Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

CorpCar Services Houston, Ltd. (CorpCar) entered into a franchise license agreement with Carey Licensing, Inc., and Carey International, Inc. (collectively Carey) to operate a chauffeur-driven service under the Carey brand in Houston, Texas. In 2015, CorpCar was found liable for punitive damages for creating a racially hostile work environment, which led Carey to terminate the franchise agreement in 2016. CorpCar argued that the termination was wrongful because it did not materially breach the agreement and, even if it had, Carey did not provide an opportunity to cure the violation as required by the agreement.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia granted summary judgment to Carey, finding that CorpCar’s breach was incurable as a matter of law and that CorpCar had an opportunity to cure but failed to do so. The court also denied CorpCar’s cross-motion for summary judgment, concluding that issues of material fact remained for the jury to decide.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and agreed with the lower court that CorpCar’s breach was material. However, the appellate court disagreed with the finding that the breach was incurable as a matter of law. The court held that the language of the franchise agreement was clear and precluded the application of the incurable breach doctrine. The court also found that there was a dispute of material fact as to whether Carey repudiated the franchise agreement, effectively denying CorpCar an opportunity to cure.The appellate court reversed the grant of summary judgment to Carey and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court instructed that a jury must decide whether Carey repudiated the agreement, whether CorpCar had cured or could have cured its breach, and whether affording an opportunity to cure would have been futile. The denial of CorpCar’s cross-motion for summary judgment was affirmed. View "CorpCar Services Houston, LTD v. Carey Licensing, Inc." on Justia Law

Debra Stevenson and Eugene Smith co-own a property for which Stevenson initially took out a loan from Wells Fargo. After defaulting, she refinanced with Fremont Investment & Loan, which paid off the Wells Fargo loan. Stevenson defaulted again and filed for bankruptcy. HSBC Bank, as Fremont's successor, sought to enforce its interest in the property through equitable subrogation, claiming the right to stand in Wells Fargo's position.In bankruptcy court, HSBC was found to be the holder of the note and entitled to equitable subrogation for the amount used to pay off the Wells Fargo loan. The federal district court adopted this decision, and the D.C. Circuit affirmed, holding that HSBC could enforce its interest despite Fremont's knowledge of Smith's co-ownership and refusal to sign the loan documents.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the Superior Court's grant of summary judgment to HSBC. The court held that Stevenson and Smith were collaterally estopped from relitigating issues decided in federal court, including HSBC's standing and entitlement to equitable subrogation. The court also rejected their Truth in Lending Act (TILA) rescission argument, as it had been previously litigated and decided against them. The court affirmed the Superior Court's ruling, finding no genuine issues of material fact and that HSBC was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "Stevenson v. HSBC Bank USA" on Justia Law

Douglass Sloan provided a $60,000 short-term loan to Carlos Allen for property rehabilitation, with a 60-day term and a 20% fixed return rate. If unpaid within 60 days, the loan accrued an additional 2% every subsequent 60 days. The loan was subject to the maximum interest rate allowed by D.C. law if not repaid within 60 days. Sloan sought to collect the debt, leading to a dispute over whether the loan's interest rate was usurious, as D.C. law caps interest rates at 24% per annum.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia initially ruled that Allen had waived his usury defense by not raising it for nearly seven years. The court awarded Sloan $256,946.46 plus $97,450 in attorney’s fees and costs. On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals upheld the attorney’s fees but remanded the case for reconsideration of the usury defense waiver. The trial court then found no substantial prejudice to Sloan from Allen’s delay and ruled the loan usurious, reducing the award to $39,026.46, the remaining principal, plus the affirmed attorney’s fees.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case again. It upheld the trial court’s findings that Allen had not waived his usury defense and that the loan was usurious, as it effectively charged a 34.7% interest rate in its first year. The court rejected Sloan’s arguments against these findings but agreed that Sloan was entitled to post-judgment interest on the award from the date of the initial October 2020 judgment. The court also dismissed Allen’s cross-appeal, which challenged the validity of the loan and the attorney’s fees, as these issues had been resolved in a prior decision. The case was remanded for the imposition of post-judgment interest on the $39,026.46 award. View "Sloan v. Allen" on Justia Law