Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Defendants appealed from a district court's order confirming an arbitration award where plaintiffs, six business entities, claimed to have been defrauded by defendants. At issue was whether the arbitration panel had exceeded its jurisdiction by rendering an award against defendants because they had never consented to arbitration. The court reversed the district court's order because under ordinary principles of contract and agency law, defendants, as the CEO and CFO of the defendant corporations, were not personally bound by the arbitration agreements their corporations entered into. Therefore, the court held that the arbitration panel lacked jurisdiction to render an award against defendants.

Appellant, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in St. Louis, Missouri, sued appellee, a Spanish corporation with its principal place of business in Barcelona, Spain, for breach of contract and misappropriation of trade secrets in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. At issue was whether the district court properly granted appellee's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, declined to reach the forum-non-conveniens argument, and denied the motion for failure to state a claim. The court held that the proper application of the five-factor test set forth in Johnson v. Arden supported hearing the present case in Missouri. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's decision to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction and remanded for further proceedings. As a preliminary matter, the court held that it would address the forum-non-conveniens argument because no additional facts were needed to resolve the issue. The court held, however, that because the plaintiff's choice of forum was entitled to significant deference and because the public-interest factors favor deciding the case in Missouri, the court did not find that the present case presented the exceptional circumstances necessary to invoke the doctrine of forum-non-conveniens. Therefore, the court denied appellee's motion to dismiss based on this ground. The court further held that in denying appellee's motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the district court did so without analysis and without prejudice. Therefore, the issue should be left for the district court to consider on remand.

This case involved two related oil and gas mineral lease disputes that were jointly tried. At issue was whether limitations barred the Marshalls' (respondents and lessors) fraud claim against BP America Production Co., et al. (the lessee and operator), and whether Vaquillas Ranch Co., Ltd., et al. (lessors) lost title by adverse possession after Wagner Oil Co. (successors-in-interest) succeeded to BP's interests, took over the operations, and produced and paid Vaquillas royalties for nearly twenty years. The court held that because the Marshalls' injury was not inherently undiscoverable and BP's fraudulent representations about its good faith efforts to develop the well could have been discovered with reasonable diligence before limitations expired, neither the discovery rule nor fraudulent concealment extended limitations. Accordingly, the Marshalls' fraud claims against BP were time-barred. The court further held that by paying a clearly labeled royalty to Vaquillas, Wagner sufficiently asserted its intent to oust Vaquillas to acquire the lease by adverse possession.

Viasystems, Inc., a Missouri-based corporation, filed suit against EBM-Papst St. Georgen GmbH & Co., KG (St. Georgen), a German corporation, alleging several claims in contract and tort. At issue was whether the district court properly concluded that it had neither specific nor general personal jurisdiction over St. Georgen and granted its motion to dismiss. The court held that Viasystems failed to establish a prima facie case that specific and general jurisdiction could be asserted over St. Georgen. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Viasystems' motion for jurisdictional discovery. Therefore, because St. Georgen did not have sufficient "minimum contacts" with Missouri, the maintenance of the suit would offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Accordingly, the court affirmed the dismissal of the case.

This appeal arose out of a contest for control of Trans-Resources, Inc., a Delaware corporation, where plaintiffs brought a Court of Chancery action under 8 Del. C. 225 against defendant to determine which stockholder group possessed the majority voting interest entitled to elect the Trans-Resources board of directors. The court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Chancery in so far as it embodied and implemented the rulings in the Merits and Spoliation Opinions; and reversed to the extent it adjudicated the beneficial ownership of the Orly Trust Shares and the Genger Shares based on the determinations made in its August 9, 2010 Side Letter Opinion and August 18, 2010 Final Judgment Order.

The SEC brought a civil action against defendant alleging that, as an outside director of Engineered Support Systems, Inc. (ESSI), he violated numerous federal securities laws by participating in the grant of backdated, "in-the-money" stock options to ESSI officials including his father. At issue was the district court's grant of defendant's Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 50(a)(1) motion for judgment as a matter of law. The court agreed with the district court's conclusion that the SEC had failed to prove the requisite elements of scienter and negligence. The court also held that there was no clear abuse of discretion in excluding any reference to the Incentive Stock Option Agreement between defendant's father and ESSI. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

This case stemmed from a contractual arrangement known as a "cash-settled total return equity swap agreement" between the parties. The parties appealed the judgment of the district court finding defendants in violation of section 13(d) of the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. 78m(d), and permanently enjoining them from future violations. The court considered only whether a section 13(d) violation occurred with respect to CSX shares owned outright by defendants acting as a group. Because the district court did not make findings sufficient to permit appellate review of a group violation of section 13(d) with respect to outright ownership of CSX shares, the court remanded for further consideration. An earlier order affirmed the denial of an injunction against the voting of shares acquired by defendants while they were not in compliance with section 13(d). The court explained that ruling on the ground that injunctive "sterilization" of shares was not available when shareholders had adequate time to consider the belated Williams Act disclosures before the relevant shareholder's vote. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded in part.

This action arose from a technology-sharing relationship between plaintiffs and defendant where plaintiffs brought suit against defendant in January 2009 for, among other things, breach of contract based on defendant's alleged failure to perform its end of a bargain the parties had struck. Both parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. Having considered the parties' extensive submissions and their presentations at the argument held on March 1, 2011, the court decided to deny both motions because numerous issues of material fact remained in dispute. Nonetheless, the court made several summary judgment findings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) regarding certain discrete issues where the facts were without substantial controversy.

Plaintiff appealed from a judgment granting defendant's motion to dismiss as untimely plaintiff's complaint, which alleged breach of fiduciary duty, intentional misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and conspiracy to commit those three offenses. At issue was whether the district court properly ruled that tolling of the untimely claims, on the basis of defendant's continuing concealment, was unwarranted. The court affirmed and held that the lawsuit, commenced on April 2004, arose from an injury suffered no later than June 2000 and therefore, was barred by the applicable statute of repose, Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-577. The court also held that plaintiff could not seek the safe harbor of equitable estoppel due to its failure to recognize that it was required to pursue its action. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district.

Plaintiffs, former shareholders and the representative and attorney-in-fact for all shareholders of Kinexus Corporation (Kinexus), commenced this action asserting claims against Advent Software, Inc. (Advent) for breach of contract and unjust enrichment arising out of a December 31, 2001 agreement entered into by Advent to acquire Kinexus. Advent subsequently moved to dismiss the action because of Kinexus' failure to prosecute and Advent argued that dismissal with prejudice was appropriate under Court of Chancery Rules 41(b) and 41(e). The court held that Advent's motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute was denied where the court was not convinced that these circumstances necessitated dismissal because of the court's preference for resolving cases on the merits and because Kinexus appeared to have renewed their efforts to diligently prosecute the matter. Accordingly, counsel were requested to confer and to promptly submit a case scheduling order so that discovery could be completed and a trial date could be established.