Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Jeffrey Healey and Edward Given, residents of the Massachusetts Treatment Center, were each civilly committed as a sexually dangerous person. Plaintiffs brought separate suits, which were later consolidated, challenging the conditions of their confinement and the adequacy of their sexual offender treatment. Plaintiffs sought equitable relief against the Massachusetts Department of Corrections and other state officials (collectively, the DOC). Both plaintiffs alleged violations of the Constitution and state statutory provisions, and Healey alleged that the DOC was not in compliance with the terms of a management plan (Plan) for the Center developed by the DOC during the course of prior litigation. The district court granted Plaintiffs declaratory and injunctive relief on some claims and entered judgment in favor of the DOC on the remaining claims. The First Circuit (1) reversed the declaratory judgment in favor of Healey on his contempt claim as well as injunctive relief compelling the Commonwealth’s compliance with the Plan’s provisions; and (2) affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of Defendants in all respects with the exception of the judgment for Plaintiffs regarding the constitutionality of the pharmacological evaluation and treatment provided by Defendants, as that portion of the judgment was not challenged on appeal.View "Healey v. Dennehy" on Justia Law

The Ho-Chunk Nation, a federally recognized Indian Tribe, operates casinos in Wisconsin and nets more than $200 million annually from its gambling operations. Cash Systems, one of three businesses involved in this case, engaged in issuing cash to casino customers via automated teller machines and kiosks, check-cashing, and credit- and debit-card advances. Whiteagle, a member of the Nation, held himself out as an insider and offered vendors an entrée into the tribe’s governance and gaming operations. Cash Systems engaged Whiteagle in 2002 as a confidential consultant. Cash Systems served as the Nation’s cash-access services vendor for the next six years, earning more than seven million dollars, while it paid Whiteagle just under two million dollars. Whiteagles’s “in” was his relationship with Pettibone, who had been serving in the Ho-Chunk legislature since 1995. Ultimately, Whiteagle, Pettibone, and another were charged with conspiracy (18 U.S.C. 371) to commit bribery in connection with the contracts with the Ho-Chunk Nation and substantive bribery (18 U.S.C. 666). Whiteagle was also charged with tax evasion and witness tampering. Pettibone pleaded guilty to corruptly accepting a car with the intent to be influenced in connection with a contract. Whiteagle admitted that he had solicited money and other things of value for Pettibone from three companies, but denied actually paying bribes to Pettibone and insisted that he and Pettibone had advocated for Whiteagle’s clients based on what they believed to be the genuine merits of those clients. Convicted on all counts, Whiteagle was sentenced, below-guidelines, to 120 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence on the bribery charges, the loss calculation, and admission of certain evidence.View "United States v. Whiteagle" on Justia Law

Rick Wheeler had two liability insurance policies with American Family Mutual Insurance Company. Both Rick and his son Ryan were insureds under the policies. Both policies provided personal liability coverage and included exclusions for abuse and intentional injury. Both policies also contained a severability clause, which required that the insurance be applied separately to each insured. Joshua and Maren McCrary sued Rick and Ryan for Ryan’s alleged sexual assault of the McCrarys’ minor daughter. American Family filed a complaint for declaratory judgment seeking a judgment that its policies did not provide liability coverage to Rick. The district court granted summary judgment to American Family. At issue on appeal was whether the severability clause changed the effect of, or rendered ambiguous, the exclusions that would otherwise bar coverage for Rick. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the severability clause did not affect the unambiguous language of the policies’ exclusions, which barred coverage for Rick. View "Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wheeler" on Justia Law

Clark, the owner and president of an East St. Louis Illinois company, was charged with making false statements in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1001(a)(3). Clark’s company had entered into a hauling services subcontract with Gateway, general contractor on a federally funded highway project in St. Louis, Missouri. Employers must pay laborers working on certain federally-funded projects the “prevailing wage,” calculated by the Secretary of Labor based on wages earned by corresponding classes of workers employed on projects of similar character in a given area, and maintain payroll records demonstrating prevailing wage compliance, 40 U.S.C. 3142(b) The indictment charged that Clark submitted false payroll records and a false affidavit to Gateway, representing that his employees were paid $35 per hour, when they actually received $13-$14 per hour. The district court dismissed for improper venue, finding that when a false document is filed under a statute that makes the filing a condition precedent to federal jurisdiction, venue is proper only in the district where the document was filed for final agency action. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Although the effects of the alleged wrongdoing may be felt more strongly in Missouri than in Illinois, the Southern District of Illinois is a proper venue. View "United States v. Clark" on Justia Law

Plaintiff entered into a plea agreement under which he pled nolo contendere to one count of lewd and lascivious acts upon a child. Plaintiff filed a plea form stating that Plaintiff must register as a sex offender under Cal. Penal Code 290. Plaintiff registered as required by section 290. The Legislature later amended the law and provided a means by which the public can obtain personal information of the State's registered sex offenders. The legislature made the public notification provisions retroactive and thus applicable to Plaintiff's conviction. Plaintiff filed a civil complaint, contending that requiring him to comply with the amended law's public notification provisions would violate his plea agreement. The district court concluded that publicly disclosing any of Plaintiff's previously confidential sex offender registration information would violate the terms of Plaintiff's plea agreement. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals asked a question of the California Supreme Court, which responded by answering that under California law of contract interpretation as applicable to the interpretation of plea agreements, the fact that parties enter into a plea agreement does not have the effect of insulating them from changes in the law that the legislature intended to apply to them. View "Doe v. Harris" on Justia Law

In 2008, Donte Newsome, a university student, was the innocent victim of murder. In 2009, Newsome's mother, Angela Smith, submitted an application to the court of claims seeking reimbursement from the West Virginia Crime Victims Compensation Fund for medical expenses, funeral and burial costs, and student loans owed by Newsome at the time of his death. Smith was granted an award for medical expenses and funeral and burial costs but was denied compensation for the student loans. After a hearing, the court of claims denied Smith's request for reimbursement of her son's unpaid student loans pursuant to the West Virginia Crime Victims Compensation Act, concluding that student loans are contractual obligations that cannot be reimbursed under the Act. The Supreme Court denied Smith's petition for writ of certiorari, holding that Newsome's student loans were not subject to reimbursement under the Act because they were not loans that Newsome was unable to receive or use, in whole or in part, prior to his death. View "State ex rel. Smith v. W. Va. Crime Victims Comp. Fund" on Justia Law

In 2005, Curtis McGhee and another individual brought claims against the City alleging violations of civil rights sounding in malicious prosecution. The City sought coverage under insurance policies issued by CIC and Columbia. On appeal, the City and McGhee challenged the district court's order granting summary judgment to CIC and Columbia, on CIC's and Columbia's declaratory judgment claims concerning coverage under the various insurance policies. The court concluded that the district court correctly refused to consider and correctly denied additional discovery of extrinsic evidence. The court also concluded that the alleged malicious prosecution and resulting personal injuries occurred when the underlying charges were filed against McGhee in 1977. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment that the following policies did not afford coverage to the City for the malicious prosecution claims: the two excess liability policies issued by CIC; four of the special excess liability policies issued by Columbia; and the commercial umbrella liability policy issued by Columbia. As to the 1977-78 special excess liability policy issued by Columbia, the court reversed the district court's judgment regarding the applicability of the reasonable expectations doctrine. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Chicago Ins. Co., et al v. City of Council Bluffs, et al" on Justia Law

Susie Stohm, the one-time CFO of ClearOne Communications, was charged with eight federal criminal counts relating to an investigation into certain accounting practices at ClearOne. Strohm was eventually acquitted of all but one count. Strohm and her counsel (Counsel) filed this action against ClearOne, alleging that ClearOne was required to indemnify Strohm for her criminal defense costs. The district court (1) ordered ClearOne to indemnify Strohm for her defense costs subject to certain restrictions, and (2) found that a contract between the parties entitled Counsel to charge ClearOne eighteen percent interests on the amounts that were billed to ClearOne but not timely paid and to collect the costs it expended in enforcing ClearOne's contractual obligation to indemnify Strohm. A unanimous court affirmed the district court affirmed the district court's indemnification decisions in large part, its rulings relating to contract termination rights, its reasonableness determination for fees in the criminal case, and its decision to enforce the eighteen percent interest rate. A majority of the court, however, reversed the district court's decision to allow Counsel to recoup its fees in the collection matter. Remanded. View "Strohm v. ClearOne Commc'ns, Inc." on Justia Law

In this appeal, the issue before the court concerned whether monetary damages are available to a prisoner for violations of the terms of a judicial decree approving the "Cleary Final Settlement Agreement." In 2004 appellee Corrections Corporation of America contracted with the State to house Alaska inmates at Corrections Corporation's Red Rock Correctional Center in Arizona. Byran Perotti was an Alaska inmate at Red Rock. He filed a complaint against Corrections Corporation alleging that Corrections Corporation violated provisions of its contract with the State, as well as various State Department of Corrections policies. He asserted standing as a third-party beneficiary to the contract between the State and Corrections Corporation. He based his argument on his status as a Cleary class member and the provisions of the Cleary Final Settlement Agreement, which settled the class action involving various inmate claims against the State of Alaska, Department of Corrections (DOC). Perotti's complaint sought liquidated damages under the DOC-Corrections Corporation contract, as well as compensatory damages, nominal damages, and punitive damages. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Cleary Final Settlement Agreement did not contemplate the award of monetary damages to enforce its provisions. Therefore the Court affirmed the superior court's decision granting Corrections Corporation's motion for summary judgment and dismissed all of Perotti's claims. View "Perotti v. Corrections Corporation of America" on Justia Law

Watkins, an African-American, worked for the school district, overseeing security systems. Fultz supervised Watkins and, relying on Watkins’s advice, Fultz awarded Vision a $182,000 annual contract for service of security cameras. Vision’s president, Newsome, testified that Watkins called her and talked about a “finder’s fee.. Newsome went to Cleveland for a customer visit. She e-mailed Watkins and he replied: “Absolutely$.” Newsome believed that Watkins expected her to pay him at their meeting. Newsome notified Fultz. At the meeting, Watkins requested “an envelope.” After Fultz contacted police, the FBI recorded meetings at which Newsome gave Watkins $5,000 and $2,000. A white jury convicted on two counts of attempted extortion “under color of official right” (Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951), and one count of bribery in a federally funded program, 18 U.S.C. 666(a)(1)(B). The court determined a total offense level of 22, applying a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice, another two-level enhancement for bribes exceeding $5,000, and a four-level enhancement for high level of authority, plus an upward variance of 21 months under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), and sentenced Watkins to six years’ incarceration. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to jury instructions, sufficiency of the evidence, the jury’s racial composition, and the reasonableness of the sentence.View "United States v. Watkins" on Justia Law