Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, certified by the city as a minority-owned business eligible for favored treatment, sells a variety of products. The city is virtually its only customer. Early in 2005 the city began to suspect that plaintiff was a broker rather than a wholesaler, which would make it ineligible to bid for contracts as an MBE. Plaintiff had only six employees, though it claimed to have a warehouse. The city never completed its investigation, so plaintiff retains its certification. The city also believed that the company had shorted it on a shipment of aluminum sign blanks, and ultimately debarred it from dealing with the city. The company sued immediately and obtained a temporary restraining order; debarment was in effect for only eight days. The city abandoned its attempt to debar the company. The district court then ruled in favor of defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Claims by the principals in the company were frivolous, given that they continued to be employed by the company. The temporary diminution in business did not amount to destruction of the company nor did it constitute retaliation. Plaintiff did not prove breach of contract.

Sterling, a limited liability corporation engaged in the business of importing and selling Iraqi currency, hired Grossi, a company that specialized in web-based marketing strategies, in an effort to create an internet-based sales platform. After the parties' dispute over the modification of a compensation scheme by which Grossi was paid, Sterling filed suit against Grossi seeking a temporary restraining order, interlocutory and permanent injunctions, and damages. Grossi subsequently appealed the grant of interlocutory injunction in favor of Sterling, contending that the trial court erred by entering an interlocutory injunction that failed to preserve the status quo. The court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by entering the injunction in light of Grossi's threats to do harm to the website. The court also rejected Grossi's contention that the interlocutory order was, in reality, a mandatory, permanent injunction affecting the rights of the parties. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

In 2006, a jury awarded plaintiffs for breach of contract, and the trial court awarded plaintiffs costs and attorney and expert witness fees. Defendant appealed the judgment. At issue on appeal was whether Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278's reference to "the cost to obtain a letter of credit" extended to the interest expense incurred by an appellant to borrow funds to secure a letter of credit that was obtained to secure an appeal bond posted to stay enforcement of a money judgment during the pendency of the appeal. The court adopted a restrictive meaning of the reference and held that rule 8.278(d)(1)(F) did not authorize an award of costs for interest expenses and fees incurred to borrow funds to deposit as security for a letter of credit that was procured to secure an appeal bond. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

Lakeside appealed from the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Producers on Lakeside's state-law claim for fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and unjust enrichment involving payment for the feed and care of the hogs at issue. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Producers on Lakeside's fraudulent misrepresentation claim where Lakeside was unable to establish that Producers made any false representations; affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on the fraudulent nondisclosure claim where Producers was under no legal obligation to disclose information to Lakeside; held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Lakeside's expert testimony where such testimony was not needed to inform the district court on the legal issues; affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Producers on the issue of negligent misrepresentation where Producers was not in the business or profession of supplying information or guidance to Lakeside but rather the two conducted themselves at arm's length; and held that it was not unjust to allow Producers to retain the benefit of these particular happenings when a shortfall existed, as it was not inequitable to allow a contracting party the right to fulfillment of contractual obligations, which in this case included the payment of fees contemplated by the Hog Program.

Appellants, Robert A. Sears and Korley B. Sears, appealed from the June 8th, 2011 order of the bankruptcy court overruling their objections to claims that were filed by the Sears Family Members in the bankruptcy case of the debtor and disallowing Claim No. 26 of Korley. The court held that the bankruptcy court correctly disallowed Claim No. 26 where Korley's proof of claim provided no legal basis for liability by the debtor. The court also agreed with the bankruptcy court's determination that Robert and Korely failed to overcome the presumptive validity of the proofs of claim filed by the Sears Family Members. The court finally held that there was no need for the bankruptcy court to allow Robert and Korley more time to develop the record or a hearing with testimony and cross-examination of witnesses, before it ruled on the claim objections.

This case arose when Norma Sandoval and her sister, Nora Martinez, jointly filed suit against SCI alleging fraud, deceptive trade practices, and other tort claims arising from their respective interment rights and services contracts for family burial plots at Mont Meta Memorial Park. Martinez's contract allowed the court to appoint an arbitrator, while Sandoval's contract required the American Arbitration Association (AAA) to appoint the arbitrator if the parties could not reach a mutual agreement. The trial judge severed the cases and then appointed an arbitrator for Martinez's case. Over the objection of SCI, the trial court also appointed the same arbitrator to arbitrate Sandoval's case. At issue on appeal was whether SCI allowed a lapse or mechanical breakdown in the contractual process for selection of an arbitrator, thereby validating the trial court's intervention to appoint the arbitrator. The court held that the trial court abused its discretion by appointing an arbitrator instead of following the agreed-upon method of selection outlined in the contract. As a matter of law, the two-month delay in the selection of an arbitrator in this case, by itself, did not establish a lapse or failure of the parties to avail themselves of the contractual selection method. Accordingly, without hearing oral argument, the court conditionally granted SCI's petition for writ of mandamus and directed the trial court to vacate its prior order appointing David Calvillo as arbitrator.

This mandamus proceeding arose from an arbitration agreement governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 1 et seq. The parties entered into a contract for interment rights and services. The contract obligated the parties to arbitrate this dispute over the care and maintenance of the cemetery. The arbitration agreement provided that an arbitrator would either be selected by mutual agreement of the parties or appointed by the American Arbitration Association (AAA). The parties failed to agree to an arbitrator and the trial court appointed an arbitrator without allowing a reasonable opportunity to procure an appointment by AAA. The court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion and conditionally granted the petition for writ of mandamus.

This case concerned an arbitration provision that allowed each party to appoint one arbitrator to a panel, subject to certain requirements. At issue was whether Americo wavied its objection to the removal of the arbitrator it selected. The underlying dispute concerned the financing mechanism for Americo's purchase of several insurance companies from Robert Myer. Pursuant to the financing agreement, Americo and Myer submitted their dispute to arbitration under American Arbitration Association (AAA) rules. The arbitrators found in favor of Myer, and Americo filed a motion to vacate the award. The trial court granted the motion, holding that Americo was entitled to any arbitrator that met the requirements set forth in the financing agreement and that the arbitrator removed by the AAA met those requirements. The court of appeals reversed, holding that Americo had waived these arguments by not presenting them to the AAA. Because the record demonstrated otherwise, the court rejected the court of appeals' judgment and remanded the case to that court for further proceedings.

This matter arose out of a dispute over whether the City of Dallas paid its firefighters and police officers in accord with a 1979 ordinance adopted pursuant to a voter-approved referendum. Claiming the City had not properly paid them, some firefighters and police officers brought a class action asserting breach of contract claims and seeking a declaratory judgment. For the reasons set out in City of Dallas v. Albert, the court concluded that: (1) the ordinance's adoption by means of referendum did not result in the City's loss of immunity from suit; (2) the City had immunity from suit as to the declaratory judgment action; (3) by non-suiting its counterclaim the City did not reinstate immunity from suit as to the Officers' claims that were pending against the City when it non-suited the counterclaim; and (4) the case must be remanded for the trial court to consider whether the Legislature waived the City's immunity by amending the Local Government Code.

This case involved a property dispute between the parties over easements and right-of-ways on plaintiffs' property. Defendant contended that the tort claims against it were barred by the two-year statute of limitations and that the declaratory judgment against it was unwarranted. The court held that plaintiffs' common-law tort claims were barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations and the estoppel effect of the alleged fraudulent concealment ended in December 2002. Because plaintiffs did not file suit until more than two years after this date, their claims were time-barred. The court agreed that claims for declaratory judgment were moot because defendant had removed its cable lines from plaintiffs' properties prior to trial. Accordingly, the court granted defendant's petition for review and reversed the court of appeals' judgment.