Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Monarch Casino & Resort, Inc. appealed a district court’s grant of Affiliated FM Insurance Company’s (“AFM”) motion for partial judgment on the pleadings, which denied Monarch coverage under AFM’s all-risk policy provision, business-interruption provision, and eight other additional-coverage provisions. Monarch also moved the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals to certify a question of state law or issue a stay. Monarch presented AFM with claims incurred through business interruption losses from COVID-19 and government orders directing Monarch to close its casinos. AFM denied certain coverage on the ground that COVID-19 did not cause physical loss of or damage to property. Monarch sued for breach of contract, bad faith breach of insurance contract, and violations of state law. The Tenth Circuit denied Monarch’s motions to certify a question of state law and issue a stay. And it affirmed the district court’s judgment: (1) AFM’s policy had a Contamination Exclusion provision that excludes all-risk coverage and business-interruption coverage from the COVID-19 virus; and (2) Monarch could not obtain coverage for physical loss or damage caused by COVID-19 under AFM’s all-risk provision, business-interruption provision, or eight additional-coverage provisions because the virus could not cause physical loss or damage and no other policy provisions distinguished this case. Accordingly, Monarch could not obtain the coverage that the district court denied. View "Monarch Casino & Resort v. Affiliated FM Insurance Company" on Justia Law

In this case surrounding the acquisition of Twitter Inc., the Court of Chancery denied Plaintiff's motion for mootness fees, holding that Plaintiff's claim was without merit.Defendants Elon R. Musk, X Holdings I, Inc., and X Holdings II, Inc. agreed to acquire Twitter Inc. pursuant to an agreement and plan of merger (merger agreement). After Defendants' counsel sent a letter to Twitter claiming to terminate the merger agreement Twitter filed a complaint seeking specific enforcement. Thereafter, the deal closed on the original terms of the merger agreement. Plaintiff, who held 5,500 shares of Twitter common stock, brought suit seeking specific performance and damages, claiming that Elon Musk breached his fiduciary duties as a controller of Twitter and that Defendants breached the merger agreement. This Court issued a memorandum opinion dismissing most of Plaintiff's complaint, leaving open the possibility that the damages provision in the merger agreement conveyed third-party beneficiary status to stockholders claiming damages for breach of the agreement. Months later, Plaintiff claimed partial credit for the consummation of the deal and petitioned for mootness fees in the amount of $3 million. The Court of Chancery denied Plaintiff's motion for mootness fees, holding that Plaintiff's claim was not meritorious when filed. View "Crispo v. Musk" on Justia Law

Explosives manufacturer Dyno Nobel tendered an action to its commercial general liability insurance policyholder, Steadfast Insurance Company (“Steadfast”), after being sued in Missouri for damages caused by the release of a nitric oxide plume from one of its Missouri plants. Steadfast denied the claim based on the insurance policy’s clauses precluding indemnification and defense of pollution-related bodily injury actions. Dyno Nobel thereafter filed an action in Utah state court seeking a declaratory judgment that Steadfast had a duty to indemnify and defend against this action under an endorsement titled “Vermont Changes – Pollution” (“Vermont Endorsement”). Contrary to Coverages A, B, and C in the insurance policy, the Vermont Endorsement would have required Steadfast to defend and indemnify against pollution-related bodily injury claims up to an aggregate amount of $3 million. Steadfast removed the action to federal court, and the federal district court entered judgment for Steadfast, concluding the Vermont Endorsement applied only to claims with a nexus to Vermont. Dyno Nobel appealed. After its review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed, finding the plain language of the insurance contract did not cover Dyno Nobel’s claim in the underlying action. View "Dyno Nobel v. Steadfast Insurance Company" on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court concluding that the City of Malden had violated the Massachusetts Wage Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, 148 (the Wage Act) and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 44, 53C (the Municipal Finance Law), holding that there was no violation of the Wage Act or Municipal Finance Law in this case.Plaintiffs, City of Malden police officers, sued the City, arguing that a term in the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) that set the hourly rate for police detail work aligned with how they were historically paid and that a ten percent deduction for an administrative fee resulted in a reduction in their wages as set forth in the CBA, in violation of the Wage Act. The district court ruled that the contract term was ambiguous and, after hearing witness testimony, ruled that the City violated the Municipal Finance Law and the Wage Act. The First Circuit reversed, holding (1) the contract term was unambiguous in favor of the City; (2) any reduction in the calculated rate still resulted in a higher payout than contemplated in the CBA, and therefore, there was no Wage Act violation; and (3) the district court clearly erred in finding that the City had violated the Municipal Finance Law. View "Owens v. City of Malden" on Justia Law

In 2008 Plaintiff Bill Grubb signed an employment agreement with Defendant DXP Enterprises to lead the development and production of horizontal pumps. The agreement recited that the parties intended to create a new company to produce the pumps, and Grubb would own 10%. If the project became a success, Grubb had the right under the employment agreement to require DXP to buy his ownership stake at a price based on the new company’s gross revenue. The project was successful; in March 2019, Grubb gave notice to DXP that he wanted to sell his ownership stake in accordance with the agreement. But DXP informed Grubb it had never formed the new company, so there was nothing for it to purchase under the agreement. Grubb brought this action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma against DXP, asserting claims for breach of contract, actual and constructive fraud, conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, and unjust enrichment; and sought a declaratory judgment. After the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of DXP on all claims. Grubb appealed. After review, the Tenth Circuit found sufficient evidence of bad faith by DXP (in failing to form the new company) to support Grubb’s breach-of-contract claim but otherwise found no error in the rulings by the district court. Accordingly, the Court reversed in part the judgment below and remanded for further proceedings. View "Grubb v. DXP Enterprises" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court ruling that an Employer's refusal to collect dues from Union members' paychecks was a breach of certain collective bargaining rights and awarding money damages to Union, holding that there was no error.Union brought suit against Employer alleging that Employer breached its contracts by failing to deduct dues. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Union as to Employer's liability for breach of contract for refusing to deduct dues. After a bench trial on the issue of damages the court awarded $1,046,835 to Union. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Employer breached the contracts' written terms by failing to collect dues; and (2) the money damages remedy was appropriate and without legal error. View "UE Local 893/IUP v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant resides in Arcadia, California, and holds a Chinese resident identification card. In 2019, Defendant made several trips to Macau, which is an autonomous region on the south coast of China. Gambling is legal in Macau. While in Macau, Defendant entered into seven loan agreements with Tak Chun Gaming Promotion Company Limited (Tak Chun). Tak Chun sued Long in a California state court seeking HK$74,331,320 (that is, US$9,904,787) under causes of action for (1) breach of contract, (2) quantum meruit, and (3) common counts. Following the entry of judgment for Defendant, Tak Chun appealed.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court concluded that the common law rule barring resort to the California courts to collect gambling debts rests on a rationale with continued vitality—namely, a policy of discouraging the creation of those debts and the financially ruinous consequences that often flow from them, regardless of whether those debts were lawfully incurred. The court explained that where, as in this case, the lender knows that the money will be used for gambling (as Tak Chun knew because it tendered Defendant casino tokens), the common law rule applies. Lastly, California courts will entertain a lawsuit seeking an accounting following a transaction to sell a casino, but such a lawsuit does not directly involve any gamblers and hence does not hasten any gambler’s financial ruin; while such a lawsuit involves the gambling industry in general, it does not implicate the rationale underlying the common law rule. View "Tak Chun Gaming Promotion Company Limited v. Long" on Justia Law

John Doe (“Appellant”) filed this civil action alleging claims for defamation, abuse of process, tortious interference with contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and civil conspiracy against Jane Doe (“Appellee”) after Appellee accused Appellant of sexual assault. When Appellant filed his complaint, he also filed an ex parte motion to proceed using the pseudonym “John Doe” rather than his real name. The district court denied the motion.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that in considering the district court’s entire analysis of the James factors, it concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion because it did not rely on incorrect factual or legal premises, nor did it give any indication that it was acting by general rule. Instead, the district court conducted a thorough, case-specific analysis when it exercised its discretion. The court wrote that the district court considered each of Appellant’s arguments, and it carefully balanced Appellant’s stated interests against the public’s interest in the openness of judicial proceedings as required by Public Citizen. It did not abuse its discretion in doing so. View "John Doe v. Jane Doe" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from a partial final judgment of the district court dismissing his Connecticut state law claims for defamation and tortious interference with contract against Defendant, who accused Plaintiff of sexual assault in 2015 while the two were students at Yale University. Plaintiff argued that the district court erred in finding (1) Defendant to enjoy absolute quasi-judicial immunity for statements made at the 2018 Yale disciplinary hearing that resulted in Plaintiff’s expulsion from the university and (2) Plaintiff’s tortious interference claims based on Defendant’s original 2015 accusations to be untimely. On preliminary review, the Second Circuit was unable to determine whether Connecticut would recognize the Yale disciplinary hearing at issue as a quasi-judicial proceeding supporting absolute immunity in this case. Accordingly, the court certified questions pertinent to that determination to the Connecticut Supreme Court. That court responded that absolute immunity does not apply in this case because Yale’s disciplinary hearing was not a quasi-judicial proceeding in that it lacked procedural safeguards associated with judicial proceedings.   In response, The Second Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court explained that while the Connecticut Supreme Court recognized the possibility for participants in such a hearing to be shielded by qualified immunity, the Connecticut Supreme Court concluded that Defendant is not presently entitled to dismissal on that ground because Plaintiff’s complaint sufficiently pleads the malice necessary to defeat such immunity. With this guidance as to Connecticut law, the court concluded on this appeal that Plaintiff’s complaint should not have been dismissed against Defendant except as to his tortious interference claim based on 2015 statements, which is untimely. View "Khan v. Yale Univ." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court granting the IU Credit Union's (IUCU) motion to compel individual arbitration and finding an enforceable agreement to arbitrate between the parties, holding that Tonia Land's silence and inaction did not amount to acceptance of the agreement.When Land, who maintained at least two checking accounts with IUCU, registered for online banking for one of her accounts she received by email a an agreement (the disclosure) permitting ICU to modify the terms and conditions to its services and send any notice to Land via email. Under the disclosure, Land was deemed to have received any such notice three days after it was sent. IUCU later sent Land an addendum, which Land claimed never to have received. Land later filed a class action complaint alleging breach of contract and other claims based on the agreement's amendment. IUCU moved to compel individual arbitration, which the trial court granted. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) IUCU provided Land with reasonable written notice of its offer to amend the agreement; (2) Land's silence and inaction did not amount to an acceptance of IUCU's offer; and (3) therefore, there was no enforceable agreement to arbitrate. View "Land v. IU Credit Union" on Justia Law