Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Central Mortgage and Morgan Stanley entered into a contract concerning the purchase of servicing rights for loans that Morgan Stanley planned to sell to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (the agencies) and private investors. Subsequently, many of the loans for which Morgan Stanley sold the servicing rights began to fall delinquent. The agencies exercised their contract right to put delinquent agency loans back to Central Mortgage. Central Mortgage then filed a complaint against Morgan Stanley for breach of contract. The Chancery Court granted Morgan Stanley's motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the claims were legally sufficient to withstand the motion. Central Mortgage then filed an amended complaint to add new claims for additional agency loans (new loans) that had been put back by the agencies and to challenge the private loans. Morgan Stanley moved to dismiss the amended complaint. The Chancery Court (1) denied the motion to dismiss to the extent that it rehashed theories that the Court and Supreme Court already considered in the context of its original motion to dismiss; but (2) granted the motion to dismiss the claims related to the new loans because those claims were barred by Delaware's statute of limitations. View "Central Mortgage Co. v. Morgan Stanley Mortgage Capital Holdings LLC" on Justia Law

GRT and Marathon are engaged in attempting to convert methane gas into fuel. They entered into interrelated agreements, including a Securities Purchase Agreement (Marathon purchased $25 million of GRT’s stock), mutual licensing agreements, and a Cooperative Development Agreement, governing collaboration to develop gas-to-fuels technology. Marathon built a multi-million dollar “Demonstration Facility” to test the technology on a large scale and a smaller research facility (Pilot Unit). Under the Development Agreement, GRT obtained access the Demonstration Facility and the ability to modify the Facility, to expire on December 31, 2012. The Facility began operations in 2008. Marathon executed a run campaign and shared data with GRT. In November 2009, Marathon decided to permanently close the Facility because of operational difficulties. Marathon followed procedures prescribed by the Agreement, gave notice, and extended GRT the right to acquire the Facility. GRT did not exercise that right. Although the Facility is currently closed, the Pilot Unit is operational, and both parties continue to test there. GRT claimed breach of contract. The chancellor found that the Development Agreement is not ambiguous and does not impose an affirmative duty on Marathon to operate the Facility through December, 2012, but provides GRT protection in other ways that would be internally inconsistent with such an affirmative duty.

NuVasive alleges that Lanx improperly persuaded NuVasive employees and a NuVasive consultant to leave NuVasive and work for Lanx instead, in breach of agreements that the employees had with NuVasive, to misappropriate NuVasive’s trade secrets and other proprietary information. Both are medical corporations. NuVasive claimed unfair competition, tortious interference with contractual relations, tortious interference with prospective contractual relations, aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty, civil conspiracy, and misappropriation of trade secrets. Lanx argued that the former NuVasive employees were necessary and indispensable parties to the action because NuVasive’s claims are predicated upon their acts. The chancellor declined to dismiss. While the former employees’ interests are not adequately protected by Lanx, the chancellor reasoned that a remedy could be crafted to avoid prejudice to their interests. The former employees were not indispensable to the misappropriation claim.

Plaintiff, both individually and as the trustee of several trusts that she directed, asserted claims against defendants arising out of her decision to invest in Lord Baltimore. Defendants moved to dismiss all of the claims asserted against them. The court held that defendants' motion to dismiss was granted, except to plaintiff's claim that there was an implied covenant in the Shareholders' Agreement requiring that repurchase proposals be presented to and considered by the Board, which was not dismissed.

This was a declaratory judgment action under 6 Del. C. 111 to determine the duties, obligations, and liabilities, if any, of a Delaware limited liability company to one of its initial members. The court concluded that a clear forum selection clause in Todd's employment agreement with RWI (N.M.), which closely paralleled a similar provision in a related Stock Purchase Agreement (SPA), precluded the court from determining what effect, if any, Todd's termination from RWI (N.M.) had upon, at least, a subset of RWI (Del.) units he previously held. As a result, the court lacked the ability to determine definitely whether Todd continued to hold any interest in RWI (Del.), at least until a court in New Mexico resolved Todd's ownership of this subset of units. Therefore, the court stayed the action as a matter of judicial efficiency and in deference to the apparent intent of the contracting parties in favor of the proceedings pending in New Mexico.

This action involved claims of fraud and breach of fiduciary against an individual defendant, a former investment professional accused of having committed a massive fraud related to a quantitatively-based trading program that he allegedly developed to trade futures contracts. Plaintiffs, as a result of their association with defendant and Paron, the firm they founded with defendant, claimed that they have been stigmatized and thus face dismal prospects of finding employment in the financial services industry. The court found that defendant committed fraud and breached his fiduciary duties to plaintiff and Paron by making false statements of fact about his program, his investment track record, and his personal financial situation. As a result, plaintiffs were entitled to extensive damages against defendant based on their lost future earnings and other costs associated with the formation and operation of Paron. The court also awarded plaintiffs limited injunctive relief requiring defendant to destroy or return copies of Paron's trading program and to stop marketing any versions of that trading program.

Entities affiliated with ASB sued to reform the capital-event waterfall provisions in a series of agreements governing real estate joint ventures managed by affiliates of The Scion Group. The erroneously drafter provisions called for Scion to receive incentive compensation know as a "promote" even if the joint ventures lost money. Scion sought to enforce the agreements as written, and its affiliates advanced counterclaims for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and breach of contract. The court found that plaintiffs have proven their entitlement to reformation by clear and convincing evidence and entered a judgment in their favor of defendants' counterclaims.

Travelers, an insurer, was being sued for insurance benefits in a New Jersey court. Plaintiff there was a subsidiary of a defendant here, Sequa. Travelers sought specific performance of, and a declaratory judgment arising from, a release of claims by Sequa in favor of Travelers, made in connection with the settlement of coverage litigation in the Delaware Superior Court in 1997. The relief sought by Travelers here would relieve it from, or indemnify it for, liability in the coverage litigation being undertaken in New Jersey. Because the explicit language of the release excluded the sites for which plaintiff in the New Jersey action sought coverage, as a matter of contract law Travelers was not entitled to the specific performance or declaratory judgment it sought here. Accordingly, the court dismissed the matter.

This case arose when Martin Marietta sought to purchase all of Vulcan's outstanding shares (Exchange Offer). At issue was the meaning of confidentiality agreements entered into by both parties. The court found in favor of Vulcan on its counterclaims for breach of the non-disclosure agreement (NDA) (Count I), and the joint defense and confidentiality agreement (JDA)(Count II), and against Martin Marietta on its claim that it did not breach the NDA (Count I). Martin Marietta shall be enjoined for a period of four months from prosecuting a proxy contest, making an exchange or tender offer, or otherwise taking steps to acquire control of Vulcan shares or assets. During that period, it is also enjoined from any further violations of the NDA and JDA. Vulcan shall submit a conforming final judgment within five days, upon approval as to form by Martin Marietta.

Plaintiffs brought their Verified Complaint asserting claims for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing against defendant. J.P.Morgan also asserted a claim for attorneys' fees and costs under an option agreement that J.P. Morgan and defendant entered into, which was the contract central to the dispute. Defendant moved to dismiss pursuant to Court of Chancery Rule 12(b)(6). The court held that J.P. Morgan has failed to state a claim that defendant breached the express terms of the Option Agreement and therefore, defendant's motion to dismiss was granted as to Count I. Defendant's motion to dismiss was denied as to Count II because J.P. Morgan's allegations, taken together, were sufficient to state a claim of the implied covenant. Finally, defendant's motion to dismiss was denied as to Count III where J.P. Morgan could eventually be the prevailing party in this action.