Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Energy, Oil and Gas
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Rita Sue Rasnic, (f/k/a Johnson) appealed the grant of summary judgment quieting title to disputed mineral interests in McKenzie County to Norris and Beverly Hildre. Rasnic argues she was entitled to the disputed mineral interests because those mineral interests were subject to a mortgage held by her predecessor in interest, American State Bank. Upon review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the plain language of the Hildres' 1988 mortgage applied only to mineral interests owned by them when the mortgage was executed and title to the disputed mineral interests, which was acquired by the Hildres after the mortgage was executed, did not inure to American State Bank as security for the Hildres' debt under N.D.C.C. section 35-03-01.2(4). Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment quieting title in the disputed mineral interests to the Hildres. View "Rasnic v. ConocoPhillips Co." on Justia Law

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Debra Ganske, Wesley Borgen, Michael Borgen, Sue Evans, and Linda McCoy ("the Borgens") appealed a district court summary judgment quieting title in certain oil and gas leases in Golden Eye Resources, LLC and dismissing their counterclaim for rescission or cancellation of the leases. Golden Eye cross-appealed. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, concluding the district court erred in concluding the Borgens' fraudulent inducement claims were barred as a matter of law, and the court therefore erred in dismissing their rescission action and quieting title in the leases in Golden Eye. View "Golden Eye Resources, LLC v. Ganske" on Justia Law

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At issue in this case was a joint operating agreement (JOA) for Wyoming oil and gas interests entered into in 2000 by the predecessors in interest to Windsor Energy Group, LLC and Windsor Beaver Creek, LLC (together, Windsor) and Noble Energy, Inc. (Noble). In 2004, Noble’s predecessor assigned its interest to another party. In 2010, Windsor filed suit against Noble’s predecessor, claiming it was obligated for costs under the JOA. The district court ruled (1) an assignor of an interest who was not formally released was still obligated under the JOA, but (2) Windsor’s claim against Noble for breach of the JOA was barred by laches. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment without addressing the contract issue, holding that the district court (1) did not err in ruling that the equitable doctrine of laches was an available defense to Windsor’s claim for breach of the JOA even though the statute of limitations had not expired; and (2) did not abuse its discretion by finding the elements of laches were satisfied in this case.View "Windsor Energy Group, LLC v. Noble Energy, Inc." on Justia Law

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In approximately twenty years PCS Nitrogen, Inc. contributed to environmental contamination by manufacturing fertilizer and disturbing contaminated soil during various demolition activities. In 2003, Ashley II of Charleston, Inc. purchased 27.62 acres of the PCS's property. Since that time, Ashley II has incurred substantial costs in remediating the environmental contamination. In July 2008, Ashley II filed a complaint against PCS seeking a declaration of joint and several liability under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) due to costs of the environmental cleanup at the Site. Additionally, PCS asserted a third-party indemnification claim against the site's previous owner based on the indemnity provision in a 1966 purchase agreement, seeking indemnification for attorney's fees, costs, and litigation expenses incurred in establishing that the predecessor contributed to the contamination. The South Carolina Supreme Court anwered the following certified question from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina: "Does the rule that a contract of indemnity will not be construed to indemnify the indemnitee against losses resulting from its own negligent acts, unless such intention is expressed in clear and unequivocal terms, apply when the indemnitee seeks contractual indemnification for costs and expenses resulting in part from its own strict liability acts? " In the context of the underlying claim in federal court, the South Carolina Court answered the question, "no." View "Ashley II v. PCS Nitrogen" on Justia Law