitrators to hear their dispute. The agreement to arbitrate seemed designated for a two-party dispute. Notwithstanding that the parties agreed to arbitrate before three arbitrators, the district court ordered the parties to proceed to arbitration before five arbitrators: three party-appointed arbitrators, who would then choose two neutral arbitrators. If the party-appointed arbitrators could not agree, the district court ordered the parties to petition for appointment of the two neutral arbitrators. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed in part and vacated in part the district court's judgment, holding (1) there was a lapse in the naming of the arbitrators in the parties' agreement; (2) the district court was authorized to exercise appointment power under 9 U.S.C. 5; and (3) the district court erred in deviating from the parties' express agreement to arbitrate before a three-member panel. Remanded. View "BP Exploration Libya Ltd. v. ExxonMobil Libya Ltd." on Justia Law

Joseph purchased the BP franchise in 2006 for $400,000. In 2009, Sasafrasnet purchased BP’s interests in the land and a Dealer Lease and Supply Agreement, becoming lessor and franchisor. The DLSA authorizes Sasafrasnet to terminate if Joseph fails to make payment according to EFT policy, causing a draft to be dishonored as NSF more than once in 12 months; Sasafrasnet is not obligated to extend credit, but did deliver fuel before collecting payment. There were several instances of NSF EFTs; Sasafrasnet began to require payment in advance. Later, Sasafrasnet allowed Joseph to resume paying by EFT within three days of delivery, but established a $2,500 penalty for any NSF and stated that pre-pay would resume if he incurred two more NSFs. There were additional NSFs, so that Joseph had incurred nine for amounts over $20,000 and three for amounts over $45,000. Sasafrasnet gave Joseph 90 days’ notice that it was terminating his franchise, listing the NSFs and failing scores on a mystery shopper inspection as bases for termination. Joseph sued under the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 2801. The district court denied a preliminary injunction to prevent the termination. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the statute requires additional findings.

The Stockmans entered into an extension of their mineral lease with Chesapeake Louisiana, L.P. and received a $240,000 bonus. In May 2008, the Stockmans entered into a mineral lease with Petrohawk Properties, L.P. for a $1.45 million bonus. Petrohawk then dishonored the draft and executed a second mineral lease with the Stockmans, paying them a $1.7 million bonus. Chesapeake sued the Stockmans for breach of contract, and the parties settled at trial. The Stockmans then sued Petrohawk for fraud in obtaining the first mineral lease, and Chespeake sued Petrohawk for intentional interference with its contract with the Stockmans. The district court (1) found that Petrohawk procured the first mineral lease by fraud and rescinded the lease, (2) dismissed Chesapeake's tort claim, and (3) dismissed Petrohawk's claim for a return of its bonus money. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Petrohawk obtained the first lease by fraud, and the district court did not err in rescinding the lease, awarding attorney's fees to the Stockmans; (2) the district court did not err in dismissing Petrohawk's counterclaim for the return of the lease bonus; and (3) the district court correctly dismissed Chespeake's intentional interference with a contract claim.

Defendant-Appellant and Cross-Appellee BP America Production Company (BP) appealed a judgment from a jury verdict in favor of Plaintiffs-Appellees and Cross-Appellants, a certified class of royalty and overriding royalty owners. The judgment included $9,740,973 in damages for failure to pay royalties consistent with the underlying leases and $3,443,372.40 in prejudgment interest (calculated at 15%). The class took issue with two aspects of BP's "netback" method for market-value-at-the-well contracts: its sales price for natural gas liquids (NGLs) at the tailgate and its processing cost. Specifically, the class complained that BP sold refined NGLs at the tailgate of the processing plant to an affiliate company at a discount (called an "affiliate transfer price"), and that BP, as co-owner of the plant, deducted an inflated processing fee, thereby lessening their royalty payments. Further, the class alleged BP breached the covenants of good faith and fair dealing in their contracts. BP's theory of the case was that there is a market for gas at the well, and that its netback method resulted in royalty payments in line with market values. BP unsuccessfully moved in limine to prohibit the class from introducing evidence regarding the royalty practices of ConocoPhillips ("COP"), co-owner of the processing plant with BP. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that disputed evidence of material fact on the market-value leases existed to preclude either party from judgment as a matter of law in their favor. Admission of the COP evidence was an abuse of district court's discretion and reversible error; the Tenth Circuit reversed for a new trial on that ground. On remand, the Court ordered the district court vacate the judgment entered on the jury's verdict and the prejudgment interest award, and provide an explanation of any ruling on the breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

Pentonville Developers, Ltd. and Marblearch Trading, Ltd., two Cyprus oil brokerage companies, sued the Republic of Iraq for unilaterally terminating two contracts for the purchase and sale of Iraqi oil. The district court concluded it had subject matter jurisdiction notwithstanding Iraq's assertion of sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act because the lawsuit fell within the "commercial exception" to that immunity. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that because the lawsuit was not based upon commercial activity by Iraq in the United States, nor upon an act in connection with such commercial activity having a direct effect in the United States, the district court erred in denying Iraq's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.