Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

The case involves an ex-wife, Stephanie P. Shilling, attempting to enforce an agreement with her ex-husband, Ebon T. Shilling, regarding the sale of her interest in a property acquired during their marriage. The ex-husband offered to purchase the ex-wife's interest via email, and she accepted the offer. However, the Family Court found that the email exchanges did not result in an enforceable contract because the parties did not adequately manifest their intent to be bound and the exchanges did not contain all material contractual terms.The Family Court of the State of Delaware previously reviewed the case. The court found that there was no enforceable contract between the parties because the email exchanges lacked a meeting of the minds and did not include all material terms. Additionally, the court concluded that signing a formal written agreement was a condition precedent to the contract, and even if there was a contract, the ex-wife acquiesced in the ex-husband's repudiation by continuing to negotiate.The Supreme Court of the State of Delaware reviewed the case and disagreed with the Family Court's findings. The Supreme Court found that the email exchanges did form an enforceable contract as they contained a clear offer and acceptance, and the parties intended to be bound by the terms discussed in the emails. The court also determined that the signing of a formal written agreement was not a condition precedent to the contract. Furthermore, the Supreme Court found that the ex-wife did not acquiesce in the ex-husband's repudiation. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the Family Court's judgment and remanded the matter for further proceedings to determine appropriate relief in light of the enforceable contract. View "Shilling v. Shilling" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the control of Byju’s Alpha, Inc., a Delaware subsidiary of Think and Learn Private Ltd. (T&L), an Indian company. Byju’s Alpha entered into a $1.2 billion loan agreement with GLAS Trust Company LLC (GLAS) as the administrative and collateral agent. The agreement required Whitehat, another T&L subsidiary, to become a guarantor, contingent on approval from the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). However, changes in RBI regulations made it impossible for Whitehat to obtain the necessary approval.The Court of Chancery of Delaware held a trial and ruled that Timothy R. Pohl was the sole director and officer of Byju’s Alpha, following actions taken by GLAS to enforce its rights under the loan agreement. The court found that the failure of Whitehat to accede as a guarantor constituted a breach of the loan agreement, allowing GLAS to take control of Byju’s Alpha’s shares and appoint Pohl as the sole director and officer.The Delaware Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Chancery’s decision. The Supreme Court held that the amendments to the loan agreement explicitly defined Whitehat’s failure to accede as a “Specified Default,” entitling GLAS to enforce its remedies. The court also rejected the impossibility defense, concluding that the changes in RBI regulations were foreseeable and could have been guarded against in the contract. The court found that the sophisticated parties involved should have anticipated the regulatory changes and included provisions to address such risks.In conclusion, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s ruling that Pohl was the sole director and officer of Byju’s Alpha, and that GLAS was entitled to enforce its remedies under the loan agreement due to the breach caused by Whitehat’s failure to accede as a guarantor. View "Ravindran v. GLAS Trust Company LLC" on Justia Law

In this case, SARN SD3 LLC ("SD3") brought a breach of contract action against Czechoslovak Group A.S. ("CSG") regarding an option contract for shares in RETIA A.S. ("RETIA"). The contract stipulated that if CSG ceased to own a majority of RETIA before SD3's call option expired, CSG would pay SD3 a "Penalty Amount" based on an "Independent Valuation" of RETIA. CSG sold RETIA, triggering the Penalty Amount, but disputes arose over access to valuation information, leading SD3 to file suit.The Superior Court of Delaware granted SD3's entitlement to the Penalty Amount and calculated the Independent Valuation as the average of two valuations from Big Four accounting firms, despite CSG's objections. The court later determined that SD3's valuation was independently determined and in good faith. SD3 then filed a Rule 37 Motion for sanctions, alleging CSG withheld important valuation documents, but the court denied the motion, suggesting SD3 seek relief under Rule 60(b) for newly discovered evidence. SD3's subsequent Rule 60 Motion was also denied, as the court found the documents were not newly discovered and no exceptional circumstances warranted relief.The Delaware Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's decisions. The Supreme Court held that the contract's provisions were clear and unambiguous, not requiring judicial inquiry into the valuation methodologies. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the Superior Court's handling of the Rule 37 and Rule 60 motions, as SD3 had the documents in question well before the summary judgment ruling and failed to demonstrate due diligence. Additionally, the Supreme Court upheld the Superior Court's decision to convert the judgment to U.S. dollars using the exchange rate as of the valuation date, rejecting SD3's arguments for a different conversion date. View "Czechoslovak Group A.S. v. SARN SD3 LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between two parties who entered into a partnership agreement that specified the financial conditions under which the appellant would receive a distribution upon the sale of the partnership’s principal asset. The agreement set a net-sale-price threshold above which the appellant would receive a distribution, and it directed the general partner to calculate that net sale price by deducting certain categories of costs from the gross sales price. The general partner determined that the deductions reduced the net sale price below the minimum threshold for a distribution. The appellant challenged several of these deductions, particularly the costs incurred to defease the interest payments on the mortgage.The Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware reviewed the case and held that the deduction for the costs to defease the interest payments on the mortgage was proper under the partnership agreement. The court concluded that this deduction was outcome determinative and entered judgment in favor of the partnership. The court also noted that the general partner acted in good faith in calculating the net sale price, which eliminated any breach of contract claim.The Supreme Court of the State of Delaware reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Chancery’s judgment. The Supreme Court held that the plain language of the partnership agreement and the formula used permitted the challenged deduction for defeasance costs. The court did not reach the effect or correctness of the Court of Chancery’s alternative holding regarding the general partner’s good faith. The Supreme Court concluded that the defeasance costs were properly deducted, which reduced the net resale price below the threshold required for the appellant to receive a distribution. View "Exit Strategy, LLC v. Festival Retail Fund BH, L.P." on Justia Law

The case involves Ferrellgas Partners L.P. and its subsidiaries (collectively "Ferrellgas") and Zurich American Insurance Company ("Zurich"). Ferrellgas had an insurance policy with Zurich, which included a provision for the advancement of defense costs for litigation. Ferrellgas was involved in a separate lawsuit with Eddystone Rail Company, LLC ("Eddystone") over a breach of contract. Ferrellgas sought to have Zurich cover the defense costs for the Eddystone litigation under their insurance policy.In the lower court, the Superior Court of the State of Delaware, Ferrellgas filed a motion for summary judgment seeking a declaratory relief obligating Zurich to advance defense costs for the Eddystone litigation. Zurich also filed a motion for summary judgment seeking a declaration that it had no obligation to advance defense costs. The Superior Court denied Ferrellgas' motion and granted Zurich's motion, finding that the Eddystone litigation was excluded from coverage under the Zurich policy.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware affirmed the decision of the Superior Court. The Supreme Court found that the Eddystone litigation was a claim seeking relief for a breach of contract that occurred after the commencement of the Run-Off Coverage Period in the Zurich policy. As such, Zurich had no duty to advance defense costs for this matter due to the Run-Off Exclusion in the policy. The court also found that Ferrellgas' appeal was timely filed. View "Ferrellgas Partners, L.P. v. Zurich American Insurance Company" on Justia Law

The case involves NGL Energy Partners LP and NGL Energy Holdings LLC (collectively, "NGL") and LCT Capital, LLC ("LCT"). NGL, entities in the energy sector, engaged LCT, a financial advisory services provider, for services related to NGL's 2014 acquisition of TransMontaigne Inc. However, the parties failed to agree on payment terms, leading LCT to file a lawsuit in 2015. The Superior Court held a jury trial in July 2018, which resulted in a $36 million verdict in LCT's favor.NGL appealed the Superior Court's decision, challenging the $36 million final judgment and a set of evidentiary rulings. LCT cross-appealed, contesting the Superior Court's methodology for computing post-judgment interest. NGL argued that the Superior Court erred by admitting evidence and arguments about the value/benefit supposedly gained by NGL in the Transaction, asserting that such evidence is prejudicial and irrelevant to a quantum meruit claim. NGL also argued that the Superior Court erred by admitting evidence of benefit-of-the-bargain or expectancy damages when assessing the quantum meruit value of LCT’s services.The Supreme Court of the State of Delaware affirmed the Superior Court’s evidentiary rulings and rejected NGL's contention that the Superior Court incorrectly allowed LCT to recover benefit-of-the bargain/expectancy damages. However, the Supreme Court disagreed with the Superior Court’s post-judgment interest determination. The Supreme Court held that prejudgment interest is part of the judgment upon which post-judgment interest accrues under Section 2301(a). Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court as to this issue and remanded the case to the Superior Court for entry of judgment consistent with its opinion. View "NGL Energy Partners LP v. LCT Capital, LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves BitGo Holdings, Inc. and Galaxy Digital Holdings Ltd., who entered into a merger agreement. BitGo, a technology company, was required to submit audited financial statements to Galaxy, the acquirer, by a specified date. When BitGo submitted the financial statements, Galaxy claimed they were deficient because they did not apply recently published guidance from the Securities and Exchange Commission’s staff. BitGo disagreed, but submitted a second set of financial statements. Galaxy found fault with the second submission and terminated the merger agreement. BitGo then sued Galaxy for wrongful repudiation and breach of the merger agreement.The Court of Chancery sided with Galaxy and dismissed the complaint. The court found that the financial statements submitted by BitGo did not comply with the requirements of the merger agreement, providing Galaxy with a valid basis to terminate the agreement.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Delaware reversed the decision of the Court of Chancery. The Supreme Court found that the definition of the term “Company 2021 Audited Financial Statements” in the merger agreement was ambiguous. The court concluded that both parties had proffered reasonable interpretations of the merger agreement’s definition. Therefore, the court remanded the case for the consideration of extrinsic evidence to resolve this ambiguity. View "BitGo Holdings, Inc. v. Galaxy Digital Holdings Ltd., et al." on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware, Cantor Fitzgerald, L.P., a global financial services company, appealed a decision by the Court of Chancery. The case involved the company's contractual provisions that allowed it to withhold distributions otherwise owed to a partner who leaves the partnership and then competes with the partnership. The plaintiffs were six former partners who had their distributions, ranging from under $100,000 to over $5 million, withheld after they left Cantor Fitzgerald and joined competing businesses.The lower court held that these "forfeiture for competition" provisions were unenforceable, ruling they were unreasonable restraints on trade. However, the Supreme Court reversed this decision. It ruled that, under Delaware law, courts should enforce such agreements absent unconscionability, bad faith, or other extraordinary circumstances. The court emphasized the importance of freedom of contract, particularly in the context of sophisticated parties entering into a limited partnership agreement. It argued that public policy considerations favored enforcing the agreement, particularly as the parties had voluntarily agreed to the terms. As such, it held that Cantor Fitzgerald was within its rights to withhold the distributions based on the plaintiffs' competitive activities. The case was remanded to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "Cantor Fitzgerald, L.P. v. Ainslie" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Delaware Supreme Court's review stemmed from a failed, multibillion-dollar merger (the “Merger”) of two fuel pipeline giants - The Williams Companies, Inc. (“Williams”) and Energy Transfer LP (“ETE”). The parties spent a decade litigating over various fees to which they argued they were entitled under the Merger Agreement. ETE continued to assert its entitlement to a $1.48 billion breakup fee, despite being the party who terminated the Merger. It also disputed that it had to pay Williams a $410 million reimbursement fee, which it was required to pay if the Merger failed and certain conditions were met. Finally, ETE argued a related $85 million attorney’s fee award was unreasonable. But the Supreme Court found no error with the Court of Chancery’s opinions that held ETE was not entitled to an over-one-billion-dollar fee and find that ETE had to pay Williams the $410 million reimbursement fee and the related $85 million in attorney’s fees. View "Energy Transfer, LP v. The Williams Companies, Inc." on Justia Law

Guaranteed Rate, Inc., a mortgage lender, purchased two types of insurance policies from ACE American Insurance Company: management liability and professional liability. Guaranteed Rate sought coverage under the policies for an investigation and eventual settlement of claims brought by the federal government under the False Claims Act. ACE denied coverage under both policies. According to ACE, the Professional Liability Policy expressly excluded False Claims Act charges. ACE also contended that the False Claims Act charges arose from Guaranteed Rate’s professional services, which were excluded under the Management Liability Policy. Only the Management Liability Policy was at issue in this appeal. In Guaranteed Rate’s suit against ACE, a Delaware superior court held that the False Claims Act investigation and settlement did not arise out of Guaranteed Rate’s professional services. Instead, it arose out of false certifications made to the government. Thus, the Management Liability Policy covered the loss. To this, the Delaware Supreme Court agreed with the superior court. View "ACE American Insurance Company v. Guaranteed Rate, Inc." on Justia Law