Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

In 2002, Defendants decided to purchase, renovate, and resell a home located in Medford Lakes. According to their plan, Defendants Christopher Masso and John Torrence would finance the purchase; Defendant James Githens would perform the renovations; and Defendant real estate agent Jennifer Lynch would serve as the listing agent. Plaintiff Debra Lombardi viewed the home and made an offer. The sales contract, which was signed by Masso and Torrence, indicated that the house was being sold to Lombardi âas isâ and that any guarantees, unless set in writing, would be void. However, handwritten into the contract was a notation to âsee construction addendum attached.â That addendum reflected at least seventy repairs and renovations. At the closing, the house was nowhere near completion. Masso agreed to place money in escrow to ensure completion of the renovations. The escrow was to be held until which time the renovations would be completed. Against her realtorâs advice, Lombardi went ahead with the closing. Thereafter, the house remained unfinished and Plaintiff filed suit. The trial court granted summary judgment to the Defendants, finding that Lombardi accepted the property âas is,â Defendants did not breach the contract, Defendants could not be held liable under the Consumer Fraud Act, and they made no misrepresentations. Later the trial judge would write a letter to the parties, including the dismissed defendants, informing them that he was going to reconsider his order granting summary judgment and was scheduling a new hearing on the issue. The judge ultimately vacated the grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The Appellate Division granted defendantsâ motion for leave to appeal, remanded to the trial court for further findings of fact and conclusions of law, and ultimately reversed the trial court. The Supreme Court concluded after its review that the Appellate Division correctly determined that the trial courtâs original summary judgment order dismissing several of the defendants was issued in error, the trial judge was well within his discretion in revisiting and vacating the summary judgment order.

The heirs of a composer, who died in 2003, sued a music publisher and a performance rights society, with which the composer had contracted in 1995 with respect to four songs. The defendants failed to supply royalty reports as required by the contracts. The district court award the maximum statutory damages for the copyright infringements pursuant to 17 U.S.C. 504(c)(1). The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting many of the defendants' arguments as not properly raised and, therefore, waived.

These consolidated cases arose out of a 2007 labor dispute between the Painters Union and Nevada contractors over whether the Union's card check established its majority status under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA), thereby requiring the contractors to bargain with the Union pursuant to Section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 151 et seq. One set of cases arose from the Union's charges before the NLRB that the contractors failed to bargain in good faith during the following card check. The other case arose from the district court, where the Union sought an order to arbitrate whether the card check established the Union's majority status under the terms of the CBA. In the petitions for review from the NLRB's decision, the court enforced the NLRB's order, and denied the Union's and Flooring Solutions' petitions for review. In the appeal from the district court, the court held that the dispute over whether the Union established majority status pursuant to the CBA's card check provision was primarily contractual and subject to arbitration. Therefore, the court withdrew its prior decision and replaced it with this opinion reversing the district court's order denying arbitration. The court remanded for the district court to order all parties to arbitrate whether, under the CBA's card check provision, the Union established majority status.

Plaintiff appealed the district court's enforcement of the arbitration agreement in his employment contract with defendant. Plaintiff sued defendant on a single count of Jones Act negligence, pursuant to 46 U.S.C. 30104, claiming that defendant breached its duty to supply him with a safe place to work. The court held that, given the United Nations Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention) and governing Supreme Court and Circuit Court precedent, the court must enforce the arbitration clause in plaintiff's employment contract, at least at this initial arbitration-enforcement stage. Therefore, after review and oral argument, the court affirmed the district court's order compelling arbitration of plaintiff's Jones Act negligence claim.

In 2003, the company entered into contracts with the government for roof repairs of two government buildings. Due to delays the projects were not completed and accepted by the government until September and October 2005. At the time, Federal Acquisition Regulations required that a performance report be prepared for each construction contract for $550,000 or more, 48 C.F.R. § 36.201. The company received negative interim performance evaluations from the resident engineer for both projects in February, 2004. In March, 2006, the resident engineer issued proposed negative final performance evaluations for both projects. The company protested the proposed evaluations, asserting that subcontractors and other problems, beyond its control, caused the delays. In final performance evaluations, the engineer assigned an overall performance rating of unsatisfactory and assigned unsatisfactory ratings for each project in 15 individual categories. The contracting officer issued a final decision that the unsatisfactory performance appraisal was justified. The Claims Court rejected the company's suit. The Federal Circuit affirmed. A contractor is responsible for the unexcused performance failures of its subcontractors and the complaint did not allege facts that would excuse the delays.

After two decades of marriage, William and Teresa Underwood divorced. The district court entered a consent order requiring William to make monthly alimony payments to Teresa. Ten years later, William asked the trial court to terminate his alimony obligation because Teresa was cohabitating with another man. The trial court terminated the alimony payments. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the trial court lacked the authority to terminate or modify the alimony payments because a reciprocal consideration provision in the consent order demonstrated that the parties unambiguously intended the order to be unmodifiable. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court did not err because (1) N.C. Gen. Stat. 50-16.9(b) requires the termination of alimony payments to a dependent spouse who engages in cohabitation, and (2) the reciprocal consideration provision was unenforceable. Remanded.

While away for a competition in a school-supported event, students caused damage to a motel where they were lodging. The motel's property insurer paid to repair the damage then exercised its right of subrogation pursuant to its insurance contract with the motel to seek to recover compensation for those responsible for the loss. The insurer filed a complaint against the school district, alleging it was liable for breach of contract based on its failure to protect and safeguard the property from damage during the period of occupancy and to refrain from activities that would damage the property. The superior court granted the school district's motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the school district did not undertake to be responsible to pay damages in a subrogation action, the insurer's action against the school board was barred.

The company sought a preliminary injunction against a former employee to prohibit violation of his employment agreement by competition with the company, solicitation of its customers and remaining employees, and use of information gained while employed. The court granted a preliminary injunction as to the confidential information, but not as to competition or solicitation. The First Circuit affirmed, applying the law of Massachusetts. The contract limited the employee for only one year, which has passed. When the period of restraint has expired, even when the delay was substantially caused by the time consumed in legal appeals, specific relief is inappropriate and the injured party is left to his damages remedy.

This case was an interlocutory appeal. Riverbend Utilities alleged that the trial court erred by: (1) adding Arch Insurance Company as an involuntary counterplaintiff, and (2) ordering Riverbend to make four individuals available for deposition. In August 2006, sewage backed up into a home occupied by Hugh Brennan, Shanda Brennan, Meranda Brennan, Diana Marut, and Sarah Marut1 (âthe Brennansâ) in Saucier. During discovery, Riverbend learned that the Brennansâ home had suffered damage from Hurricane Katrina in August 2005. In August 2009, with leave of the trial court, Riverbend counterclaimed, alleging that the Brennans had submitted the same invoices to Riverbend that they previously had submitted to their homeownerâs insurance provider and that they had been paid by that insurer. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found that the trial court erred in ordering that Arch be made a party to the counterclaim. Furthermore, the Court held that the individuals noticed for depositions were not parties, Mississippi residents, or Riverbend employees, and concluded the trial court abused its discretion in ordering Riverbend to make them available for deposition. The Court reversed the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings.

After self-insured Employer filed for bankruptcy, it continued to take payroll deductions from Employees for medical coverage but stopped paying the provider hospital for the covered charges. The hospital then directly billed Employees for services that should have been paid by Employer. Employees filed suit to stop the hospital's attempts to collect payment, seeking relief under the theories of declaratory judgment, injunction, breach of contract, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and bad faith breach of contract. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the hospital on all of Employees' claims. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Employees had standing as third party beneficiaries to enforce the provisions of the hospital agreement and payer agreement; and (2) Employees were not obligated to pay for covered medical services under the agreements. Remanded.