Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Respondents brought this action on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated against Philip Morris, alleging that Philip Morris's marketing of its cigarettes violated Minnesota's consumer protection statutes. Respondents asserted claims under Minn. Stat. 8.31(3a) and for common law fraud and unjust enrichment. The district court granted Respondents' motion to certify the class. Subsequently, the court granted summary judgment to Philip Morris on the consumer protection claims asserted under section 8.31(3a) and then dismissed the case. The court of appeals affirmed the class certification but reversed the grant of summary judgment and reinstated Respondents' section 8.31(3a) consumer protection claims. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Respondents' consumer protection claims asserted under section 8.31(3a) were previously released; and (2) because all of Respondents' claims had been dismissed, the issue of whether the plaintiff class was properly certified was moot.

In these consolidated cases, the primary issue was whether there was liability insurance coverage for Plaintiffs' injuries resulting from an altercation on the premises of Insured's bar and restaurant. Insurer denied coverage and declined to defend Insured based on its determination that there was no coverage under the terms of the policy. The trial court entered an order finding that the altercation was covered under both the commercial general liability and liquor liability provisions of the policy. The court of appeals ruled that the liquor liability coverage agreement provided coverage for the judgments but that the commercial general liability agreement provided no coverage. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) based on the clear terms of the policy agreement, there was no liability coverage because the incident arose from an assault and battery, which was an excluded cause, and because there was no nonexcluded concurrent cause to provide coverage; and (2) estoppel by judgment did not apply to collaterally estop Insurer from arguing the lack of coverage.

In these consolidated cases, the primary issue was whether there was liability insurance coverage for Plaintiffs' injuries resulting from an altercation on the premises of Insured's bar and restaurant. Insurer denied coverage and declined to defend Insured based on its determination that there was no coverage under the terms of the policy. The trial court entered an order finding that the altercation was covered under both the commercial general liability and liquor liability provisions of the policy. The court of appeals ruled that the liquor liability coverage agreement provided coverage for the judgments but that the commercial general liability agreement provided no coverage. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) based on the clear terms of the policy agreement, there was no liability coverage because the incident arose from an assault and battery, which was an excluded cause, and because there was no nonexcluded concurrent cause to provide coverage; and (2) estoppel by judgment did not apply to collaterally estop Insurer from arguing the lack of coverage.

Appellants appealed from the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of American Standard. The district court concluded that appellants were not entitled to recover underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage benefits under four American Standard policies because the tortfeasor's vehicle was not an "underinsured motor vehicle" under the policies' plain language. The court held that the district court correctly concluded that appellants were not entitled to recover under the UIM policies because stacking them did not result in an amount exceeding the tortfeasor's liability. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Entities affiliated with ASB sued to reform the capital-event waterfall provisions in a series of agreements governing real estate joint ventures managed by affiliates of The Scion Group. The erroneously drafter provisions called for Scion to receive incentive compensation know as a "promote" even if the joint ventures lost money. Scion sought to enforce the agreements as written, and its affiliates advanced counterclaims for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and breach of contract. The court found that plaintiffs have proven their entitlement to reformation by clear and convincing evidence and entered a judgment in their favor of defendants' counterclaims.

The United States Court of appeals asked the court to answer a question that stemmed from a dispute over the proper interpretation under Georgia law of a contract insuring real property. The primary issue presented was whether the court's ruling in State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Mabry, a case involving an automobile insurance policy wherein the court held that a provision requiring the insurer to pay for loss to the insured's car required the insurer to also pay for any diminution in value of the repaired vehicle, was applicable. The court held that its ruling in Mabry was not limited by the type of property insured, but rather spoke generally to the measure of damages an insurer was obligated to pay.

This case concerned a summary judgment granted by the district court in favor of the Plaintiff-Appellee RAHI Real Estate Holdings, LLC, against the Defendants-Appellants Vincent and Leslie Adams. The original plaintiff, Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings, LLC, filed a petition to foreclose in 2009, claiming Appellants defaulted on their note. Residential attached a copy of the subject note and mortgage to the petition. The note has a special indorsement from Gateway which states "Pay to The Order Of: Option One Mortgage Without Recourse." Also attached to the note was a blank indorsement by Option One Mortgage Corporation. The district court granted a motion to substitute RAHI as plaintiff in place of Residential in this foreclosure action and ordered that the caption be modified to reflect RAHI as plaintiff. One day after the order granting substitution, Residential as plaintiff filed its first amended petition. Defendants filed their answer admitting that a note and mortgage were executed but denied that the note and mortgage attached to the petition are the ones they signed. Further, they denied default and demanded strict proof. Appellants also attacked plaintiff's standing and the subject matter jurisdiction of the court. Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment alleging there is no controversy as to any material facts and attached an affidavit. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that there was no transcript of a June 29, 2010 hearing in the record, so the Court could not determine what evidence was presented, including any concerning whether or not the substitution of parties gave Option One Mortgage and Option One Mortgage Corporation the right to enforce the note. It did appear from the filed record that there was at least one issue of material fact and summary judgment was inappropriate. Accordingly, the Court reversed the grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Circle Y filed a complaint alleging, among other things, breach of contract when the school district terminated a construction management services contract with Circle Y. The trial court denied the school district's motion to dismiss and the court of appeals affirmed. The court held that, in light of the determination by the court of appeals that the trial court correctly denied the motion to dismiss because Circle Y's complaint alleged facts that, when taken as true, established that the contract was not void as a matter of law due to voter approval of the educational local option sales tax, it was not necessary for the court of appeals to construe OCGA 20-2-506(h) in order to resolve the appeal. Accordingly, the court remanded to the court of appeals with direction that it vacate that portion of the Division order that addressed OCGA 20-2-506.

Appellee, as executrix of the estate of her father, and her sister, brought a breach of contract action in which they asserted that their father's second wife, appellant, contractually waived her right to retain the proceeds of their deceased father's employer-provided 401K plan and life insurance policy by entering a settlement agreement incorporated into an order of separate maintenance executed approximately a year prior to the father's death. At issue was whether the court of appeals erred in finding that decedent's children could maintain a state law action against the decedent's surviving spouse to recover proceeds distributed to the spouse as the beneficiary of the decedent's ERISA-governed benefits plans, 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., where the state law claims were based on a contention that the spouse waived her rights to such proceeds. The court answered in the negative, concluding that, in this case, since the proceeds of the ERISA-covered plans were paid out to appellant and were no longer in the control of the plan administrator, the trial court erred when it dismissed appellees' breach of contract claim against appellant.

Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of her complaint against Safety, which alleged that Safety improperly denied coverage under her homeowner's insurance policy for damage to her house. The court concluded that plaintiff satisfied her initial burden of proving that her claimed loss fell within the coverage of her homeowner's insurance policy. Safety then satisfied its burden of showing that the exclusion for damage caused directly or indirectly by surface water was applicable to plaintiff's claim. In light of the anticoncurrent cause provision in the exclusions section of plaintiff's policy, where the excluded peril was a direct or indirect cause of the damage to plaintiff's home, Safety was not obligated to provide insurance coverage "regardless of any other cause or event contributing concurrently or in any sequence to the loss." Accordingly, the court affirmed the grant of Safety's motion for summary judgment.